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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Essays on Economic Growth
by
Minhyeon Jeong
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
Washington University in St. Louis, 2018
Professor Costas Azariadis, Chair
My dissertation investigates how economic growth is determined in the long run. To
do this, I mainly focus on culture and institutions as fundamental growth factors and
develop a general theoretical framework in which culture, institutions and growth are
endogenously determined. Using the framework, I highlight the crucial role of the
interaction between culture and institutions in the long-term growth.
Chapter 1. Endogenous Financial Friction and Growth
The first chapter investigates the role financial frictions play in economic growth.
Most existing studies consider an exogenous form of borrowing constraint, the tight-
ness of which is arbitrarily fixed at a certain value over time. As a result, a sufficiently
tight constraint has, if any, a permanent growth effect. The main concern of the chap-
ter is that tightness can vary by economic circumstance, and hence, it will change in
different stages of economic development. If borrowers’ profits increase along with
economic growth, the tightness will be relaxed, leading to an endogenous relaxation
of financial frictions. I develop a theory that has this property as a novel feature; I
then provide empirical evidence by applying OLS and dynamic panel GMM regres-
sions to support the endogenous relaxation hypothesis. The endogenous relaxation
implies that the growth effects of financial frictions are, at best, temporary; therefore
viii
financial factors may not be fundamental determinants that underlie the long-term
economic growth.
Chapter 2. Culture, Institutions and Growth
The second chapter deals with culture and institutions as fundamental engines of
growth. To this end, I develop a theoretical framework in which culture (individualism
vs. collectivism), institutions (protection of property rights over innovations), and
growth are endogenously and jointly determined. I first summarize and corroborate
empirical facts about culture, institutions, and growth to make the model consistent
with the empirical findings. The primary mechanism that drives the main conclusions
of the chapter is that culture and institutions are strategic complements. I show
that there are two steady states with opposing properties. One is a good steady
state characterized by strong individualism and secure protection of property rights
with high long-run growth. The other one is associated with strong collectivism and
poor protection of property rights. The strategic interaction between culture and
institutions leads to not only multiple static equilibria (multiple steady states) but
also to multiple dynamic equilibria with contrasting properties. The second chapter
demonstrates the significance of institutions for the economic prosperity of society,
especially over the long run. This conclusion provides motivation for investigating
other roles of institutions, which is the focus of the last chapter.
Chapter3. Rent-Seeking, Institutions and Morality
While the second chapter deals with public predation by the government, the third
chapter pays attention to rent-seeking as private predation, which has long been
an impediment to economic growth. It starts with this question: If rent-seeking is
indeed bad for an economy, why does it still prevail in many countries? That is,
why did those countries not eliminate rent-seeking activities long ago? This question
leads to a consideration of the factors underlying rent-seeking behavior. In this
ix
context, I develop a model where rent-seeking activities result in long-lasting poverty
through culture (morality of society) and institutions (effectiveness of enforcement of
laws), both of which are endogenously determined. I show that society with healthier
morality tends to establish more effective enforcement of laws that diminishes rent-
seeking, achieving higher income and faster growth.
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Chapter 1
Endogenous Financial Friction and
Growth
1.1 Introduction
Financial friction is one of central topics in economics. Accordingly, many researchers
have examined the role financial frictions play, especially, on resource misallocations
caused by imperfect risk sharing and forgone profit opportunities. Not surprisingly,
a large volume of literature has addressed various growth effects of financial frictions.
However, most of the previous studies have adopted an ad-hoc borrowing con-
straint without any theoretical and/or empirical justification as follows:
bt ≤ λat
where a is asset, b is debt, and λ is the reciprocal of the tightness of the borrowing
constraint, which is arbitrarily given.1
This exogenous financial friction ensures analytical simplicity. Therefore, the
previous studies have revealed valuable insights on impacts of financial frictions at
1 For instance, Jappelli and Pagano (1994), de Gregorio (1996), Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-
Foulkes (2005), among others.
1
various angles. However, the exogenous borrowing constraint does not capture some
important implications arising from financial frictions in reality. For instance, the
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio for a borrowing-constrained individual is exogenously given
and arbitrarily fixed at λ. This implies that the LTV ratio is irrelevant to any
economic situations including the stage of development, which seems implausible.
Also, since the tightness of the credit constraint 1/λ determines growth effects, if the
tightness is fixed and the constraint is assumed to be binding, a growth effect of the
exogenous financial friction persists forever. Consequently, one needs to endogenize
the tightness of financial frictions to assess its role in growth, especially, over the very
long run.
Based on this motivation, we consider the financial friction, the tightness of which
varies endogenously. In our framework, the tightness is implied by economic circum-
stances rather than exogenously given. That is, we view the tightness as an equilib-
rium value determined by other variables, which are more fundamental. To do that,
this chapter presents a simple endogenous growth model with the financial friction
led by asymmetric information and costly state verification as in Townsend (1979),
Williamson (1986, 1987), Bernanke and Gertler (1989).
In our model, the economy grows through entrepreneurs’ innovations that enhance
productivity.2 Since the productivity-enhancing investment — R&D investment —
is risky, entrepreneurs’ ability to borrow for R&D investment is limited under the
information asymmetry. More specifically, in the model, an entrepreneur borrows
money to invest in R&D. However, even when the investment is successful, he may
avoid paying his debt by falsely reporting that he failed in the R&D: the moral
hazard problem. When an entrepreneur reneges on his debt, the lender confiscates the
borrower’s net worth after auditing, which incurs monitoring costs. For the incentive
constraint compatible, any entrepreneur borrowing for R&D investment should pay
a higher interest rate than the market deposit rate. This wedge discourages R&D
2 This is common in the recent endogenous growth literature, e.g., Aghion and Howitt (1992),
Morales (2003), Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005), Berentsen, Rojas Breu and Shi (2012),
Doepke and Zilibotti (2013) among others.
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investments, resulting in lower growth. We call this a direct growth effect.3
Notably, this negative growth effect disappears as the economy grows in our model.
This is because the credit market becomes asymptotically efficient although an en-
trepreneur borrowing for R&D investment is assumed to be credit constrained.4 This
is because the incentive constraint is endogenously relaxed as the borrower’s profit
(entrepreneurial profit) increases along with growth of the economy.5 This implies
that the negative growth effect emerges during the transition phase only, and thus,
the growth effect is temporary. We call this asymptotic irrelevance to growth.
This finding contradicts the permanent growth effect of financial frictions. If
financial frictions adversely affect growth, then this negative impact is permanent
in the previous literature adopting the exogenous borrowing constraint as long as
it is assumed to be binding. This is simply because the tightness of the financial
friction is arbitrarily given and fixed at a certain level. In contrast, the tightness is
endogenously determined in our framework, and thereby, the negative growth effect
disappears gradually as the economy grows.6
Hence, the growth effect of the financial friction is heterogeneous across countries
3 Similar growth effects of financial frictions, led by the inefficient resource allocation, can be
found in, for example, de Gregorio (1996), Berentsen, Rojas Breu and Shi (2012), Bencivenga
and Smith (1991) Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005), Trew (2014) and Laeven, Levine and
Michalopoulos (2015) among others. In line with this theoretical result, there is extensive empirical
evidence that consistently shows negative growth effects of financial frictions. Some prominent
examples include King and Levine (1993) and Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000).
4 Recently, Azariadis, Kaas and Wen (2016) develop a parsimonious model that features endoge-
nous credit friction led by limited commitment. In the model, the credit market operates efficiently
provided that the reputation value is large enough for a borrower to honor his debt voluntarily.
5 This intuition seems plausible from the observation that the average firm size correlates pos-
itively with income per capita (the average income of a country), e.g., Poschke (2014). Since a
firm’s profit is increasing, on average, in its size, the average firm will have higher profits in a richer
country. Similarly, Donovan (2014) empirically shows that there are more entrepreneurs who are
“poor” (subsistence entrepreneurs) in a poorer country.
6 This endogenous relaxation is equivalent as the model-implied tightness decreases, converging
asymptotically to the steady state value that guarantees the first-best optimum. Looked at another
way, we theoretically show that the interest rate spread, which proxies the severity of the financial
friction, decreases along with growth due to the endogenous relaxation of the financial friction. Galor
and Zeira (1993) also derive the spread of borrowing and lending rates led by the borrower’s moral
hazard problem and connect the interest rate spread to the degree of the financial friction severity.
However, the interest rate spread in their model is essentially exogenous since it is independent of
the state of the economy, and therefore, the negative effect of the financial friction persists forever
in their framework.
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due to the asymptotic irrelevance, and this feature is not captured in most of the
previous studies dealing with the exogenous financial friction. However, we present
evidence supporting the asymptotic irrelevance of financial frictions to growth by
showing that the negative effect of the financial friction gets alleviated as the average
income of a country increases.
Our model also predicts that the financial friction interplays with aggregate un-
certainty through the endogenous determination of the tightness. More precisely, we
show that the financial friction amplifies the negative impact of volatility on growth.
We refer to this as an indirect growth effect, which also asymptotically disappears
due to the endogenous relaxation of the credit constraint. When aggregate volatility
increases, the expected profit from R&D investment gets smaller. Then, the credit
constraint becomes tighter, leading to a further decrease in R&D investment. This
sheds light on the role financial frictions play in the negative growth effect of aggre-
gate uncertainty. As demonstrated by many empirical studies, countries with higher
volatility have lower long-term growth, e.g., Ramey and Ramey (1995). We provide a
theory that reveals how financial frictions amplify the negative growth impact of ag-
gregate uncertainty by allowing the credit constraint tightness to vary endogenously.
Thirdly, regarding transition dynamics, we will show that the endogenous relax-
ation of the financial friction replicates various stylized transitional features including
the increasing trend of the investment rate in the development process, while they
are not always replicated in the exogenous credit constraint setting.
Finally, we can easily understand the main mechanism that causes the direct and
indirect growth effects thanks to the parsimony of the model. The degree of the
financial friction severity is measured by the interest rate spread, which is easy-to-
access. Hence, we can easily test three empirical hypotheses from the theory: the
direct, indirect growth effects and the asymptotic irrelevance. We conduct not only
cross-country OLS regressions, but also the dynamic panel GMM ones to address
the shortcomings of the OLS regressions. The estimation results support all the
theoretical results.
4
Empirical Evidence on Credit Constraints over R&D Investment
In the finance literature, information friction has been regarded as a primary culprit
that restricts borrowing of firms, e.g., Myers (1977), Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and
Myers and Majluf (1984). Our model reflects this intuition. That is, information
asymmetry limits a firm’s borrowing for R&D investment in the model. This intu-
ition seems plausible since many empirical studies suggest that R&D investment is
subject to financial restrictions. For example, Carpenter and Petersen (2002) find
that small high-tech companies in the U.S. obtain little debt financing. Similarly,
from a large sample of European firms, Brown, Martinsson and Petersen (2012) offer
evidence that credit constraints adversely affect R&D activities. Brown, Fazzari and
Petersen (2009) also show that the U.S. recently experienced a finance-driven cycle
in R&D from 1994 to 2004. The evidence in the U.S. and Europe suggests that R&D
investment indeed depends largely on financial factors, especially in poor countries
where financial markets are primitive.
Related Literature
This research is closely related to a few papers adopting the credit constraint with
costly state verification. Among others, Azariadis and Smith (1996), Huybens and
Smith (1997, 1999) and Aghion, Banerjee and Piketty (1999) consider the overlapping
generations model with the same type of credit constraint to investigate various
implications in the determinacy of equilibrium, endogenous volatility or the rate of
money growth. Recently, Greenwood, Sa´nchez and Wang (2010) demonstrate how
technological progress in financial intermediation affects the economy by using the
model where a costly state verification framework is embedded. In contrast, our
research offers a more simple and tractable model that allows endogenous growth,
which is depending on the severity of the financial friction. That is, our model deals
with growth effects of the financial friction, not scale effects that the aforementioned
papers mainly focus on.7
7 Notably, Khan (2001) investigates growth effects of financial development with the costly state
5
On the indirect growth effect, this chapter is related to previous literature that
investigates the relationship between volatility and growth, e.g., Aghion, Angeletos,
Banerjee and Manova (2010) (AABM) and the references therein. In the AABM
model, the financial friction interacts with aggregate volatility through the substi-
tution between the short- and long-term investments although the tightness of the
borrowing constraint is exogenously given. Our model differs in that the financial
friction is endogenized. That is, we show that financial frictions interplay with volatil-
ity through the endogenous determination of the tightness, not through the cyclical
composition of investments as in AABM.
Regarding the R&D investment as a prime engine for economic growth under fi-
nancial frictions, this chapter is closely linked to Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes
(2005) (AHM). They investigate growth effects of financial developments during con-
vergence phase in a parsimonious Schumpeterian model.8 They show that the fi-
nancial friction has the permanent negative growth effect provided that the financial
condition gets worse than a certain threshold.9
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 introduces the model
and describes the equilibrium. Section 1.3 derives the main theoretical results. Sec-
tion 1.4 presents empirical evidence supporting the theoretical results. Section 1.5
concludes with some remarks.
verification as in our model. He shows that a reduction in the financial intermediation cost leads to
a decline in the spread between borrowing and lending rates, resulting in faster growth. We consider
the same type of financial friction, while uncovering other roles of the financial friction on growth,
namely the indirect growth effect and asymptotic irrelevance. We also provide empirical evidence
supporting the results.
8 Similarly, Morales (2003) also presents a Schumpeterian growth model in which growth is driven
by entrepreneurial innovations, which are subject to the exogenous credit constraint. He shows that
financial intermediation can mitigate the moral hazard in the R&D sector, raging the growth rate.
9 Berentsen, Rojas Breu and Shi (2012) develop a monetary model where the economy en-
dogenously grows through R&D innovations. Instead of focusing on the growth effects of financial
frictions, they investigate the negative growth effect of inflation through its impact on R&D activi-
ties under the search friction. Bencivenga and Smith (1991) develop an endogenous growth model
with the Diamond-Dybvig type banking contract to show that financial intermediaries can boost
growth when they encourage productive investments, the profits of which are realized over a long
period of time, by pooling ”liquidity risks.”
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1.2 The Model
We consider a small open economy that consists of two period-overlapping genera-
tions. Obviously, the small open economy assumption ensures analytical simplicity
since the interest rate rt is exogenously given. However, it has more important im-
plication in our framework that will be discussed with details later.10
In this economy, there are two types of heterogeneous agents: entrepreneurs of
unit mass and workers of mass Lt. Here, we interpret Lt broadly such that it includes
human capital, i.e., Lt is the effective labor supplied by workers. For simplicity, Lt
is exogenously given in the model.
1.2.1 Entrepreneur’s Problem
In each period t, entrepreneurs are born with a skill/ability z ∈ [zL, zH ] drawn from a
time-invariant continuous c.d.f. F (x). We assume that f (x) > 0 ∀x ∈ [zL, zH ] where
f(x) is a p.d.f..11 In the following period t+1, each entrepreneur is endowed one unit of
labor and can produce through his own productivity augmented to the social common
Cobb-Douglas production technology f (k, `) = (kα`1−α)v that is homogeneous of
degree v < 1. More specifically, an entrepreneur i augments his own productivity
Ai such that yi = A
1−v
i f (ki, `i) where yi denotes individual output. v is the span of
control parameter of an entrepreneur as in Lucas (1978).
There are two types of investments: R&D and capital investments. R&D in-
vestment is risky, long-term and productivity-enhancing investment, which requires
borrowings. Hence, in presence of asymmetric information, this investment comes
with a credit constraint as shown later. Meanwhile, capital investment is risk-free
and short-term investment. Such investments are free of credit restrictions.12
R&D investment takes one period to be completed. This means that, in the first
period after elder entrepreneurs produce, a young entrepreneur should determine
10 We also look at the case of a closed economy briefly in Appendix A.1.
11 This implies that F (x) is strictly increasing in z.
12 These contrasting features are similar to those of AABM.
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whether or not invest in R&D in order to enhance his own productivity level Ai
after drawing his individual ability zi. Investing in R&D requires x (z, A) amount of
consumption goods. We assume that x (z, At) ≥ 0, xz (z, At) < 0, limz→zL x (z, At) =
∞, limz→zH x (z, At) = 0 and xA (z, At) > 0 where At > 0 denotes the total factor
productivity (TFP) in period t. The last assumption reflects that it is more costly
to conduct R&D innovations as the economy develops further.13 We denote xt (z) ≡
x (z, At) for convenience.
R&D investment is risky. Once investment has begun, he succeeds in the R&D
project with probability p ∈ (0, 1) and obtains γAt as individual productivity where
γ > 1.14 For simplicity, we assume that the entrepreneur obtains zero productivity if
he failed in his R&D project, i.e., Ai = 0, so that produces and consumes nothing in
the following period t+ 1 (he goes underground).15 Meanwhile, an entrepreneur who
does not invest has the same individual productivity with the TFP given by At.
Finally, entrepreneurs are risk-neutral, and they consume at the end of second
period. Then, an entrepreneur with z solves the following problem:
pit (z) ≡ pi (z, At) ≡ max {p [pi1,t+1 − (1 + it+1)xt (z)] , pi0,t+1}
s.t. pi1,t+1 ≡ max{k1+1,t≥0,`1,t+1≥0} (γAt)
1−v f (k1,t+1, `1,t+1)− rt+1k1,t+1 − wt+1`1,t+1,
pi0,t+1 ≡ max{k0,t+1≥0,`0,t+1≥0}A
1−v
t f (k0,t+1, `0,t+1)− rt+1k0,t+1 − wt+1`0,t+1.
13 Jones (2008) shows with empirical evidence that successive generations of innovators have a
heavier educational burden as technology develops further. Similarly, the last condition reflects that
it is harder to imitate or adopt more advanced technologies from other countries as the economy
develops since the TFP, At, increases over time through successful R&D projects. Technically, this
assumption is necessary for stationary growth and, in fact, widely adopted in many other studies.
For instance, the R&D cost function is assumed to be linear in At for stationarity in AHM and
Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2006). As shown later, the linearity is a sufficient condition for
stationary growth in our model; see Proposition 1.3.
14 One can introduce project varieties such that G = {γ1, γ1, · · · , γN} where γi > γj , i > j, and
pi ≡ Pr(ith project is done successfully) < 1. Here, for simplicity, we consider the simplest case,
N = 1, since there is no significant change in the qualitative results.
15 This assumption can be easily relaxed such that the entrepreneur can still produce some amount
of consumption goods. However, there is no change in the results qualitatively.
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We denote the gross borrowing rate by 1 + i. The subscript 1 indicates that the
producer is a (successful) R&D investor while the subscript 0 is for the one who did
not invest. The gross borrowing rate 1 + it+1 is required to be equal or larger than
the gross return to capital 1 + rt+1− δ > 0; if not, all entrepreneurs can make profits
arbitrarily by borrowing consumption goods at 1 + it+1 from a lender and lending
them at 1 + rt+1 after depreciation by δ. That is, the net borrowing rate i has the
lower bound at r− δ in any equilibrium to preclude the arbitrage opportunity. Then,
entrepreneur i’s borrowing is fixed at x (zi, A), and therefore, only inputs are choice
variables.
Also, the above problem indicates that the borrowing rate i is independent of the
skill z, and every successful borrower honors his gross debt (1 + i)x(z) to the lender.
These features will be verified by deriving the optimal financial contract presented
later. Now, from the assumptions on f (k, `) and x (z, A), we have the following
result.16
Lemma 1.1 Unique Existence of Skill Threshold: Given any price vector,
(r, w, i) ∈ R3++, there exists a unique skill threshold z∗ ∈ (zL, zH) if, and only if,
pγ > 1 such that an entrepreneur with z ≥ z∗ invests in R&D and does not invest
otherwise.
From Lemma 1.1, we assume the following condition for the unique skill threshold:
Assumption 1 pγ > 1.
Note that there always exist entrepreneurs investing R&D in any equilibrium since
z∗ is an interior solution, i.e., z∗ ∈ (zL, zH), and f(z) > 0 ∀z ∈ (zL, zH) where f (·) is
the p.d.f. of the skill z.
Financial Contract
16 All proofs are relegated in Appendix A.4.
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There are financial intermediaries (FI, hereafter) that lend consumption goods to
entrepreneurs. Whether there is success or failure in a R&D project is assumed to
be private information. Hence, when a borrower defaults, so that he does not honor
his debts, FI randomly monitor (or audit) with probability η where each monitoring
incurs µ > 0 amount of consumption goods as the monitoring cost.
Note that the monitoring cost is time-invariant. We will discuss the case of time-
varying monitoring costs in Appendix A.1. However, we show that all the theoretical
results do not change with the time-varying monitoring cost as long as it grows slower
than the borrower’s net worth pi1, which is the entrepreneurial profit.
17 In Appendix
A.1, we will argue that this is indeed the realistic assumption by showing empirical
evidence consistent with the assumption.18 Hence, let us assume that the monitoring
cost is time-invariant, which is a particular case of the assumption, for a clearer and
simpler exposition of the main idea without any qualitative change in the theoretical
results.19
Once the audit reveals that a borrower defaulted even though he succeeded in his
R&D, and hence, could repay debt, the lender (financial intermediary) confiscates
17 See Proposition A.1 in Appendix A.1. It is worth noting that although the tightness of the
credit constraint is endogenously determined in our model, the monitoring cost varies exogenously
over time. Meanwhile, Laeven, Levine and Michalopoulos (2015) explore impacts of endogenous
innovations in the financial intermediation technology on long-term growth. In their model, given
the exogenous cost of innovations in the financial intermediation technology, a financial intermediary
tries to improve its intermediation technology to reduce the intermediation cost, which is analogous
to the monitoring cost in our model. They show that growth is not sustainable in the long run
if the innovation cost, which is exogenously given, increases to infinity, and thereby, there is no
innovation in the financial intermediation. This result is similar to the one that we obtain when
the monitoring cost grows faster than the entire economy, diverging to infinity; see Case (2-iii) of
Proposition A.1. Hence, their conclusion can be obtained as a specific case in our model, implying
that there is no loss of generality in our reduced-form-style approach that lets the monitoring cost
be given exogenously over time.
18 To do that, we use panel data from Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, Laeven and Levine (2004). The data
provides abundant information on financial conditions of more than 1,400 banks from 72 developed
and developing countries over the period of 1995–1999.
19Finally, one can interpret the monitoring cost as the material cost determined by legal and
accounting systems in a country. Obviously, the monitoring cost gets smaller as the institutional
systems are efficient. According to Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000), the cross-country differences
in legal and accounting systems can explain differences in financial development. They show that
exogenous components of the development in the financial intermediation correlate positively with
economic growth, a finding that is consistent with our theoretical and empirical conclusions.
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the borrower’s entire wealth. This environment reflects the financial friction arising
from information asymmetry between a lender and a borrower that prevents efficient
resource allocations, and hence, leads to welfare loss as we will see clearly later. Under
the environment, the terms of contract are derived by solving the following problem
in period t.20
max
{it+1(z)≥rt+1−δ,1≥ηt+1(z)≥0}
p {pi1,t+1 − (1 + it+1(z))xt (z)}
s.t. p (1 + it+1(z))xt (z)− (1− p) ηt+1(z)µ ≥ (1 + rt+1 − δ)xt (z) · · · (PC) ,
pi1,t+1 − (1 + it+1(z))xt (z) ≥ (1− ηt+1(z))pi1,t+1 · · · (IC) .
Where PC is the participation compatibility, and IC is the incentive constraint. Prior
to characterizing the terms of contract {i (z) , η (z)}, we assume that the following
restriction is satisfied in any equilibrium, which seems natural and plausible.
Assumption 2 ppi1,t > (1− p)µ ∀t ≥ 0.
As demonstrated in the proof of Lemma 1.2 in Appendix A.4, Assumption 2 is a
necessary and sufficient condition for guaranteeing the no-arbitrage condition 1+it ≥
1 + rt − δ in equilibrium. This assumption is easily satisfied when γ is sufficiently
large.21 Now, from the optimal financial contract problem, we have the following
20 Recall that the amount of borrowing is fixed at x (z) for an entrepreneur with the ability z since
the no-arbitrage condition given by i ≥ r−δ. Also, in our framework, every entrepreneur conducting
R&D is borrowing-constrained simply because an entrepreneur is born without asset. In the same
spirit, Greenwood, Sa´nchez and Wang (2010) also assume that any producer producing consumption
goods must borrow capital goods from a financial intermediary, and hence, any active producer is
borrowing-constrained by construction. Of course, the borrowing constraint can be binding for other
reasons; for example, impatience (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997) or linear
gains in the capital investment (Buera and Shin, 2011, 2013; Moll, 2014).
21 More specifically, suppose that the exogenous interest rate rt is given in the interval [−∞, r¯]
∀t ≥ 0. From (10) and (12) presented later, it can be easily shown that:
min {pi1,t}∞t=0 = γ (1− v) (αv)
αv
1−αv L
v(1−α)
1−αv
0 A
1−v
1−αv
0 [ψ (zL)]
−v(1−α)
1−αv r¯
−αv
1−αv
where A0 and L0 are the initial productivity and effective labor, respectively, which are given in the
initial period t = 0. Also, as will be presented later, ψ (zL) ≡ pγ {1− F (zL)} + F (zL) = pγ since
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lemma that gives the terms of contract.
Lemma 1.2 Financial Contract: Given any (r, pi1, x (z)) ∈ R2++×R+, the terms
of contract (i (z) , η (z)) are given by:
1 + it+1 =
1 + rt+1 − δ
p
ppi1,t+1
ppi1,t+1 − (1− p)µ ≡
1 + rt+1 − δ
p
∆t+1, (1.1)
ηt+1 (z) =
(1 + rt+1 − δ)xt (z)
ppi1,t+1 − (1− p)µ . (1.2)
From equation (1.1), ∆t+1 > 1 if, and only if, µ > 0. Note that ∆t+1 > 1 is the
mark-up upon the fair insurance rate (1 + rt+1 − δ) /p. This is a wedge caused by
the information asymmetry, and the wedge precludes the efficient allocation as seen
clearly later. For this reason, the financial friction gets more severe as it increases.
For example, if µ = 0, i.e., monitoring is free, then ∆ is always unity, implying the
asymmetric information is “ineffective” in the sense that it is irrelevant to the real
allocation of the economy. Formally, we define the interest rate spread as follows:
Definition 1.1 Interest Rate Spread: ∆t ≡ p (1 + it) / (1 + rt − δ), or like the
common definition in reality, define ∆˜t ≡ log ∆t − log p ' it − rt.
Finally, one can show that the participation compatibility always binds; see the
proof of Lemma 1.2. Then, the law of large numbers leads to the following condition
that should be satisfied in any equilibrium:
p (1 + it+1)
∫ zH
z∗t
xt (z) dF (z)− (1− p)µ
∫ zH
z∗t
ηt+1 (z) dF (z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Et[revenue from lending]
= (1 + rt+1 − δ)
∫ zH
z∗t
xt (z) dF (z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Et[(opportunity) cost of lending]
. m (1.3)
F (zL) = 0. Then, Assumption 2 is satisfied if the following condition holds:
γ >
( r¯
αv
) αv
1−v
[
(1− p)µ
1− v
] 1−αv
1−v
L
−v(1−α)
1−v
0 (pA0)
−1
.
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Equation (1.3) guarantees no-arbitrage for FI, and hence, can be be interpreted as
the financial market clearing condition.
1.2.2 Worker’s Problem
In each period t, each young worker, born in the same period, solves the following
problem:
max
{cˆyt≥0,cˆot+1≥0}
βu (cˆyt ) + (1− β)u
(
cˆot+1
)
s.t. cˆyt +
cˆot+1
1 + rt+1 − δ = wˆt ≡ wt
Lt
Nt
· · · (BC) .
where BC is the budget constraint, and cˆt and wˆt denote consumption and wage per
worker, respectively. Nt is the population of workers. Then, the total population
of the economy is given by Nˆt = 2 + Nt−1 + Nt. We denote income per capita by
yˆt, which is given by yˆt = Yt/Nˆt where Yt is aggregate output. We assume that the
growth rate of Nt is exogenously given, so that the growth rate of income per capita
is increasing in the growth rate of Yt.
Under the strict concavity of the utility function u(·), we have a unique solution
of optimal (cˆyt , sˆt) where sˆt is a worker’s saving in period t. Then, the domestic saving
in period t, say St, is defined by St = sˆtNt. Now, we denote saving per efficiency
unit of labor by st such that St ≡ stLt, implying st = sˆtNt/Lt. Similarly, we denote
the consumption per efficiency unit of labor ci (i = y, o) such that cyt = cˆ
y
tNt/Lt and
cot+1 = cˆ
o
t+1Nt/Lt.
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1.2.3 Equilibrium
In each period t, all quantity variables and the skill threshold solve each agent’s
problem given the prices that clear every market in the economy as follows:
Lt =
∫
`t (z) dF (z) (1.4)
st−1Lt−1 +B
f
t =
∫
kt (z) dF (z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Kt
+
∫ zH
z∗t−1
xt−1 (z) dF (z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Xt−1
(1.5)
p (1 + it)
∫ zH
z∗t−1
xt−1 (z) dF (z)− (1− p)µ
∫ zH
z∗t−1
ηt (z) dF (z)
= (1 + rt − δ)
∫ zH
z∗t−1
xt−1 (z) dF (z) (1.6)
cotLt−1 + c
y
tLt +Kt+1 + C
e
t + (1− p)µ
∫ zH
z∗t−1
ηt (z) dF (z)
=
∫
yt (z) dF (z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Yt
+ (1− δ)Kt − (1 + rt − δ)Bft +Bft+1 (1.7)
where aggregate consumption of entrepreneurs Cet is given by:
Cet =
∫ zH
z∗t−1
p {pi1,t − (1 + it)xt−1 (z)} dF (z) +
∫ z∗t−1
zL
pi0,tdF (z)
=
[
pγ
(
1− F (z∗t−1))+ F (z∗t−1)] pi0,t − p (1− it)Xt−1
Equations (1.4) and (1.5) are the labor and capital market clearing conditions, re-
spectively, where Bft is net capital flow from foreign countries in period t. Equations
(1.6) and (1.7) are the financial and goods market clearing conditions, respectively.
One can show that once equations (1.4)–(1.6) and (BC) are satisfied, the last goods
market clearing condition, equation (1.7), is automatically satisfied: Walras’s law.
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1.3 Main Results
Now, we can describe how the aggregate output and TFP are determined as follows22:
Proposition 1.1 Aggregation: The aggregate output is given by:
Yt = A
1−v
t
(
Kαt L
1−α
t
)v
where the TFP, At, is given by:
At =
[
pγ
{
1− F (z∗t−1)}+ F (z∗t−1)]At−1 = ∫ Ai (z) dF (z) .
Also,
wt =
v (1− α)Yt
Lt
and rt =
vαYt
Kt
.
Intuitively, the TFP level in time t, At, is determined by the mass of entrepreneurs
who succeeded in R&D innovations. This is given by the function ψ (z∗) ≡ pγ {1− F (z∗)}+
F (z∗). Here, to avoid the scale issues in the empirical analysis in Section 1.4, we
redefine the TFP such that A˜t ≡ A1−vt , which, in turn, yields Yt = A˜t
(
Kαt L
1−α
t
)v
.
From Proposition 1.1, defining capital and output per efficiency unit of labor by
kt ≡ Kt/Lt and yt ≡ Yt/Lt yields:
yt = (At−1/Lt)
1−v ψ
(
z∗t−1
)1−v
kαvt (1.8)
pi0,t = (1− v) (At−1/Lt)1−v ψ
(
z∗t−1
)−v
Ltk
αv
t (1.9)
pi1,t = γ(1− v) (At−1/Lt)1−v ψ
(
z∗t−1
)−v
Ltk
αv
t (1.10)
wt = (1− α) v (At−1/Lt)1−v ψ
(
z∗t−1
)1−v
kαvt (1.11)
rt = αv (At−1/Lt)
1−v ψ
(
z∗t−1
)1−v
kαv−1t (1.12)
where, by the linearity of the model, E [pit] =
∫
pit (z) dF (z) = (1− v)Yt+1.23
22 Proposition 1.1 also holds in the closed economy. That is, Proposition 1.1 is robust to the
assumption of the small open economy.
23 Note also that l0,t = ψ
(
z∗t−1
)−1
Lt and k0,t = ψ
(
z∗t−1
)−1
Kt where `1,t = γ`0,t and k1,t = γk0,t.
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1.3.1 No-Growth Case
To identify the model mechanism that drive the growth effects of the financial friction
more clearly, we first consider the case of no-growth that uncovers the scale effect,
and then turn to the case of long-term growth that reveals the growth effect. For the
no-growth case, we assume that newly developed knowledge from R&D innovations
disappears at the end of each period after production is completed, i.e., the produc-
tivity enhancement is perfectly excludable over generations. Then, an entrepreneur
who does not conduct R&D has a “fundamental” TFP denoted by A0, which is given
exogenously in the initial period t = 0. Also, the efficiency unit of labor is not
changed over time, and hence, fixed at its initial value L0, which is also exogenously
given. Then, we can obtain the following result.
Proposition 1.2 No-Growth Steady State: The no-growth steady state is (i)
unique and (ii) z∗ is increasing in µ while k is decreasing in µ, so that (iii) y, yˆ, Y
and pii (i = 0, 1) are also decreasing in µ.
From Proposition 1.2 and the definition of the interest rate spread ∆ given by
equation (1.1), we have an additional result as follows:
Corollary 1.1 Interest Rate Spread and Monitoring Cost: The interest rate
spread is strictly increasing in µ. That is, the wedge strictly increases as the moni-
toring cost µ rises.
Proposition 1.2 and Corollary 1.1 are intuitive by the following logic. First note
that the incentive constraint, (IC), tightens whenever the monitoring cost rises. This
results in a higher interest rate spread, which, in turn, causes less investment in R&D,
leading to smaller TFP and lower stock of capital k. Hence, it also results in a smaller
output y as well as lower profits pii (i = 0, 1). More importantly, from Corollary 1.1
and Proposition 1.2, we can define the degree of financial friction severity as follows:
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Definition 1.2 Financial Friction Severity: The degree of financial friction
severity arising from the information asymmetry is measured by the interest rate
spread ∆. More specifically, it increases as ∆ rises.
The definition of the financial friction severity is in accordance with that the
financial friction is more harmful as the monitoring cost µ increases as argued by
Proposition 1.2 and the wedge (or the interest rate spread) ,∆, is strictly monotonic
in µ as in Corollary 1. This has an empirical implication that it is much harder to
observe µ than observing the adjusted interest rate spread ∆˜ ≡ log ∆− log p ' i− r,
which is also strictly monotonic in µ. That is, one can use the adjusted interest rate
spread ∆˜ ' i− r as a proxy for the financial friction severity, and hence, we will use
∆˜ in our empirical analysis in Section 1.4. 24
Closed Economy
The small open economy assumption guarantees analytical simplicity in the model.
However, more importantly, the assumption allows unlimited accessibility of funds
for both R&D and capital investments through borrowings from foreign countries
denoted by Bft . In contrast, in a closed economy, available funds are limited to the
aggregate domestic saving, i.e. Bft = 0 for all t ≥ 0.
Therefore, even when the monitoring cost gets higher in the closed economy, the
output can even increase when the domestic saving increases a lot enough to cause
a sufficiently large increase in the capital investment. Actually, due to this general
equilibrium effect — or price effect, in other words, — we can analytically show that
the output can even increase when the monitoring cost µ gets higher with sufficiently
high marginal production of capital: the interest rate.25 This is because the domestic
saving can increase a lot with such a high price of capital — the interest rate —, that
makes the output even bigger through a huge increase in the capital investment, K.
24 The credit-to-output ratio has been commonly used as a proxy for the financial friction severity.
We also conduct the same empirical analysis with the credit-to-output ratio in Appendix A.6. The
estimation results are also consistent with all the theoretical findings in this chapter.
25 See Appendix A.2 for details.
17
In contrast, the interest rate is exogenously given in the small open economy without
regard to the domestic saving, and therefore, the general equilibrium effect does not
emerge.
Consequently, the negative effect of the financial friction given by Proposition 1.2
is ambiguous in the closed economy a priori.26 It is, however, revealed that the output
is always decreasing in µ in the closed economy setting from numerical simulations
with various functional specifications and plausible parameterizations. This suggests
that all results of Proposition 1.2 and Corollary 1.1 are robust to the closed economy
setting.27 Accordingly, we keep the small open economy assumption for more clear
understandings of the model mechanism.
1.3.2 Permanent Growth Case
To investigate the growth effect of the financial friction, we consider the economy
that grows permanently. We denote the gross growth rate of a variable q in period t
by gq,t ≡ qt+1/qt and define a steady state as follows:
Definition 1.3 Long-Run Growth Steady State: The long-run growth steady
state is characterized by a stationary growth such that gr = gi = gw = 1 with gz∗ = 1
and gk = gy and gA = gL = gY are time invariant where y and k denote output and
capital per efficiency unit of labor, respectively.
That is, in the steady state, all prices and the mass of entrepreneurs investing in
R&D are fixed over time, while all aggregate quantities, as well those per efficiency
unit of labor, grow at the respective same rate. For such a steady state where
the economy grows permanently, we assume that the efficiency unit of labor L is
exogenously adjusted such that gL,t = gA,t for all t ≥ 0 where gA,t is endogenously
26 See also de Gregorio (1996), Jiang, Wang and Wu (2009) and Buera, Kaboski and Shin (2014)
for this sort of general equilibrium effects in the closed economy led by limited accessibility of funds
from foreign countries.
27 Details are available upon request.
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determined by the environment of the model.28 More precisely, from Proposition 1.1,
the TFP evolves as the following fashion:
At+1 = [pγ (1− F (z∗t )) + F (z∗t )]At = ψ (z∗t )At. (1.13)
which implies that gA,t = ψ (z
∗
t ) and gA˜,t = (1− v)ψ (z∗t ); recall that A˜t ≡ A1−vt . One
can interpret equation (1.13) such that newly-developed knowledge from successful
R&D can be utilized from the following period without any permission. Hence, this
specification reflects that the patent duration is just one-period (or one generation
here). Also, one can control the speed of intergenerational knowledge spillover by
assuming that At+1 = [ψ (z
∗
t )]
ξ At where ξ ∈ [0, 1]. Of course, the spillover is perfect
in the baseline case, i.e., ξ = 1.29 Obviously, the no-growth case corresponds to ξ = 0.
Now, we are ready to provide a sufficient condition that guarantees the existence of
a unique balanced growth path and its properties as follows:
Proposition 1.3 Growth Steady State and Properties: Suppose that x(z, A)
is linear in A such that x (z, φA) = φx (z, A) ∀φ ∈ R+. Then, the economy has a
(i) unique asymptotic long-run growth steady state such that (ii) gk = gy = 1, (iii)
gY = gA = gL = ψ (z
∗), (iv) gpii = ψ (z
∗) (i = 1, 2) where ψ (z∗) > 1 and (v) g∆ = 1.
From Proposition 1.3 (and its proof), we notice the following asymptotic property
28 This assumption can be interpreted as intragenerational knowledge spillover or an “external
effect” in the production, which is standard in the endogenous growth literature, e.g., Romer (1986),
Lucas (1988) and a recent application in Doepke and Zilibotti (2013). Letting A¯t be the average
productivity of entrepreneurs, i.e., A¯t ≡
∫
Ai,t (z) dF (z), suppose that an entrepreneur i produces
consumption goods using the production function such that yi,t = A¯
v(1−α)
t A
1−v
i,t (k
α
i,tn
1−α
i,t )
v where
ni,t is the number of workers employed by the entrepreneur. Then, the production function is
rewritten such that A1−vt (k
α
i,t`
1−α
i,t )
v where `i,t ≡ A¯tni,t denotes the efficiency unit of labor. If we
assume that the number of workers is fixed at N over time, the labor market clearing condition is
rewritten as N =
∫
nt (z) dF (z) ∀t ≥ 0. Then, similarly to Proposition 1.1, we have the aggregate
production function such that Yt = A
1−v
t
[
Kαt (AtN)
1−α]v = A1−vt (Kαt L1−αt )v where Lt ≡ AtN .
Hence, gL,t = gA,t ∀t ≥ 0. Note that, in this case, gyˆ,t = gY,t ∀t ≥ 0 since Nt ≡ N ∀t ≥ 0.
29 This is simply because any entrepreneur born in period t can utilize the aggregate TFP in the
same period, At, as his productivity even when he does not invest in R&D. Instead, if we assume
that only a fraction of entrepreneurs who do not invest in R&D can use the TFP while the other
cannot, then ξ should be smaller than one. All the theoretical results in this chapter are not changed
qualitatively when ξ is assumed to be less than one as long as it is larger than zero.
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of the growth effects from the financial friction:
Corollary 1.2 Asymptotic Irrelevance to Growth: The financial friction has
no effect on the asymptotic growth rate of the economy.
Corollary 1.2 indicates that the growth effect of the financial friction becomes neg-
ligible as the economy grows. This is because the wedge arising from the financial
friction ∆t converges to unity as the borrower’s profit is growing over time. That is,
the financial friction becomes endogenously relaxed as a borrower’s profit increases
along with the growth of the economy. Hence, the asymptotic threshold z∗ achieves
the first-best optimum, which is obtained in the economy without the financial fric-
tion, or equivalently, without the monitoring cost, i.e., µ = 0.
However, during the transition to the long-run steady state, the growth effect of
the financial friction remains. To investigate this, we need to focus on the transition
to the asymptotic long-run growth steady state to obtain the following result:
Corollary 1.3 Transitional Growth Effect: On the transition to the long-run
growth steady state, the gross growth rate of the TFP ψ (z∗t ) > 1 is (i) uniquely
determined and (ii) decreasing in µ. Also, (iii) gY,t, gyˆ,t and gpii,t+1 (i = 0, 1) are
decreasing in µ while ∆t+1 is increasing in µ.
Corollary 1.3 indicates that the financial friction has a negative growth effect, which
is analogous to the negative scale effect in the no-growth economy, although the
negative growth effect disappears as the economy grows.30 Also, as in the no-growth
case, the interest rate spread captures the negative impact of the financial friction
on growth since the growth rate is decreasing in µ while ∆˜ is increasing in µ. Hence,
one can use the (adjusted) interest rate spread ∆˜ to verify the negative growth effect.
We will use the interest rate spread in the empirical analysis in Section 1.4.
30 Corollary 1.3 holds without the restriction that gL,t = gA,t ∀t, which we assumed for the
stationary permanent growth. Without the assumption, one can show that kt+1 depends on ψ (z
∗
t ) =
gA,t, and it is decreasing in µ. pii,t+1 (i = 0, 1) is, therefore, decreasing in µ as well.
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We now know that the more severe financial friction, the lower growth rate as
in Corollary 1.3. However, the asymptotic irrelevance from Corollary 1.2 argues
that the negative growth effect is negligible in the long run since the borrower’s net
worth pi1 becomes too high in the long-run, especially compared to the source of the
financial friction µ, to renege on his debt; recall that when the lender audits the
borrower falsely reporting he failed in R&D, the lender confiscates the borrower’s net
worth. Hence, the borrower’s incentive to renege on his debt will be inelastic when
the monitoring cost is varying. This is why the asymptotic irrelevance emerges in the
model.31
Since the borrower’s net worth pi1 is strictly increasing in the total income Y , and
thereby, in the average income yˆ, the negative growth effect of the financial friction
gets smaller as the economy grows, and eventually, it disappears in in the long run.
That is, Corollary 1.2 and 1.3 imply the following empirical hypothesis: the negative
growth effect of the financial friction will be smaller as the country is richer. In
Section 1.4, we will verify the asymptotic irrelevance by showing evidence supporting
this empirical hypothesis.
Transition Dynamics
From Proposition 1.3, we know that the balanced growth path defined in Definition
1.3 is uniquely determined. Also, from Corollary 1.3, the growth rate decreases
in the monitoring cost during the transition phase. This decrease implies that the
transition speed to the stationary state will be slower (faster) in a country where
the financial friction is more severe (milder). In other words, our model predicts
that transition speeds will correlated negatively with the financial friction severity.
In other words, the model can describe different transition speeds across countries
31 Hence, when the monitoring cost also grows along with economic growth, the asymptotic
irrelevance still holds as long as the monitoring cost grows slower than the borrower’s net worth;
see Proposition A.1 in Appendix A.1. In the same appendix, we also provide evidence showing the
monitoring cost indeed grows slower than the average income of a country by using a panel data for
financial conditions of many individual banks in various countries.
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Figure 1.1: Transition Dynamics
based on different financial market conditions. With this motivation, we now consider
transition dynamics and provide its properties as follows:
Proposition 1.4 Transition Dynamics: Suppose that rt is fixed. Then,
(i) the equilibrium threshold z∗t is decreasing over time, converging to the asymptotic
level z∗, i.e., z∗t ↓ z∗.
(ii) the growth rate of GDP and the TFP ψ (z∗t ) is increasing over time, converging
to the asymptotic level ψ (z∗), i.e., ψ (z∗t ) ↑ ψ (z∗).
(iii) the investment-to-output ratio is increasing over time, converging to the asymp-
totic level, i.e., ιt ↑ ι where ιt ≡ It/Yt = {Kt − (1− δ)Kt−1} /Yt.
(iv) the R&D expenditure-to-output ratio is increasing over time, converging to the
asymptotic level, i.e., ρt ↑ ρ where ρt ≡ Xt/Yt.32
(v) the external debt-to-output ratio is increasing over time, converging to the asymp-
totic level, i.e., θt ↑ θ where θt ≡ Bft /Yt.
According to Proposition 1.3 and 1.4, as well as Corollary 1.2 and 1.3, our model
predicts gradual increases of TFP and the investment rate during the transition phase
32 This also implies that the relative size of borrowing through finance industry to GDP increases
as the economy develops since aggregate R&D investment Xt is the size of aggregate borrowings
through the finance industry of the economy.
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as depicted in Figure 1.133 All these transitional characteristics, some of which cannot
be explained by the neoclassical growth model, are found in many growing economies
in the real world, especially in the so-called miracle economies (see Buera and Shin,
2013).
For example, Figure 1.2 depicts the actual transition dynamics of China, Korea,
Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand where thick solid lines denote unweighed
averages. Note that dynamics of income per capita, the TFP (relative to the U.S.) and
the investment rate are consistent with the model predictions. Moreover, sustained
TFP growth requires only a sustained fraction of GDP spent on R&D as in the
endogenous Schumpeterian growth model (see the third and seventh panels of Figure
1.1 from upper left) although the proposed model does not share the essential feature
of the Schumpeterian growth model. This feature is also empirically plausible (see
Ha and Howitt, 2007).
Meanwhile, in the bottom right panel of Figure 1.2, one notices that the interest
rate spread is on average stable after 1980. Since the data is unavailable before 1980
for those countries from the data we use in this chapter, we guess the dynamics of the
interest rate spread for that period. From the increasing investment rate during the
same period in the upper right panel, it is natural to infer a decreasing trend of the
interest rate spread as represented by the thick dashed line, which is also consistent
with the model prediction.34
Finally, the transition speed slows as the financial system worsens, i.e., the mon-
itoring cost µ is higher so is the interest rate spread. For example, if the monitoring
is free, i.e., µ = 0, then the model boils down to the standard endogenous growth
model, and there is no transition given any fixed interest rate as illustrated in Figure
1.1. This means that the investment rate is not increasing over time, contradicting
33 This is not a simulation; but a simple illustration of transition dynamics based on the theoretical
conclusions.
34 Greenwood, Sa´nchez and Wang (2012) calculate the interest rate spread from 1970 to 2005 of
the U.S. and Taiwan from various datasets. According to Figure 1.1 in the paper, the interest rate
spreads for both countries are similar to our model prediction.
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Figure 1.2: Actual Transition Dynamics of Developing Countries
the stylized fact. Indeed, the investment rate is decreasing in the closed economy or
constant in the small open economy in the standard neoclassical growth model. These
convergence properties are all inconsistent with the actual transition in reality.35
1.3.3 Volatility and Financial Friction
To investigate the amplification effect of the financial friction on the negative growth
effect of volatility, we add uncertainty to our model. Suppose that the economy has an
aggregate productivity shock st in each period such that A˜t = A (At, st+1) > 0 where
st is drawn from a c.d.f. G (x) in each period t. Then, it is natural to define higher
volatility as the mean-preserving spread of G (x). Also, by assuming that Et[A˜t] = At,
we can regard ψ (z∗t ) ≡ At+1/At as a growth trend of the TFP, or equivalently, the
mean growth rate of the TFP.
To make the uncertainty effective, entrepreneurs should determine whether or
35 In line with this, Buera and Shin (2013) point out that even the “economic miracles” seems
three times slower compared with a calibrated neoclassical model, implying that a mechanism that
retards the transition to the steady state is required.
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not invest in R&D before the aggregate shock is revealed. We assume that the R&D
investment cost x (z, A) is independent of the noise s. That is, the cost function is
deterministic in the sense that every individual knows the exact R&D cost given a
level of the TFP and his ability z without regard to the random shock on At.
In this environment, the terms of contract {i, η(z)} need to be state-contingent
to satisfy the no-arbitrage condition for any st; see (3). Then, the gross borrowing
rate and the probability of being monitored are given by:
1 + i
(
st+1
)
=
1 + rt+1 − δ
p
ppi1 (s
t+1)
ppi1 (st+1)− (1− p)µ ≡
1 + rt+1 − δ
p
∆
(
st+1
)
,
η
(
z, st+1
)
= (1 + rt+1 − δ) xt (z)
ppi1 (st+1)− (1− p)µ .
where st+1 is the history up to and including st+1 such that s
t+1 ≡ {s0, s1, · · · , st+1}.
Also, the entrepreneur’s problem is rewritten as follows:
pit (z) ≡ max {p[Et[pi1,t+1]− Et[(1 + it+1)]xt (z)],Et[pi0,t+1]} .
where Et[qt+1] ≡ E[qt+1|st]. Now, we can provide the following result:
Proposition 1.5 Amplification Effect: The financial friction amplifies the neg-
ative effect of volatility on the mean growth rate.36
This amplification effect is intuitive since the incentive constraint endogenously
tightens whenever the borrower’s expected profit decreases. If the economy experi-
ences higher volatility, then Et[pi0,t+1] decreases, so that the threshold increases from
z∗ to z∗N , as depicted in Figure 1.3, which means R&D investments are discouraged.
37
Once the expected profit decreases, the credit constraint becomes tighter, i.e., Et[∆t+1]
36 We use the assumption that gL,t+1 = gA,t+1 in the proof of Proposition 1.5. However, one can
easily show that Proposition 1.5 still holds without this assumption. The only difference is that the
LHS of equation (A.10) in the proof of Proposition 1.5 is no longer independent of z, but strictly
increasing in z.
37 In the proof of Proposition 1.5, we show that an increase in the volatility deteriorates growth
regardless whether the financial friction is effective or not. This is because entrepreneurial profits
are decreasing return to scale.
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Figure 1.3: Indirect Effect
increases. Therefore, R&D investments get smaller once again, arriving at the new
threshold z∗F . That is, the negative effect of volatility on growth is amplified by the
financial friction, which is represented by z∗F − z∗N .
However, it is obvious that this amplification effect also disappears as the wedge
(the interest rate spread) decreases along with the growth of the economy. This is
because, as just described, the indirect growth effect arises from fluctuations in the
interest rate spread. In the extreme case where the interest rate spread is unity, i.e.,
1 + i = (1 + r − δ)/p, the indirect effect (the amplification effect) does not emerge.
1.4 Empirical Evidence
One can examine the direct and indirect growth effects of the financial friction with
the asymptotic irrelevance by the following econometric framework:
g¯yˆ,i = X
′
iθ + ασi + β
¯˜∆i + γ
¯˜∆iσi + δ
¯˜∆i log yˆ1980,i + εi
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where average variables are used for the relationship of the financial friction and
growth as in de Gregorio (1996), AHM and AABM. g¯yˆ,i and
¯˜∆i denote the average
annual growth rate (%) and the average annual interest rate spread (%) over 1980–
2010, respectively.38 For volatility, which is denoted by σi, we use the standard
deviation of % annual growth rates over the sample period as in Ramey and Ramey
(1995), AHM and AABM. Finally, Xi is a vector of important controls for a cross-
country growth analysis identified by Levine and Renelt (1992).
For Xi, following Ramey and Ramey (1995), AHM and AABM, we consider (i)
logged initial GDP per capita, (ii) initial human capital and (iii) the average growth
rate of the population. An investment factor such as the average investment rate
needs to be controlled but we omit this factor since, in our case, it is controlled
indirectly by the average interest rate spread ¯˜∆i.
39 All the data come from the Penn
World Table (PWT Ver. 8.0) except the interest rate spread, which is obtained from
the World Bank Dataset.40
With the specification, β and γ represent the direct and indirect growth effects,
respectively. Meanwhile, suppose that δ is positive. Then, the growth effect caused
by the (adjusted) interest rate spread, ∆˜, becomes smaller as the economy has ini-
tially higher income per capita, supporting the asymptotic irrelevance hypothesis.41
In summary, we have the following three testable predictions:
[Empirical Hypothesis I] Direct Growth Effect: β < 0
38 Since data on the interest rate spread is unavailable for many undeveloped countries before
1980, the sample period is chosen to be 1980–2010.
39 From Proposition 1.4, one can notice that the investment rate is strictly monotonic in the
threshold z∗t , which is also strictly monotonic in the interest rate spread. Hence, the investment
rate is controlled by the interest spread through the skill threshold.
40 The human capital is available in the PWT: the variable, hc. It is based on the Barro-Lee years
of schooling and Mincer returns to education. For more details, see Inklaar and Timmer (2013): p.
37-38. The interest rate spread for the U.S. is unavailable in the World Bank Data, and therefore,
the U.S. is excluded in all regressions.
41 We also verify the asymptotic irrelevance hypothesis through separate regression analysis with
split samples in Appendix A.5. The estimation results from the separate regression analysis are
consistent with those from the baseline regression with the interaction term, consistently supporting
the asymptotic irrelevance argument.
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11 [Empirical Hypothesis II] Indirect Growth Effect: γ < 0
111 [Empirical Hypothesis III] Asymptotic Irrelevance: δ > 0
Table 1.1 verifies the three empirical hypotheses. From each column of the table,
we can find that β < 0, which means that the interest rate spread, the proxy for
the financial friction severity, is negatively correlated with the average growth rate
of income per capita. This confirms the direct growth effect.
Also, the estimate of γ is significant and negative in each regression, implying
that the financial friction indirectly lowers the average growth rate via volatility. For
example, suppose that the standard deviation of % growth rates (volatility) is 3.
Now let the average interest rate spread increase by 1%p. Then, according to the
first column, the annual growth rate decreases by 0.233 + 3 × 0.018 = 0.287%p on
average during the period of 1980-2010. In reverse, volatility affects growth via the
financial friction. If the standard deviation of % growth rates increases by 1, the
average growth rate of income per capita decreases by ¯˜∆i×0.018%p. Hence, if the
average interest rate spread is 5%p, the growth rate of GDP per capita decreases by
0.09%p on average during the sample period. That is, the negative effect of volatility
is amplified by more severe financial friction. If the financial friction becomes so
severe that the interest rate spread doubles, then the negative effect also doubles to
0.18%p even with the same volatility level.
It is worth noting that the indirect effect is still significant when volatility is
controlled. As demonstrated in both the second and the fourth columns, γ is negative
and significant, while the coefficients for the volatility term are not significant any
longer. This suggests that volatility affects growth primarily via the interest rate
spread.
Finally, δ is positive and significant as expected, implying that, with the degree
of the financial friction severity being controlled, the negative growth effect of the
financial friction is smaller in an already developed country, the income per capita
of which is initially higher. That is, the negative growth effect gets alleviated as
28
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Table 1.1: Financial Friction and Income Growth (OLS)
Dependent Variable: Average Growth Rate of GDP per Capita (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Independent Variable N = 74 N = 74 N = 74 N = 74
Interest Rate Spread −.233∗∗∗ −.180∗∗ −1.072∗∗∗ −1.055∗∗∗
(.061) (.081) (.370) (.369)
Interest Rate Spread × Volatility −.018∗∗∗ −.030∗∗ −.015∗∗∗ −.030∗∗
(.006) (.013) (.006) (.013)
Interest Rate Spread × Initial Income .237∗∗ .250∗∗
(.103) (.103)
Volatility .116 .145
(.116) (.113)
Initial Income −1.780∗∗∗ −1.958∗∗∗ −3.067∗∗∗ −3.365∗∗∗
(.407) (.444) (.685) (.720)
Initial Human Capital .723 .897ˆ .841∗ 1.065∗∗
(.513) (.542) (.500) (.528)
Population Growth −.159 −.195 −.073 −.113
(.163) (.167) (.163) (.165)
R2 .512 .519 .548 .558
Note: All regressors are the averages over the sample period of 1980–2010. Volatility is the
standard deviation of % growth rates during the same period. Initial income and human capital are
taken for 1980. Initial income is logged GDP per capita. We excluded any country from the regressions
either when the number of data points of the interest rate spread is smaller than 20, which is two thirds
of the total number of data points over the sample period, 1980–2010, or when the average interest rate
spread is larger than 20%. Constant terms are not shown. Standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, **
,* and ˆ significant at 1%, 5%, 10% and 11%, respectively.
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Figure 1.4: Direct and Indirect Effects on Income Growth
an economy grows further, and hence, it has higher GDP per capita. Suppose, for
instance, that the economy faces a stationary interest rate spread at 5%. According
to the third column, the negative growth effect becomes smaller by 5× 1× 0.237 =
1.185%p when the logged GDP per capita increases by 1. This positive income effect
implies that the negative growth effect gets smaller as the economy grows, supporting
the asymptotic irrelevance.
Dynamic Panel GMM Regressions
There are several shortcomings in the OLS regressions. First of all, financial condi-
tions may be endogenously changing depending on the economic development, e.g.,
higher income may lead to higher demand for financial services, inducing more effi-
cient financial markets in the economy. Then, the interest rate spread that proxies
financial market conditions will depend on the economic development. Also, unob-
served country-specific differences cannot be fully controlled in our OLS regressions.
Finally, the OLS regressions do not utilize the time-series dimension of the data since
all variables are averaged over the sample period. To address all these shortcomings,
we conduct dynamic panel GMM regressions by using the following 5-year dynamic
30
panel model as in Beck, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Levine (2007):
log yˆit = (θ1 + 1) log yˆit−1 + X′it−1θ + ασit + β∆˜it + γ∆˜itσit + δ∆˜it log yˆ1980,i + νit
where Xit−1 ≡ [hit−1 gN,it−1]; hit−1 is human capital in the previous period; gN,it−1 ≡
logNit − logNit−1 is the growth rate of the total population. Note that the specifi-
cation is rewritten as follows:
log yˆit − log yˆit−1 = θ1 log yˆit−1 + X′it−1θ + ασit + β∆˜it + γ∆˜itσit + δ∆˜it log yˆ1980,i + νit
where the LHS is 5-year growth rate of income per capita. Basically, the specification
for this dynamic panel GMM regression is the same as the one for the OLS regression,
while all variables are averaged over each 5-year period not the entire sample period,
1980–2010.
Since a lagged dependent variable log yˆit−1 is used as an independent variable
in the regression, one can use two specific GMM techniques in order to obtain the
consistency of estimators. One is the first-difference GMM developed by Arellano and
Bond (1991), and the other is the system GMM developed by Arellano and Bover
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). The main idea of both techniques is to use
lagged dependent and independent variables as instruments, assuming that the error
term νit is not serially correlated.
42
Blundell and Bond (1998) show that the system GMM yields more precise esti-
mators than the first-difference GMM in the case that variables in time series are
highly persistent, causing the first-differences to be weak instruments.43 We will re-
port the system GMM regression estimators as our baseline since it is reasonable
to think both income and the TFP growth carries persistence.44 Finally, there are
42 Specifically, the first-difference GMM regression uses lagged variables in levels only, while the
system GMM regression uses lagged variables both in levels and differences. Hence, the system
GMM has more moment conditions than the the first-difference GMM.
43 This is because, if so, the first-differences become almost uncorrelated with the lagged variables.
44 Halter, Oechslin and Zweimu¨ller (2014) explore the relationship between inequality and growth.
Since inequality — the Gini index — is highly persistent similarly to growth, they also use the system
31
one- and two-step estimators for the two GMM techniques. The two-step estimator
is asymptotically more efficient although efficiency gains are known typically small.
We report estimation results of both variants.45
The system GMM estimation results are summarized in Table 1.2. As shown
in the table, an increase in the interest rate adversely affects growth, confirming
the direct growth effect. Also, the coefficient of the interaction term between the
interest rate spread and volatility is negative and statistically significant in regressions
(1), (3), (5) and (7), which do not have the volatility regressor. However, it turns
out to be insignificant once the volatility is added as a regressor; see regressions
(2), (4), (6) and (8). We found that the coefficient of the volatility term becomes
negative and statistically significant once the interaction term between the interest
rate spread and volatility is dropped although we do not report the result here. This
suggests that the financial friction channel may not be a primary route through which
aggregate uncertainty affects growth negatively in the short run (five years). Finally,
the coefficient of the interaction term between the interest rate spread and initial
income turns out to be positive in every case. This implies that the negative growth
effects become smaller as the initial income increases, and thereby, supports the
asymptotic irrelevance. Consequently, the dynamic panel IV regressions corroborate
the empirical findings from the OLS regressions.46
GMM method as a baseline.
45 The Arellano-Bond robust estimators are calculated for the one-step estimation, and the Wind-
meijer bias-corrected estimators for the two-step.
46 We report the Hansen statistics instead of the Sargan statistics to check if the model is overi-
dentified since the Sargan statistic is not robust to heteroskedasticity (or autocorrelation) in the
error term; see Arellano and Bond, 1991. As shown in the table, the p-values on the Hansen test
of over-identifying restrictions suggest that the null of validity of all instruments cannot be re-
jected. It is also important to verify if there is no autocorrelation in the second-differenced error
term in checking the validity of instruments. To do this, we provide the Arellano-Bond test for the
second-order autocorrelation in the first-differenced errors ∆νi,t. Rejecting the null hypothesis of
no-autocorrelation at the second order implies that the moment conditions for the GMM regres-
sions are invalid. As shown in the table, the p-values do not reject the null hypothesis at order two,
suggesting that there is no evidence that the model is misspecified.
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1.4.1 Productivity and Financial Friction
The main mechanism that the financial friction adversely affects growth is quite
simple. The financial friction increases the wedge (the interest rate spread), and
hence, the borrowing rate too, with the interest rate r being fixed. Consequently,
some R&D projects are not initiated, while they would be “profitable” without the
financial friction. That is, the negative growth effects of the financial friction in our
theory are caused by a decrease in TFP growth led by suboptimal R&D investments,
and thus, the three empirical hypotheses must be relevant to TFP growth as well.
To verify this empirically, we first note that A˜i,t is given by:
log A˜i,t = log Yi,t − vi,t {αi,t logKi,t + (1− αi,t) logLi,t}
Following the convention, e.g., Benhabib and Spiegel, 2005; Caselli, 2005, we pick
αi,t = 1/3 for all countries and for any t in the 1980–2010 period. Similarly, the span
of control parameter vi,t is also homogeneous across countries and time-invariant.
There are several estimates of v for the U.S. Atkeson and Kehoe (2005)’s estimate is
0.85, while it is 0.79 in Buera and Shin (2011).47 Here, we set v = 0.80.48 We define
the efficiency unit of labor such that Li,t ≡ hi,tNi,t where hi,t is human capital per
worker and Ni,t is total population.
49 Again, data on Yi,t, Ki,t and Li,t come from the
PWT. Then, we can calculate the productivity A˜i,t and its average growth rate g¯A˜i .
Now, to check if the financial friction adversely affect growth of the TFP, we can
regress the following specification, which is the same as the one for income growth:
g¯A˜,i = X
′
iθ + ασ¯i + β
¯˜∆i + γ
¯˜∆iσ¯i + δ
¯˜∆i log yˆ1980,i + νi
47 Hsieh and Klenow (2009) estimate v from a different approach and suggest 0.50 for its estimate,
which is quite low.
48 Although we do not report here, the estimation results summarized in Table 1.3 and 1.4
presented below turn out robust to a small change of the value of v.
49 Following Benhabib and Spiegel (2005), we regard Ni,t as the total population rather than the
number of workers. When we use the number of workers, which is also provided in the PWT, the
results about β and δ are not changed qualitatively. However, the coefficient for the indirect growth
effect γ is not significant for some cases.
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Figure 1.5: Direct and Indirect Effects on TFP Growth
According to the theory, β and γ should be negative and statistically significant.
Meanwhile, for the asymptotic irrelevance, δ should be positive and statistically sig-
nificant, and therefore, the negative growth effects on the TFP must be smaller in
already developed countries with controlling for the degree of the financial friction
severity ¯˜∆i.
Table 1.3 shows estimation results from the OLS regression. As expected, the
growth effects of the financial friction still hold for the TFP, meaning that the finan-
cial friction deteriorates growth of the TFP both directly and indirectly, although
the magnitudes are smaller than those for income growth.50 Table 1.3 also shows
that an increase in GDP per capita mitigates the negative effect on growth of the
TFP although the significance is weak. Hence, one can argue that the asymptotic
irrelevance exists for growth of the TFP too, but less confident than the asymptotic
irrelevance for income growth. In overall, the results confirm the validity of the model
mechanism underlying the main theoretical conclusions.
50 Table 1.3 also shows that there exists a strong positive effect of human capital on TFP growth;
the initial human capital correlates positively with the average growth rate of the TFP. Intuitively,
it seems plausible to think that a larger stock of human capital encourages productivity-enhancing
investments, raising the growth of the TFP.
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Table 1.3: Financial Friction and TFP Growth (OLS)
Dependent Variable: Average Growth Rate of the TFP (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Independent Variable N = 74 N = 74 N = 74 N = 74
Interest Rate Spread −.140∗∗∗ −.115∗ −.602∗∗ −.594∗∗
(.044) (.059) (.274) (.274)
Interest Rate Spread × Volatility −.013∗∗∗ −.018∗ −.015∗∗∗ −.018∗
(.004) (.010) (.004) (.010)
Interest Rate Spread × Initial Income .057∗ .060∗
(.044) (.033)
Volatility .055 .071
(.085) (.084)
Initial Income −.661∗∗∗ −.698∗∗∗ −.969∗∗∗ −1.032∗∗∗
(.129) (.141) (.220) (.233)
Initial Human Capital 1.112∗∗∗ 1.194∗∗∗ 1.177∗∗∗ 1.286∗∗∗
(.374) (.397) (.371) (.394)
Population Growth .140 .123 .187 .168
(.119) (.122) (.121) (.123)
R2 .479 .482 .478 .506
Note: All regressors are the averages over the sample period of 1980–2010. Volatility is
the standard deviation of % growth rates during the same period. Initial income and human
capital are taken for 1980. Initial income is logged GDP per capita. We excluded any country
from the regressions either when the number of data points of the interest rate spread is smaller
than 20, which is two thirds of the total number of data points over the sample period, 1980–2010,
or when the average interest rate spread is larger than 20%. Constant terms are not shown.
Standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, ** and * significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Quantitatively, comparing the third and the fourth columns of Table 1.1 and 1.3
indicates that the direct effect for TFP growth is about a half of that for income
growth, while the indirect growth effects for both of them are similar to each other.
This implies that the direct growth effect emerges not only from the R&D investment
but also from the capital investment, while the indirect growth effect arises mainly
from the R&D investment.
To address the shortcomings of the OLS regressions, we conduct the dynamic
panel GMM regressions for 5-year TFP growth as we did for income growth. Table
1.4 summarizes the estimation results. Similarly to the results in Table 1.2 for income
growth, the direct and indirect growth effects are negative for the TFP growth,
while the indirect effect appears insignificant when the volatility term is added in the
regression; see regressions (2), (4), (6) and (8). The asymptotic irrelevance turns out
even less statistically significant than the OLS regressions for the period of 30-year.
This suggests that the asymptotic irrelevance for the TFP growth does not emerge
in short run, for example, over five years.
1.5 Conclusion
Financial frictions have been viewed as playing an important role in growth of a
nation. Motivated by the intuition that the degree of the financial friction severity
will be different in different development stages, we construct a tractable endogenous
growth model where entrepreneurial activities are constrained by financial frictions.
Our model has a novel feature; the tightness of the financial friction varies endoge-
nously by economic circumstance. This feature reveals important aspects of financial
frictions that the previous literature has not discover.
Among others, we show that the credit constraint is endogenously relaxed along
with economic growth, and hence, the negative growth effects disappear asymptot-
ically. This suggests that impacts of the financial friction on growth are, at best,
temporary. This finding also leads to identifying heterogeneous impacts of the finan-
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cial friction across countries. In the transition phase, the negative growth effect of
the financial friction gets more severe in a poorer country.
However, the simplicity of our model entails some important caveats. Our two-
period model does not allow entrepreneurs’ self-financing. As shown by Buera and
Shin (2011), self-financing could be an effective substitute for well-functioning finan-
cial markets. As a result, the negative impact on growth will be somewhat diminished
quantitatively. Also, other types of financial frictions possibly matter in reality. Al-
though we consider a particular type of financial friction, which is driven by informa-
tion symmetry, another type of financial friction may explain the spread of long-term
growth across countries as well as explaining the negative growth effect of “too much
finance”; see Arcand et al. (2015).
Regarding policy implications, financial friction still has a considerable impact on
output level even in very long run although the growth effects gradually disappear.
That is, cross-country differences in the national income caused by different finan-
cial market conditions persist. Related, the economy converges slower to the steady
state as it suffers from more severe financial friction. The asymptotic irrelevance,
therefore, does not mean that policy makers do not need to enhance financial con-
ditions. Obviously, policies mitigating credit constraints are required to minimize
output losses.
Finally, the asymptotic irrelevance does not necessarily imply growth acceleration
over time. This is because there are many other important growth determinants, for
instance, human capital, culture, institutions and geography.51 The asymptotic irrel-
evance rather argues that financial factors may not be “fundamental determinants”
underlying long-term economic growth of society, although they do matter for growth
in the short run. Hence, it would be also interesting to analyze those fundamental
factors that determine growth even in very long run.
51 Our model, however, predicts growth acceleration with other things being constant, which
seems, in fact, true in reality once an economy takes off after a period of long-lasting poverty; see,
for example, Fact 2 in Jones and Romer (2010).
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Chapter 2
Culture, Institutions and Growth
2.1 Introduction
Everything changes and nothing remains still ... and ... you cannot step twice into
the same stream. fdsjafjdkslafdjfdjslkadffsdfsfdsjklfdafsajfkdsHeraclitus, Cratylus
One of the most important and interesting questions in economics is “What is the
secret of economic growth?” Numerous economists have tried to uncover the secret
to economic prosperity. Thanks to their efforts, we have begun to answer critical
questions, but many gaps in our understanding of economic prosperity remain.
In particular, we do not know much about the role that culture and institutions
play in the development of prosperity. This gap in understanding persists, even
though economists have long regarded those factors as fundamental to determining
long-term growth. Notably, North (1991) defines institutions as “humanly devised
constraints that structure political, economic and social interactions,” and emphasizes
interactions between the evolution of institutions and the development of societies to
understand various development paths across countries.
North distinguishes the institutions according to formal and informal constraints.
Formal constraints represent rules such as constitutions, laws and property rights,
while informal ones are restrictions such as customs, codes of conduct, taboos and
40
traditions. For the sake of exposition, one can generally refer to the formal and
informal constraints as institutions and culture, respectively. Looking at different
historical episodes, North argues that the interaction between formal and informal
constraints, or institutions and culture in our terms, plays a crucial role in the deter-
mination of the development of society. Ultimately, he raises the following question:
“What is the relationship between formal and informal constraints?” (North, 1991,
p. 111).1
In this chapter, we try to understand how the interplay between culture and
institutions determines economic prosperity. To this end, we develop a dynamic
model in which culture, institutions and long-term growth are jointly determined.
Since culture and institutions are highly abstract and broad notions, we focus on a
specific dimension of culture and institutions in this chapter. Namely, we investigate
interactions between culture, specified as the degree of individualism, and institutions,
defined by protection of property rights over innovations.2
To achieve concreteness in the analysis, we interpret individualism and collec-
tivism as agents’ types that are transmitted over generations.3 Based on the empirical
evidence on individualism/collectivism and innovation, we assume that an individ-
ualist is a type that has comparative and absolute advantages in innovation, while
a collectivist has comparative and absolute advantages in the production of goods.
The transmission of the two types over generations is partly determined by parents’
altruistic care for their children. A parent is altruistic in that he wants to maximize
his child’s consumption. Since a child’s consumption in the next period is affected
1 In the same vein, Tabellini (2008a) recently raises a similar question that asks how the inter-
action between individual values and formal feature of institutions — culture and institutions in
our terms, respectively — affects economic outcomes. In particular, he asks the following question:
“How do values interact with economic incentives and with formal features of institutions to influ-
ence economic and political behavior?” (Tabellini, 2008a, p. 258). In this regard, Tabellini (2008b)
investigates how values (trustworthiness) and formal institutions (the quality of legal enforcement)
interact with each other in a dynamic setting.
2 As a seminal contribution on the theoretical analysis of property rights in economics, one can
refer to Grossman and Kim (1995). For its growth implications, see Grossman and Kim (1996).
3 Similarly, Galor and Michalopoulos (2011) interpret entrepreneurship as a risk-neutral type
and explore how cultural transmission of the entrepreneurial trait over a risk-averse type affects
long-term growth.
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by the child’s culture type, a parent tries to transmit the culture type that leads to
larger expected consumption for his child.
To answer North’s longstanding question on the interaction between culture and
institutions, it is critical to understand a strategic complementarity between the
altruistic parental efforts on the transmission of cultural traits and the endogenous
determination of the degree to which property rights over innovations are secured.
The intuition is simple. If the government heavily taxes innovations in the future,
parents will try to raise children as collectivists, not individualists. This is because
an individualist’s competitive edge in innovation is no longer valuable under the high
risk of government expropriation of innovation. Consequently, the society becomes
collectivist in the subsequent period, i.e., there are few individualists, which, in turn,
implies that there will be a small number of innovators since an individualist is more
likely to be an innovator based on his competitive edge in innovation.
With this dynamics in mind, suppose that the degree of protection of property
rights is determined by a certain political decision rule, for instance, majority voting,
that gives stronger political power to an interest group that has a larger number of
members. Then, if society is collectivist, the government tends to tax innovations
severely. This is because an individualist is more likely to be an innovator, so that
collectivist society that consists of few individualists will not have enough innovators
to impose a lower rate of tax on innovation. This is the expropriation regime where
innovators are few, and hence, politically impotent. By the same logic, if the gov-
ernment does not tax innovations in the future, parents will try to raise children as
individualists, causing the society to become individualistic. Since an individualist is
more inclined to be an innovator than a collectivist, the number of innovators would
be enough to enforce a lower tax rate on innovation. This is the non-expropriation
regime where innovators are many, and hence, politically strong. Consequently, there
are two different steady states with opposing properties: individualistic society with
strong enforcement of property rights and collectivist society with weak enforcement
of property rights.
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What are the growth implications of cross-country differences in institutional
qualities in terms of protection of property rights over individual innovations? In
the model, long-term economic growth is determined by the mass of innovations.
Poor protection of property rights undermines long-term growth since it lowers the
incentive to innovate. This is a direct effect of institutions on growth. Also, recall
that poor protection of property rights accompanies collectivism. Then, long-term
growth is hampered again since collectivist society has fewer competent innovators
compared to individualistic society; this contrast owes to the different advantages in
innovation between a collectivist and an individualist. This is an indirect effect of
institutions on growth through a change in the state of culture. In sum, collectivist
society operating in the expropriation regime falls into the low-growth trap, which
is a bad steady state. In contrast, individualistic society enjoys high growth in the
long run since there are more competent innovators and individual inventions are
encouraged by a government which does not expropriate individual achievements.
This is a good steady state.
The strategic complementarity provides not only multiple static equilibria (mul-
tiple steady states) but also multiple dynamic equilibria with contrasting properties.
This is the fundamental economic instability arising from endogenous regime switch-
ing over time. As we will later observe, the model admits a region where multiple equi-
libria emerge in every period and an equilibrium is solely determined by self-fulfilling
expectations. Hence, if this region is near the bad steady state (low-growth trap), a
collectivist society will suffer from not only low growth but also excess volatility. The
intuition behind the multiple dynamic equilibria is similar to the one for the multiple
steady states. In the model, parents must forecast how much the government will tax
innovations in the next period in order to maximize children’s consumption.4 If par-
ents form negative expectations about the protection of property rights in the next
period, i.e., the government will tax innovations heavily, then the expected return of
4 Technically, this forecasting behavior translates to forward-looking properties in the dynamics
of culture; see equation (15) in Section 3.
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being an individualist will be small. Hence, they try to raise children as collectivists,
resulting in too few innovators to implement secure property rights. This causes the
government to tax innovations severely, fulfilling the pessimistic beliefs. On the other
hand, if they form positive expectations about the protection of property rights, i.e.,
the government will not expropriate innovations, then society will be individualistic.
This makes the fraction of innovators large enough to implement strong protection
of property rights, confirming the optimistic beliefs.
Finally, by considering culture and institutions, our theoretical framework pro-
vides broader perspectives on policy implications for growth miracles. We show that
once the economy escapes from the low-growth trap, it may experience high growth
over a long period of time as if it had recovered “growth potential,” which we inter-
pret as a growth miracle. The thing is that, in our framework, such a growth miracle
is possible not only by changing economic factors, e.g., tax policies, but also by up-
grading political factors throughout political reforms or improvement of individual
rights to private ownership. Accordingly, our framework uncovers more comprehen-
sive policy prescriptions that encompass not only sound economic policies but also
desirable reform packages in political environments.
Related Literature
Our motivation is based on the idea that culture and institutions are the most
fundamental determinants of long-term growth, a vision apparent in recent empirical
studies such as Acemoglu et al. (2001) and Gorodnichenko and Roland (2017).5 How-
ever, Acemoglu et al. (2001) mostly focus on institutions, so that the study is silent
on the interactions between culture and institutions although it acknowledges those
interactions are important. Gorodnichenko and Roland (2017) also investigate a role
of individualism on the dispersion of income across countries. Our research comple-
ments Gorodnichenko and Roland (2017) in that we provide a theoretical framework
5 There is another view focusing on other fundamental factors such as genetic or geographical
aspects, e.g., Diamond (1997), Sachs (2001), Ashraf et al. (2010), Vollrath (2011), Ashraf and Galor
(2013), among others.
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for growth implications with culture and institutions being interconnected.6
Regarding the strategic complementarity between culture and institutions, our
research is closely related to the seminal contribution by Azariadis and Drazen (1990)
that theoretically establishes the possibility of the group convergence by proposing
the concept of threshold externalities. Although there are many subsequent papers
that investigate sources of such externalities, e.g., Galor and Zeira (1993), Durlauf
(1993), Laing et al. (1995), Redding (1996), Sorger (2002), Antinolfi et al. (2007)
and Azariadis et al. (2016), at least to the best of our knowledge, this research is
the first attempt to lend another source of threshold externality arising from the
interaction between culture and institutions. Also, the low-growth trap in the model
conceptually resembles the poverty trap, e.g., Azariadis (1996) and Azariadis and
Stachurski (2005). It can also be reconciled with the well-known empirical findings
such as “The Great Divergence” over the very long run, e.g., Maddison (1995), and
the spread of growth in recent decades, e.g., Jones and Romer (2010) and Jones
(2015).
The endogenous regime-switching property in our model is related to Azariadis
and Smith (1998), Aghion et al. (1999) and Matsuyama (2007, 2013). In those mod-
els, the economy features endogenous business cycles arising from regime switching
affiliated with tight or slack credit constraints. Here, we show that the interaction
between culture and institutions generates regime switching, and hence, endogenous
growth cycles driven by self-fulfilling expectations.7
6 Galor and Michalopoulos (2011), Doepke and Zilibotti (2013) and Chakraborty et al. (2016)
investigate the culture-growth relationship focusing on entrepreneurship. de la Croix and Delavallade
(2016) try to understand how religions affect growth via fertility decisions. Barro and McClearly
(2003) demonstrate interesting empirical evidence on contrasting growth effects of believing in and
belonging to religions. In a more general perspective, Kim and Lee (2015) discuss various roles
of non-productive social values on growth dynamics. These studies, however, abstract from any
concern on institutions or on interactions between culture and institutions. Meanwhile, Tabellini
(2010) applies novel instrumental variables to identify a causal effect of culture, which is independent
of institutional factors, on economic development of the European regions.
7 There are, of course, other sources of endogenous cycles. Matsuyama (1999), for instance,
demonstrates endogenous switching between the no-innovation and innovation regimes, which he
calls the Solow and Romer regimes, respectively. This arises from the strategic complementarity
between the market size and the incentive to innovate. See also Boldrin and Woodford (1990) for
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Finally, the transmission of culture traits over generations in the model shares
essential features of the one in Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001). In particular, Bisin
and Verdier (2015) provide a general theoretical framework that jointly determines
development paths of culture and institutions as in our model. We investigate specific
growth implications consistent with empirical evidence. To do that, we develop a
novel growth theory featuring endogenous determination of culture and institutions
in an otherwise standard growth model.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents empirical facts
on individualism, protection of property rights and growth. Section 2.3 introduces the
model. Section 2.4 investigates culture dynamics and its growth implications with in-
stitutions being fixed. In Section 2.5, we let institutions be endogenously determined
by majority voting. We then explore how culture and institutions interact with each
other in Section 2.6. Section 2.7 analyzes growth with culture and institutions being
endogenously determined. Section 8 explores policy implications for growth miracles
at various angles. Section 2.9 concludes with some remarks.
2.2 Empirical Analysis
We briefly explore empirical facts about some notable relationships between individ-
ualism, innovation, protection of property rights and growth. Prior to presenting the
facts, we briefly discuss the Hofstede individualism index (or score), which we will
intensively use, to describe how it was constructed and what it measures. Details of
each part can be found in Appendix B.1.
The Hofstede individualism index
The Hofstede individualism index was constructed from an international employee
attitude survey program for IBM, a large multinational corporation. The survey was
conducted between 1967 and 1973 in two survey rounds covering 72 countries with
an excellent survey of models featuring endogenous business cycles.
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20 languages. The analysis focused on differences in answers on questions about
employee values across countries.
To be concise, the individualism index measures the extent to which it is believed
that individuals are supposed to take care of themselves as opposed to being strongly
integrated and loyal to a cohesive group (Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2017).8 A
collectivist society assumes a broad responsibility for their members, leading to goal
congruency and conformity to organizations (Hofstede, 2001). Accordingly, one of
the key criteria identifying individualism and collectivism is how much people are
willing to conform to the organizations they are involved in.
The main advantage of Hofstede’s individualism index is that it has been validated
in many subsequent studies and widely accepted in relevant academic fields such as
psychology, sociology, and political science — see, for examples, Chapter 5 of Hofstede
(2001) for a review — and recently in economics as well.
Culture-Innovation relationship
There are many empirical studies using the Hofstede individualism index that re-
veal individualism is more beneficial for innovation compared to collectivism. Among
others, Gorodnichenko and Roland (2017) and Acemoglu et al. (2015) conduct com-
prehensive cross-country empirical analyses and find that individualism encourages
innovation more than collectivism both quantitatively and qualitatively.9
However, the cross-country analyses have a critical shortcoming that they may
not fully control for differences in institutional factors or unobserved country-specific
differences. To tackle this problem, following Gorodnichenko and Roland (2017),
8 In individualistic societies, people are autonomous and independent from their in-groups: fam-
ily, tribe, company, nation, etc. Individualists give priority to their personal goals over the goals of
their in-groups and behave primarily on the basis of their attitudes rather than the norms of their
in-groups. On the other hand, collectivist cultures give priority to group goals of their in-groups,
shape their behavior primarily on the basis of in-group norms, and behave in a communal way
(Triandis, 2001).
9 To be more specific, Gorodnichenko and Roland (2017) focus relatively more on innovation
quantities, while Acemoglu et al. (2015) pay attention to innovation qualities. For more details, see
Appendix B.1.
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we examine the effect of culture on innovations within a given country, and thereby,
holding institutional differences and other country-specific factors constant. From the
public micro data (IPUMS) for the USA, we find evidence that, controlling for other
factors relevant to occupation choices, the propensity to choose research-oriented jobs
increases when the respondent’s self-reported country of ancestry is more individual-
istic in terms of the Hofstede individualism index. This suggests that an individualist
(a more individualistic person) has a comparative advantage in innovation compared
to a collectivist (a less individualistic person) in the sense of Roy (1951): self-selection
based on comparative advantages. Although this evidence itself does not necessarily
mean that an individualist also has an absolute advantage in innovation, the empir-
ical fact that individualism induces more and better innovations than collectivism
suggests an individualist also has an absolute advantage.
The same logic for this identification method can be applied to Italian immigrants
to the USA. Many scholars, e.g., Putnam (1994), argue that northern and southern
Italy are vastly different culturally and historically, and the northern part is more
individualistic. The estimation result from the regression that controls for many
relevant factors to occupation choices shows consistently that an immigrant whose
father came from northern Italy is more inclined to have a research-oriented job than
the one whose father came from southern Italy.
Culture-Growth relationship
In the previous part, we find that individualism is more beneficial for innova-
tion, which has been regarded as the driving force behind virtuous growth dynamics.
Hence, it is natural to predict that a more individualistic society will grow faster at
least in long run. Gorodnichenko and Roland (2017) provide evidence that individ-
ualism, in fact, encourages growth over very long periods of time such as 1500–2000
and 1820–2000 using the Maddison data. We corroborate this observation by provid-
ing similar evidence for relatively shorter periods of time with more controls relevant
to growth. We also conduct the same regression with the Penn World Table data
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(PWT) over a recent period. The estimation results with the PWT also indicate the
same pattern. One advantage of using the PWT is that we can regress growth of the
TPF on individualism. The TFP growth rate increases with stronger individualism as
well, which is consistent with the observation that individualism is more productive
in innovation than collectivism.
Culture-Institutions relationship
Many scholars, e.g., North (1990), Posner (1997), Tabellini (2008a, 2008b) and
Greif and Tabellini (2010), have argued that culture (values) and institutions (formal
rules) are interconnected, and especially, they are mutually reinforced over time. For
example, Max Weber noted a constructive role for individualism in the development
of the English economy through the rise of capitalism, an economic system that
generally guarantees individual property rights. He argued that one of the critical
ingredients in the rise of capitalism in England was the spread of Calvinism that
emphasized “individualistic motives of rational legal acquisition by virtue of one’s
own ability and initiative” and “had the psychological effect of freeing the acquisition
of goods from the inhibitions of traditionalistic ethics” (Ball, 2001). For the reverse
direction, Choi et al. (2015) provide evidence that experiences of a certain type of
institutions affect the development of preferences toward a market economy. They
find that North Korean refugees settled in South Korea exhibit weaker support for
market economy than native-born South Koreans, implying that institutions also
affect preferences (culture).
Related to this, Gorodnichenko and Roland (2017) find empirical evidence that
suggests mutual reinforcement relationships between individualism and protection
against expropriation risk. We conduct a similar empirical test. In addition to
the protection against expropriation risk taken from the International Country Risk
Guide, we also use another measure of protection of property rights from Gwartney
et al. (2015).10 As expected, the Hofstede individualism index correlates positively
10 The past version of this dataset is used in Acemoglu et al. (2001).
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with both the protection against expropriation risk and the protection of property
rights. The result from regressions where the endogeneity problem is alleviated by
proper instrument variables shows that individualism induces better protection of
property rights, and in reverse, better protection of property rights also induces more
individualistic culture. This suggests that individualism and protection of property
rights take a form of strategic complementarity.
Summary
We have three empirical findings and summarize them as follows:
Fact 1. Individualism and Innovation: an individualist has comparative and
absolute advantages in innovation compared to a collectivist.
Facta2. Individualism and Growth: societies with more individualistic cultures
enjoy higher economic growth in long run.
Facta3. Individualism and Property Rights: the interaction between individu-
alism and protection of property rights takes a form of strategic complementarity.
We now build a theoretical framework that starts with Fact 1 as an assumption
and proves Fact 2 and 3 as conclusions. The reason why Fact 1 holds can be, at least
partially, found in some academic fields such as social psychology.11 From an eco-
nomics point of view, a more individualistic culture would provide larger incentives to
innovate in line with North (1990)’s argument that institutions are all about incentive
systems.12 If this is true, the cultural dimension of individualism/collectivism can be
characterized by a specific incentive system such as social status rewards for innova-
tion, punishments for dissenting or standing out, and etc, which will endogenously
change over time — and hence will be an interesting topic to delve into.13 In Section
11 For instance, one can refer to Niu and Sternberg (2001), Goncalo and Staw (2006) and Cˇerne
et al. (2013).
12 “Institutions are the rules of the game · · · In consequence they structure incentives in human
exchange, whether political, social, or economic · · · .”(North, 1990, p. 3).
13 Specifically, Friedrich Hayek points out some virtues of individualism that may promote in-
novation as follows: “It is true that the virtues which are less esteemed and practised now —
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3, we adopt a reduced form approach that captures the idea that individualism can
be interpreted as an incentive system for innovation, resulting in higher efficiency of
overall innovation. By doing that, we can focus on examining why Fact 2 and Fact
3 hold while simply postulating Fact 1 as an assumption since Fact 2 and Fact 3 are
far more important to understand in economics than Fact 1. We hope that future
research will address incentive systems in an endogenous fashion in order to explain
Fact 1 as an economic proposition as well.14
2.3 A Theoretical Framework
We consider a simple overlapping generations model in which individuals’ culture
traits are endogenously determined. Since we are focusing on a specific dimension of
culture, namely individualism verses collectivism, an individual’s culture type S is
either I or C where I stands for an “individualist” and C does for a “collectivist,”
i.e., S ∈ {I, C}. Each t = 0, 1, · · · generation consists of a continuum of risk-neutral
agents with unit measure. Also, there are homogeneous producers (firms) with unit
measure producing consumption goods. Each agent of generation t is born in the
middle of period t − 1 and socialized by his parent and colleagues. He, then, earns
income in the second period and consumes in the last period as in Figure 2.1. In the
second period, each agent chooses to be either a worker or an innovator depending on
his own culture type and individual innovation skill, indexed by z ∈ [0, 1]. Workers
supply labor in the competitive labor market in order to earn labor income, and
innovators create new ideas that enhance productivity of the consumption goods
producers. Innovators own property rights on the new ideas and sell the rights to the
producers competitively.
independence, self-reliance, and the willingness to bear risks, the readiness to back one’s own con-
viction against a majority, and the willingness to voluntary co-operations with one’s neighbours —
are essentially those on which the working of an individualistic society rests.” (Hayek, 1944, p. 218).
14 Regarding the evolution of institutions, interacting with cultural aspects, there are papers
adopting game-theoretical approaches for deeper microfoundations. Especially, one can consult
Greif (1994) for individualism verses collectivism.
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Figure 2.1: Time Line
Culture traits transmission
In each period t, every agent of generation t belonging to one of the culture groups,
S ∈ {I, C}, gives birth to one child and makes an effort dSt ∈ [0, 1] to transmit his
own culture trait S to his child. At the same time, outside home, individuals’ culture
traits are affected by their friends, colleagues, and etc.15 To capture this idea, we
define the transition probability P SS˜t ∈ [0, 1] which denotes a probability that a child
born by a S-type parent becomes S˜ type in t+ 1 period (S, S˜ ∈ {I, C}) as follows:
P SSt+1 = d
S
t + (1− dSt )piSt , (2.1)
P SS˜t+1 = (1− dSt )piS˜t S˜ 6= S. (2.2)
where piSt ∈ [0, 1] is the fraction of S-type agents of generation t, and hence, piIt +piCt =
1 for every t ≥ 0. In our framework, for example, P IIt+1 = dIt + (1 − dIt )qt and
P ICt+1 = (1− dIt )(1− qt) where qt denotes the fraction of individualists in generation t,
and 1− qt is that of collectivists. Apparently, it is natural to parameterize the state
of culture in the economy by the fraction of individualists, qt; an economy with a
larger q is more individualistic (or less collectivist).
Given the transition probabilities P SSt+1 and P
SS˜
t+1, the fraction of individualists q
15 Dohmen et al. (2012) deliver comprehensive evidence that advocates the intergenerational
transmission process of individual attitudes that we are now considering. More precisely, they show
that risk and trust attitudes are affected by both their parents and prevailing attitudes in their local
environment.
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Figure 2.2: Culture Dynamics
evolves by the following law of motion:
qt+1 = qt + qt(1− qt)(dIt − dCt ) (2.3)
There are some notable comments on this framework. First, generation t+1’s culture
traits are solely determined by generation t, and therefore, the culture parameter,
qt+1, is predetermined in view of generation t + 1. Also, a parent cannot entirely
determine his own child’s culture type as long as dSt is smaller than one; the social
environment plays a role as well.
Figure 2.2 describes evolution of the state of culture, qt, given by equation (2.3).
Let us denote δt ≡ dIt − dCt ∈ [−1, 1] the intensity of individualism transmission rela-
tive to collectivism. Then, qt increases over time when δt ∈ (0, 1]. In a word, society
becomes more individualistic as parents transmit individualism relatively stronger
than collectivism. The opposite case that δt ∈ [−1, 0) leads to decreasing individual-
ism over time. Intuitively, qt+1 = qt if δt = 0.
There are two trivial steady states, q = 0 and q = 1. When qt = 0 (or qt = 1),
qt+s = 0 (or qt+s = 1) ∀s ≥ 1. That is, in the case of extreme cultural biases where
society is composed of only one type of cultures, it does not admit the other type of
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culture forever. This is simply because there is no one who can transmit the other
culture type in those cases; see equations (1) and (2).
Agent’s problem
After the socialization that determines culture types S ∈ {I, C} for generation t,
each agent draws his own creativity z ∈ [0, 1] from a continuous time-invariant c.d.f.,
F (·), at the beginning of period t.16 Then, the probability of success in innovation
(or individual efficiency level in innovation) is given by ψS(z) ∈ [0, 1] for culture
type S where dψS(z)/dz > 0. Without loss of generality, we assume that ψS(0) = 0
and ψS(1) = 1. In this environment, a S-type agent of generation t with a skill
level z chooses his occupation by maximizing the discounted expected value of family
consumption net of effort costs. To do so, he solves the following problem:
vSt (z) ≡ max
oSt (z)∈{W,E},dSt ∈[0,1]
cSt+1(z)− κt(dSt ) + βEz[cS
′
t+2(z)|S]
s.t. cSt+1(z) = max
{
eSwt, (1− ρt)ψS(z)λSpt
}
+ θt,
Ez[c
S′
t+2(z)|S] = P SSt+1Ez[cSt+2(z)] + P SS˜t+1Ez[cS˜t+2(z)].
where P SSt+1 and P
SS˜
t+1 are given by (1) and (2).
The family value, vSt (z), consists of two parts. The first part is utility from what
he consumes when old, cSt+1 (z). He chooses his occupation in order to maximize the
consumption. At the same time, he is altruistic in that he cares his child’s utility.
Specifically, vSt (z) is increasing in his child’s expected consumption, E[c
S′
t+2 (z) |S]. He,
thus, tries to get his child’s expected consumption larger at the cost of disutility from
shaping her child’s culture type, κt
(
dSt
)
. We now describe details of each part in
vSt (z).
Occupation Choice: To maximize his own consumption in period t + 1, cSt+1 (z),
16 The c.d.f., F (z), does not need to be differentiable. All of the theoretical conclusions hold
without differentiability of the skill distribution.
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he chooses his occupation after drawing creativity parameter z. oSt (z) ∈ {W,E} is
occupation choice between a “worker” and an “e(i)nnovator” for a S-type agent with
z. If he becomes a worker, he earns eSwt consumption goods as labor income where e
S
denotes culture-specific effort level of labor supply, or roughly speaking, working hours
for production of consumption goods. On the other hand, if he becomes an innovator,
he succeeds with probability of ψS(z) that strictly increases in z. Meanwhile, λS is the
culture-specific efficiency level in innovation, and pt is the market price of property
rights.
Finally, the government randomly expropriates private property rights with a
probability of ρt ∈ [0, ρ¯] where ρ¯ < 1.17 Hence, ρ captures the institutional quality of
society proxied by the “expropriation risk” a` la Acemoglu et al. (2001). Equivalently,
one can also interpret ρ as a tax rate on innovation by the law of large numbers. θt
is a lump-sum transfer that is equally distributed to all agents by the government
through revenues from expropriations of property rights. Note that the utility from
consumption is assumed to be linear, i.e, risk-neutral. Hence, the uncertainty asso-
ciated with innovation is irrelevant to the occupation choice, and this simplifies the
analysis a lot.18
In the model, culture (individualism/collectivism) plays a role via differences
in the efficiency in the production of goods represented by eS and in innovation
parametrized by λS. Regarding the culture-specific efficiency levels, we posit the
following condition, which is crucially based on the empirical evidence of Fact 1:
17 We will discuss what ρ¯ means in detail when investigating a role of ρ¯ in making growth miracles
in Section 8.
18 More generally, with a utility function u(c), the agent problem is given by:
vSt (z;β) ≡ max
oSt (z)∈{W,E},dSt ∈[0,1]
uSt+1(z)− κt(dSt ) + βEz[uS
′
t+2(z)|S]
s.t. uSt+1 (z) = max
{
u
(
cSWt+1
)
,E[u
(
cSEt+1
) |z]} ,
cSWt+1 = e
Swt + θt, c
SE
t+1 = λ
Spt + θt,
E[u
(
cSEt+1
) |z] = (1− ρt)ψS (z)u (cSEt+1)+ ρtψS (z)u (θt) + [1− ψS (z)]u (θt) ,
Ez[u
S′
t+2 (z) |S] = PSSt+1Ez[uSt+2 (z)] + PSS˜t+1Ez[uS˜t+2 (z)].
55
Assumption 3 λ ≡ λI > λC ≡ 1; e ≡ eC > eI ≡ 1.
Assumption 1 indicates that individualism is better in innovation than collectivism
but worse for the production of goods. Also note that, under Assumption 1, εI ≡
eI/λI = 1/λ < 1 and εC ≡ eC/λC = e > 1, implying that, with everything else same,
an individualist’s opportunity cost of being an innovator is smaller than a collecivist’s
opportunity cost of being an innovator. Hence, Assumption 1 implies that an individ-
ualist, ceteris paribus, has comparative and absolute advantages in innovation, while
a collectivist has comparative and absolute advantages in the production of goods;
see Fact 1.19
Parental Effort: As already noted, a parent is altruistic in that he wants to raise
his child’s consumption that depends on his child’s creativity level, z. Since a child’s
creativity level, z, is drawn at the beginning of period t+1, a parent do not know his
child’s ability in period t. Hence, a parent tries to maximize his child’s expected con-
sumption over z. For simplicity, we assume that parents’ skill levels do not correlate
with children’s skill levels.
Future consumption depends not only on z but also on children’s culture type
S ′ ∈ {I, C}, which is conditional on parents’ culture type S through the transition
probabilities, P SS and P SS˜. Therefore, a child’s expected consumption is conditioned
on his parent’s culture trait as in the agent problem. To increase the expected
consumption, each parent makes the altruistic effort dSt in order to transmit his own
culture type S to his child. Meanwhile, the parental care, dSt , incurs costs, measured
19 For the other part of Assumption 1 such that e ≡ eC > eI ≡ 1, one can think of a situation
that collectivists work together, and their production, say G, is super-additive such that, for any
positive N , G(1, 1, · · · , 1) = Ne > N when N collectivist agents co-operate to produce goods.
If they equally divide the total production Ne over N coworkers, each agent gets e > 1. This
argument is based on the fact that collectivist cultures emphasize goal congruency and conformity
to organizations (Hofstede, 2001). Therefore, when working as a team, collectivists are likely to
have a tightly integrated and cohesive team that acts as a monolithic unit, resulting in a higher
efficiency in the production of goods. Also, there is evidence that collectivists tend not to indulge
in social loafing; people exerting less effort to achieve a goal when they work in a group than when
they work alone, see e.g., Earley (1989). In a similar spirit, Gorodnichenko and Roland (2017) also
posit that collectivists have a competitive edge in the production of final goods since collectivism
makes coordinated actions easier.
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by κt(d
S
t ). It is worth noting that, as is obvious from the problem, the occupation
choice oSt (z) and the optimal level of the parental effort d
S
t are independent of each
other, and thereby, dSt does not depend on the individual creativity level z, but only
on his culture type S. This is simply because cSt+1 and c
S′
t+2 are separable. This
property simplifies the analysis a lot along with the risk-neutrality on consumptions.
Voting for Institutional Quality: According to the time line illustrated in Figure
2.1, each agent of generation t votes for the institutional quality in period t, ρt,
after the occupation choice. For that, he will be able to choose a more preferred
institutional quality given any pair of (ρ1,t, ρ2,t) under his optimal choices of o
S
t (z)
and dSt . For a clearer understanding of the model mechanism, for the time being,
we take ρt as exogenously given for all t ≥ 0. Later, we will let it be determined
by majority voting in each period t given state variables (At−1, qt) where At−1 is
aggregate productivity and qt is the state of culture.
Producer’s problem
There are homogeneous producers with unit measure producing consumption
goods using the following technology:
Yt = A
α
t L
η
t A¯
1−α
t (2.4)
where A¯t is the average level of productivity in period t, and it is the same as At in
any symmetric equilibrium. Lt is aggregate labor in efficiency units. As standard in
the endogenous growth literature, A¯t reflects the positive externality of innovations in
forms of knowledge diffusion. Technically, this assumption gives rise to the linearity
of the model, and thereby, analytical simplicity.20
20 Note that, in any symmetric equilibrium, equation (4) collapses to Yt = AtL
η
t , the technology
linear in knowledge. The main conclusions in this chapter are not changed without the positive
externality of knowledge.
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The productivity At evolves by the following fashion:
At = γtAt−1 (2.5)
We let γt = σXt (σ > 0) where Xt is aggregate innovation created by generation
t.21 Hence, the long-term growth rate of GDP per capita in a steady state (where
occupation choices, parental effort, and prices are stationary, while consumptions,
profits and the output are growing at the same rate), say gy, is given by:
gy = σX − 1 (2.6)
gy is strictly increasing in X, which is the aggregate innovation in a steady state.
In each period t, given any price vector, (wt, pt), each producer maximizes profits
pit by hiring Lt and purchasing Xt that solve the following problem:
pit ≡ max
Lt≥0,Xt≥0
Yt − wtLt − ptXt
where Yt and At are given by equations (2.4) and (2.5), respectively.
Equilibrium with fixed institutions
In any equilibrium, producers maximize profit, given the wage wt and the price
of ideas pt, by hiring workers and purchasing ideas until the marginal production of
labor and ideas are the same as the wage and the price of innovation, respectively.
Then, the prices are determined in a symmetric equilibrium as follows:
wt =
∂Yt
∂Lt
= ηAαt L
η−1
t A¯
1−α
t = ηAtL
η−1
t = ησAt−1XtL
η−1
t (2.7)
pt =
∂Yt
∂At
∂At
∂Xt
= σAt−1αAα−1t L
η
t A¯
1−α
t = ασAt−1L
η
t (2.8)
21 More generally, one can assume that γt = G(Xt) where G(·) is monotone increasing, but the
main results are not changed.
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which implies that each producer earns the same profit, pit = (1 − α − η)Yt in a
symmetric equilibrium.
Meanwhile, each agent of generation t chooses an occupation that yields a higher
consumption cSt+1(z). As said, his own consumption c
S
t+1(z) and his child’s consump-
tion cSt+2(z) are separable. Hence, it is easy to derive the skill threshold (z
I
t , z
C
t ) such
that a S-type agent with z ≥ zSt becomes an innovator, and a worker otherwise.
Since the probability of success in innovation, ψS(z), is monotone increasing in z,
the skill threshold zSt is unique for any price vector (wt, pt). For simplicity, we let
ηˆt ≡ η/(α(1 − ρt)) and xt ≡ Xt/Lt. Also recall that εS ≡ eS/λS is a S-type agent’s
opportunity cost of being an innovator. Then, using equations (2.7) and (2.8), we
have22:
zSt = min
{
(ψS)−1(εS ηˆtxt), 1
} ∀S ∈ {I, C} (2.9)
To derive the optimal level of parental effort dSt explicitly, we let κt(d
S) ≡ κ(dS, At)
as a quadratic function in dS such that κt(d
S) = κAt(d
S)2/2. Note that κt(d
S) is linear
in At. This guarantees stationarity of d
S
t against permanent growth of the economy.
The optimal effort level dst is then derived as follows:
dIt =
{
βκ−1(1− qt)∆t+1, ∆t+1 ≥ 0
0, o.w.
(2.10)
dCt =
{
βκ−1qt(−∆t+1), ∆t+1 ≤ 0
0, o.w.
(2.11)
where ∆t+1 ≡ Ez[cIt+2(z) − cCt+2(z)]/At. That is, ∆t+1 is the premium of being an
individualist relative to a collectivist for generation t + 1, adjusted by the current
productivity level, At, for its stationarity against permanent growth. κ > 0 is a
constant that measures disutility from dst . Later, we will show that if κ > 0 is
sufficiently large, the premium of being an individualist ∆t+1 is bounded both above
22 Equation (2.9) implies that the skill threshold is increasing in the opportunity cost of being an
innovator, εS . Hence, if ψI = ψC , then zIt ≤ zCt , which indicates that an individualist is more likely
to be an innovator than a collectivist. This is consistent with the empirical fact that an individualist
tends to be a researcher more than a collectivist with other things being equal.
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and below, so that dst ∈ [0, 1].
One can notice from (2.10) and (2.11) that the premium plays a crucial role in
the transmission of cultural traits. An individualist parent will try to transmit his
own culture trait S = I to his child if, and only if, being an individualist is more
valued than being a collectivist. That is, dIt > 0 if, and only if, ∆t+1 > 0. Similarly,
a collectivist parent tries to transmit his own culture trait S = C to his child in the
opposite case, i.e., dCt > 0 if, and only if, ∆t+1 < 0.
23
Given the skill thresholds zSt , the aggregate labor and innovation, Lt and Xt, are
determined as follows:
Lt = qtF (z
I
t ) + (1− qt)eF (zCt ) (2.12)
Xt = qtλ
∫ 1
zIt
ψI(z)dF (z) + (1− qt)
∫ 1
zCt
ψC(z)dF (z) (2.13)
The lump-sum transfer through government expropriations, θt, is given by the
government budget constraint that equates transfers to the value of expropriated
innovator income as follows:
θt = ρtptXt (2.14)
Finally, in an equilibrium, the state variables At−1 and qt evolve according to the
laws of motion in equations (2.5) and (2.3), respectively, where Xt is derived from
23 This suggests that there is no bias in the parent’s altruistic motivation on the transmission
of individualism/collectivism in that parents try to maximize their children’s expected consump-
tions regardless of whether children have different types of the cultural trait from their parents’
traits. This is because the cultural trait of individualism/collectivism has a significant effect on the
measure of economic success (the expected consumption here). On the other hand, parents may be
“paternalistic” for “pure” cultural traits that have no effect on the objective economic opportunities
in that they wish to transmit their own traits, and do not internalize some measures of economic
success for their children, which is called “imperfect empathy.” For example, Bisin and Verdier
(2000) posit that parents are happier if their children have the same religious traits as parents’ ones.
Similarly, Tabellini (2008b) and Chakraborty et al. (2016) also consider the paternalistic bias on
cultural traits toward cooperation and entrepreneurship, respectively. Technically, this paternalistic
bias adds backward-looking features to the dynamics of culture presented by equation (15). How-
ever, the main theoretical conclusions in this chapter are not changed even when the paternalistic
bias is allowed in our model although the evolutionary dynamics of culture, q, will be somewhat
changed. We will discuss welfare implications when allowing the paternalistic bias in our model in
another footnote.
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equation (2.13) and dSt are derived from equations (2.10) and (2.11).
2.4 Culture Dynamics with Fixed Institutions
From now on, we confine our attention on a symmetric equilibrium only. Hence,
any equilibrium hereafter refers to a symmetric one even when there is no explicit
reference. Before investigating theoretical results, for a more general discussion,
we define the economy in a symmetric equilibrium for generation t, say Et, which
abstracts from culture and institutions as follows:
Definition 2.1 Economy: Given the aggregate productivity, the state of culture
and institutional quality, the economic equilibrium in period t is a list:
Et =
{{
oSt (z), c
S
t+1(z)
}
, (∆t+1, d
S
t ), (z
S
t , Lt, Xt), (At, Yt, pit), (wt, pt)
∣∣S ∈ {I, C}}
where each agent of generation t maximizes the family value vSt (z), and every producer
maximizes the profit pit given any price vector (wt, pt) clearing every market in the
economy.
Then, we can prove that Et is uniquely determined given a vector of state variables,
which is argued by the following proposition24:
Proposition 2.1 Given any (At−1, qt, qt+1, ρt, ρt+1) ∈ R++ × [0, 1]2 × [0, ρ¯]2, Et is
uniquely determined. Specifically, there are continuous functions: Lt = L(qt, ρt),
Xt = X(qt, ρt), At = A(At−1, qt, ρt), ∆t+1 = ∆(qt+1, ρt+1), and dSt = d
S(qt, qt+1, ρt+1).
Finally, if κ > 0 is sufficiently large, dSt ∈ [0, 1] (S ∈ {I, C}) ∀(qt, qt+1, ρt+1) ∈
[0, 1]2 × [0, ρ¯].
Proposition 2.1 indicates that all allocations and prices in the economy are uniquely
determined in any equilibrium once culture and institutions are exogenous. This is
24 All proofs are offered in Appendix B.1.
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simply because our model without culture and institutions collapses to a standard
endogenous growth model with a production technology linear in knowledge (or cap-
ital).25
We now endogenize qt while letting {ρt}t≥0 exogenously given. From Proposition
2.1, it only remains to determine qt+1 in order to solve for Et given state variables
in each period t, (At−1, qt), along with {ρt}t≥0. Since dSt = dS(qt, qt+1, ρt+1) from
Proposition 2.1 and culture dynamics obeys equation (3) in any equilibrium, the law
of motion for qt+1 can be rewritten as follows:
Φ(qt, qt+1; ρt+1) = qt + qt(1− qt)δ(qt, qt+1; ρt+1)− qt+1 = 0 (2.15)
where δt ≡ dIt − dCt . That is, an equilibrium state of culture in period t + 1, qt+1, is
a fixed point that satisfies equation (2.15) given qt and ρt+1. Then, one can define a
correspondence Q : [0, 1]→ P([0, 1]) that includes such fixed points:
Q(qt; ρt+1) = {qt+1 ∈ [0, 1]|Φ(qt, qt+1; ρt+1) = 0} (2.16)
If Q has multiple elements for some (q, ρ) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, ρ¯], then the model inherits
multiple equilibria for qt+1 that satisfy equation (2.15), and thereby, the economic
equilibrium Et is not unique at least for those (q, ρ) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, ρ¯]. On the contrary,
if the correspondence Q is a singleton for any (q, ρ) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, ρ¯], qt+1 is uniquely
pinned down by (qt, ρt+1), and hence, the entire time path of culture, {qt}∞t≥1, is
also uniquely determined for any given q0 ∈ [0, 1] with exogenously chosen {ρt}∞t≥0.
Here, we provide a sufficient condition on ∆(qt+1; ρt+1) that guarantees that Q is a
25 We can abstract from any change in the state of culture over time by letting β = 0. In a word,
this means that parents’ altruistic motivations are not existing. As is obvious from equations (10)
and (11), dSt = 0 for all t ≥ 0 if β = 0. Then, qt+1 = qt for all t ≥ 0 from equation (3), so that qt is
constant at the initial state of culture, q0. Hence, from Proposition 2.1, the economic equilibrium
Et is uniquely pinned down for all t ≥ 0 given any initial state variables (A−1, q0) and institutions,
{ρt}∞t≥0. Also, once ρt+s = ρt for all s ≥ 1, the economy immediately converges to the stationary
state where the skill threshold zSt and the prices (wt, pt) are constant, while consumption, output
per capita and the profit are growing at the same rate of σX − 1.
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singleton with some notable properties on the dynamics of culture {qt}∞t≥0 as follows:
Proposition 2.2 Suppose that ∆(q; ρ) is monotone decreasing in q ∈ (0, 1). Then,
(i) unique culture dynamics: Q is a singleton ∀ρ ∈ [0, ρ¯], and thus, there is a
single-valued function φ : [0, 1]×[0, ρ¯]→ [0, 1] such that qt+1 = φ(qt; ρt+1) that satisfies
the law of motion for qt+1 given by (15) with trivial steady states at φ(0; ρ) = 0 and
φ(1; ρ) = 1 ∀ρ ∈ [0, ρ¯]. Also, φ(q; ρ) is continuous at any q ∈ [0, 1].
emSuppose further that ∆(0; ρ) > 0 and ∆(1; ρ) < 0. Then,
(ii) unique interior steady state: There exists a unique q¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that
φ(q¯; ρ) = q¯ where ∆(q¯; ρ) = 0.
(iii) monotone convergence to the steady state: qt < φ(qt; ρ) < q¯ ∀qt ∈ (0, q¯),
and q¯ < φ(qt; ρ) < qt ∀qt ∈ (q¯, 1).
(iv) monotonicity: φ(qt; ρ) is monotone increasing ∀qt ∈ (0, 1)\q¯.
Part (i) of Proposition 2.2 shows that, if ∆(q; ρ) is monotone decreasing in q, we
have a unique time path of culture with {ρt}∞t≥0 exogenously given. Since ∆(q; ρ)
denotes the premium of being an individualist relative to a collectivist, it is plausible
to assume that ∆(q; ρ) is in fact decreasing in q. This is because X(q; ρ) is more
likely to be higher, while L(q; ρ) tends to be smaller as q rises. It means that the
mass of innovations per worker in effective units, x ≡ X/L, is likely to get larger
with a larger fraction of individualists since an individualist is better in innovation
than a collectivist. This, in turn, leads to a smaller value of being an innovator since
the price of innovation, p, decreases with a higher x; see (2.7) and (2.8). Hence, the
premium of being an individualist will be smaller if there are more individualists since
the return to innovation, which is more likely to go for an individualists, decreases
as the number of innovator increases.
If we further assume that the premium value of being an individualist is positive
when there is no individualist in society, i.e., ∆(0; ρ) > 0, and it becomes negative
when society is full of individualists, ∆(1; ρ) < 0, then we have additional results
summarized by parts (ii)-(iv) of Proposition 2.2.
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From Proposition 2.2, we can describe culture dynamics {qt}∞t=0 that converges to
a unique steady state q¯ given an initial state of culture q0 with an exogenous stream
of institutional qualities, {ρt}∞t=0. For a clearer understanding, we draw an example
in Figure 2.3 where the institutional quality, ρt is fixed at ρˆ ∈ [0, ρ¯] for the purpose
of exposition.
First, from part (i) of Proposition 2.2, we can find a single-valued continuous
function φ that maps (qt, ρt+1) to qt+1 where ρt+1 = ρˆ as depicted in Figure 2.3. We
know that φ(q, ρ) always has two trivial steady states at q = 0 and q = 1 so does
φ(q, ρˆ). Second, from part (ii) of Proposition 2.2, there is a unique interior steady
state q¯ that solves φ(q¯, ρˆ) = q¯. Also, from part (iii) of Proposition 2.2, qt+1 = φ(qt, ρˆ)
is bigger than qt and smaller than q¯ if qt ∈ (0, q¯). Hence, φ(qt, ρˆ) is drawn above
the 45 degree line and below q¯ for any qt ∈ (0, q¯). Meanwhile, in the region of
qt ∈ (q¯, 1), qt+1 is smaller than qt and bigger than q¯, so that φ(qt, ρˆ) is drawn above q¯
and below the 45 degree line for any qt ∈ (q¯, 1). Finally, from part (iv) of Proposition
2.2, φ(qt, ρˆ) increases monotonically with qt. Hence, it does not have any downward
bending character as in Figure 2.3.
Then, as in the lower panel of Figure 2.3, with ρt+s being fixed at ρˆ ∀s ≥ 0,
society converges globally (and monotonically) to the unique interior steady state q¯
unless it starts from one of the two trivial steady states, q = 0 and q = 1. Since it is
obvious that the value of the steady state q¯ depends on the level of the institutional
quality ρ, one can define a function q¯(·) that maps ρ to q¯ such that q¯ : [0, ρ¯]→ [0, 1].
For instance, q¯ = q¯(ρˆ) in the examples of Figure 2.3.
In summary, q¯ is a non-trivial unique global attractor given that the institutional
quality, ρ, is fixed at qˆ ∈ [0, ρ¯]. This implies that the world converges to q¯ globally
as long as the exogenous institutions ρ is the same across societies.26 This global
26 Suppose that the social planner maximizes the utilitarian social welfare for generation t where
the Pareto weights are the same between the two culture groups, treating the institutional quality ρ
as given. Then, the steady state is also socially optimal in the ex ante sense although the long-term
growth rate may not be maximized in the steady state. However, if there is the paternalistic bias
as in Bisin and Verdier (2000), Tabellini (2008b) and Chakraborty et al. (2016), the decentralized
allocation will be different from the social optimum in general.
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Figure 2.3: Culture Dynamics with Institutions Fixed
convergence appears simply because ∆(q) > 0 ∀q ∈ (0, q¯), so that parents try to raise
their children as individualists. Meanwhile, ∆(q) < 0 in the region of q ∈ (q¯, 1), so
that parents try to transmit collectivist cultures into their children. One can easily
prove this convergence argument rigorously by using parts (i)-(iii) of Proposition 2.2,
and thus, we provide the following corollary without a proof:
Corollary 2.1 Culture Dynamics with Institutions Fixed: Suppose that ∆(q; ρ)
is monotone decreasing in q ∈ (0, 1), and ∆(0; ρ) > 0 and ∆(1; ρ) < 0 ∀ρ ∈ [0, ρ¯].
Then, with the institutional quality ρ ∈ [0, ρ¯] being fixed, society globally converges to
a unique interior steady state q¯ ∈ (0, 1) where ∆(q¯; ρ) = 0 if, and only if, q0 ∈ (0, 1).
Now, we know that the state of culture qt converges to a unique interior steady
state q¯, and the steady state q¯ solves q¯ = q¯(ρ). Then, how will the steady state
of culture, q¯, change in response to a change of the institutional quality, ρ? To be
specific, will q increase or decrease if the institutional quality becomes worse? We
now investigate the comparative statistics on the steady state of culture with respect
to a change in the institutional quality, and its growth implications.
To do this, we first note from Figure 2.3 that, assuming differentiability for the
purpose of exposition, the sign of dq¯(ρ)/dρ is solely determined by how ∆(q, ρ) re-
sponds to a change in ρ.27 For example, if ∂∆(q; ρ)/∂ρ < 0 ∀q ∈ [0; 1], then ∆(q; ρ)
will shift leftward whenever ρ rises, and vice versa. This leads to a lower value of q¯,
which means that society will converge to a steady state with a smaller number of
individualists. In a word, if the premium of being an individualist, ∆(q; ρ), decreases
with a higher rate of tax on innovation, society ends up being less individualistic
when the tax rate on innovation increases. This comparative statistics is intuitively
straightforward. Suppose that the premium value of being an individualist decreases
27 More formally, we have:
dq¯(ρ)
dρ
= −∂∆(q¯; ρ)/∂q
∂∆(q¯; ρ)/∂ρ
by the implicit function theorem. Since we have assumed that ∂∆(q; ρ)/∂q < 0, the sign of dq¯(ρ)/dρ
is solely determined by the sign of ∂∆(q; ρ)/∂ρ.
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along with a higher tax rate on innovation. Then, the decrease in the premium should
be compensated by a smaller q in equilibrium since the premium increases as q de-
creases. This means that the mass of individualists should be smaller in equilibrium
as the government taxes on innovations more heavily.
From now on, we posit that ∆ is monotone decreasing in ρ, i.e., ∂∆(q; ρ)/∂ρ < 0
∀q ∈ [0; 1] if differentiable. This is a plausible assumption. Intuitively, an innovator’s
after-tax payoff is decreasing in the tax rate, ρ, and therefore, the premium of being
an individualist gets smaller with a higher tax rate with other things constant since an
individualist is more likely to be an innovator thanks to his advantages in innovation
compared to a collectivist. This assumption also leads to the theoretical conclusion
consistent with the empirical evidence of Fact 3 that individualism and the protection
of property rights are positively correlated with each other.
We summarize the comparative statistics using the diagrams in Figure 2.4. As
suggested by the upper panel of Figure 2.4, we assume that ∆(q; ρ) is monotone
decreasing in ρ. In this situation, once the protection of property rights is aggravated
from ρL to ρH where ρH > ρL, the steady state of culture decreases from q¯H to
q¯L. Hence, the society converges to a new steady state characterized by weaker
individualism and more expropriations on innovation. The comparative statistics also
means that club convergence is possible when we introduce culture and institutions
into an otherwise standard growth model. Given different institutions across the
world, each society converges to its own steady state depending on its institutional
quality.
Growth under Exogenous Institutions
Let us now investigate growth implications from the comparative statistics of a
change in the institutional quality. To do that, we need to solve for the economic
equilibrium in a steady state. We have understood so far how culture dynamics
{qt}∞t=0 is uniquely determined given q0 and {ρt}∞t=0. Then, from Proposition 2.1, we
can solve for the economic equilibrium in period t, Et, for all t ≥ 0 once the initial
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Figure 2.4: Different Steady States by Different Institutions
aggregate productivity, A−1, is given.
Suppose that we have already solved a sequence of economic equilibrium, {Et}∞t=0.
Then, recall that the output and consumption per capita are growing at the same
rate of σX − 1 in a steady state where culture and institutions are stable such that
q ≡ qt+s = qt and ρ ≡ ρt+s = ρt ∀s > 1. Society, therefore, enjoys higher growth in
the long run as X, the aggregate innovation in a steady state, increases. This means
that the long-term growth rate depends entirely on how X is changed in response
to a variation in the institutional quality ρ. From Proposition 2.1, one can notice
that X is a function of q¯ and ρ, which denote the steady state values of culture
and institutions, respectively. Since, q¯ is a function of ρ as already seen, we can
characterize impacts of institutions on growth over a long period as follows:
dX
dρ
=
∂X
∂ρ︸︷︷︸
direct effect
+
dq¯
dρ
∂X
∂q¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
indirect effect
(2.17)
The direct effect in equation (2.17) captures a change in the aggregate innovation
by a change in the institutional quality, while the indirect effect in equation (2.17)
captures an indirect effect of institutions on the aggregate innovation that emerges
through a change in the state of culture. It is straightforward from equation (2.17)
that we should determine signs of ∂X/∂ρ and ∂X/∂q in order to assess the sign
of dX/dρ. However, X depends crucially on functional assumptions on the skill
distribution, F (z), and the probability of success in innovation, ψS(z), so that how
X will response to a variation in ρ or q is not, in general, determined a priori without
specifying F (z) and ψS(z).
That said, it is plausible to guess that X gets larger as the society is more indi-
vidualistic in the long run, i.e., ∂X/∂q > 0. This is simply because an individualist
is more productive in innovation than a collectivist, and thereby, the more individ-
ualists in a society, the more innovations. If so, the sign of the indirect effect turns
out to be negative since, as we have already seen, dq¯/dρ < 0. In other words, when
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property rights are less secure, the society becomes less individualistic, resulting in a
decrease in X. This is the indirect effect of institutions on the aggregate innovation
via culture changes.
Similarly, it is also realistic to think that a higher tax rate discourages innovation,
i.e., ∂X/∂ρ < 0. This is because, ceteris paribus, the return to innovation, (1− ρ)p,
decreases with a higher ρ, and vice verse. If so, the sign of the direct effect becomes
negative same as that of the indirect growth effect. In sum, better institutions in
terms of protection of property rights lead to more innovations in the long run, and
hence, higher long-term growth both by providing larger incentives to innovate (the
direct growth effect) and by shaping cultures more productive in innovation (the
indirect growth effect).
Figure 2.5 illustrates the direct and indirect growth effects of institutions. Note
that the y-axis of the lower panel is the growth rate in a steady state. The upper
panel indicates that X gets smaller with a higher tax rate (higher ρ), while it gets
bigger with stronger individualism (higher q).
Suppose now that the economy is in the steady state where the institutional
quality and the state of culture are given by q¯ and q¯(ρL), respectively. In this state, if
the institutional quality is aggravated in that ρ rises from ρL to ρH , then the aggregate
innovation immediately declines from X1 to X2. This change is done without any
variation in the original state of culture, q¯(ρL), and thus, σ(X2 − X1) in the lower
panel identifies the direct growth effect. Meanwhile, the increase in ρ results in the
decrease in q¯ from q¯(ρL) to q¯(ρH) over time, leading to a further decrease in X from
X2 to X3 after some periods of time. This change emerges along with a change in
the state of culture, so that σ(X2 −X3) corresponds to the indirect growth effect.
We now consider an example of the theory by taking specific functional assump-
tions on F (z) and ψS(z) to solve for X and q¯. This will validate the assumptions
we have had so far to clarify the growth implications, arising from the interaction of
culture and institutions. Details of the derivation are provided in Appendix B.2.
70
71
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑋𝑋2
𝜎𝜎𝑋𝑋 − 1
?̅?𝜌
𝜌𝜌
0
𝑋𝑋1𝑋𝑋3
𝑋𝑋(𝑞𝑞,𝜌𝜌)𝑋𝑋2
𝜌𝜌𝐻𝐻
𝜌𝜌𝐿𝐿
𝑋𝑋3
𝑋𝑋(𝑞𝑞,𝜌𝜌)
𝑋𝑋(�𝑞𝑞(𝜌𝜌𝐻𝐻),𝜌𝜌𝐻𝐻) 𝑋𝑋(�𝑞𝑞(𝜌𝜌𝐿𝐿),𝜌𝜌𝐿𝐿)
𝑋𝑋1
Figure 2.5: Growth Effects of Institutions
Example 2.1 Suppose that z is uniformly distributed, and ψI(z) = ψC(z) = zψ.28
Then, X is given by:
X (q¯; ρ) =
µ (q¯ (ρ))
1 + ψ + ηˆ (ρ)
,
where q¯ solves:
µ (q¯ (ρ))
χ (q¯ (ρ))
=
(λ− 1) (1 + ψ + ηˆ (ρ))
ψηˆ (ρ) (e1+
1
ψ − λ1− 1ψ )
,
and
ηˆ (ρ) ≡ η
α (1− ρ) , (2.18)
µ (q¯) ≡ q¯λ+ (1− q¯) , (2.19)
χ (q¯) ≡ q¯λ1− 1ψ + (1− q¯) e1+ 1ψ . (2.20)
Then, with Assumption 1, as long as the skill threshold is interior, i.e., zS ∈ (0, 1),
we can show that:
dq¯ (ρ)
dρ
< 0,
∂X (q¯; ρ)
∂q¯
> 0 and
∂X (q¯; ρ)
∂ρ
< 0 . (2.21)
As summarized in equation (2.21), society ends up being less individualistic when
protection of property rights over innovations becomes worse, i.e., dq¯/dρ < 0. Also,
the aggregate innovation in the steady state, X, decreases when society is less indi-
vidualistic with the institutional quality being fixed, i.e., ∂X/∂q¯ > 0, confirming the
negative indirect growth effect of worse protection of property rights. Similarly, the
direct growth effect is also negative since ∂X/∂ρ < 0.29
So far, we have investigated how culture evolves over time under exogenously
given institutions, and how exogenous institutions affect both culture and the long-
28 The parameter ψ is the elasticity of the success probability in innovation with respect to the
creativity parameter z. This implies that the probability of success in innovation increases with
z more rapidly as the elasticity ψ gets bigger. Consequently, given the simple skill distribution
(uniform distribution), ψ governs income inequality, which increases with ψ.
29 We also provide sufficient conditions for ∂∆(q; ρ)/∂q < 0, ∆(0, ρ) > 0 and ∆(1, ρ) < 0 in
Appendix B.2.
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term growth rate of the economy. We show that Et is uniquely pinned down given
any vector of culture and institutions, and the state of culture converges to a unique
interior steady state under the monotonicity of ∆(q; ρ) in q where ∆(0; ρ) > 0 and
∆(1; ρ) < 0. The interior steady state of culture, q¯, depends on the exogenous in-
stitutional quality, ρ, and institutions affect the long-term growth rate both directly
(through incentives to innovate) and indirectly (through cultures of society). Specif-
ically, we argue that more secure property rights induce stronger individualism as
well as larger incentives to innovate, both of which contribute to faster growth in the
long run.
In Section 5, we let institutions be determined in an endogenous way to explore
how endogenous interactions of culture and institutions result in multiple dynamic
equilibria near the low-growth steady state, q¯L, and hence, excess volatility.
2.5 Political Equilibrium
In effect, the property rights structure that will maximize rents to the
ruler (or ruling class) is in conflict with that would produce economic
growth. (North, 1981, p. 28)
Now, we are ready to describe how the society politically determines the institutional
quality, ρt, which measures the expropriation risk by the government or, by the law
of large numbers, the tax rate on innovation.
Before we continue, let us try to understand how societies decide the protection
of property rights. What factors do underlie Pareto inefficient property rights? Of
course, there may be many mechanisms that explain the historical existence of ineffi-
cient property rights in a nation.30 In particular, conflict of interest among different
groups of people has been regarded as a primary reason that may lead to persistently
30 North quotes as follows: “Because polities make and enforce economic rules, it is not surprising
that property rights are seldom efficient.” (North, 1990, p. 110). As a historical episode, North
(1990) compares drastic divergence in institutional qualities in terms of property rights between
England and Spain after the 17th century. He also uses this idea, which is employed in Acemoglu et
al. (2001) as well, to explain the growth divergence between the North and South colonial regions
in America.
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inefficient property rights. For example, Douglass North argues that a government
tends to favor inefficient property rights since it tends to satisfy interests of a certain
group of voters whose political power is strong:
· · · the ruler will avoid offending powerful constituents. If the wealth
or income of groups with close access to alternative rulers is adversely
affected by property rights, the ruler will be threatened. Accordingly,
he will agree to a property rights structure favorable to those groups,
regardless of its effects upon efficiency. (North, 1981, p. 28)
· · · argument to account for the obvious persistence of inefficient property
rights. These inefficiencies existed because rulers would not antagonize
powerful constituents by enacting efficient rules that were opposed to their
interests · · · . (North, 1990, p. 52)
Adam Smith also noted this possibility based on human nature as follows31:
Every independent state is divided into many orders and societies, each
of which has its own particular powers, privileges, and immunities. Every
individual is naturally more attached to his own particular order or soci-
ety, than to any other. · · · He is ambitious to extend its privileges and
immunities. He is zealous to defend them against encroachments of every
other order or society. (Smith, 1759, p. 271)
To reflect this insight on externality — or philosophy in another angle —, we
consider conflict of interest among different voting groups that determines ρt endoge-
nously through the majority voting rule. This reveals why inefficient protection of
property rights can be built and last for a long period of time.
We consider a typical political environment under majority voting. There are two
political parties, P1 and P2, that competes with each other in order to take the public
authority that determines the tax rate ρt.
32 They announce ρ1,t and ρ2,t, respectively,
at the voting stage in each period t. Given the pair of policies, (ρ1,t, ρ2,t), each agent
of generation t votes for either P1 or P2 closer to his interest, one of which wins if
it gets more votes than the other. If they have the same number of votes, they flip
31 For possible connections between Adam Smith and Douglass North in methodology and sub-
stance, one can refer to Kim (2007).
32 As will be clear, the theoretical results are not changed even when there are many political
parties, not just two.
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a coin to determine the winner, and hence, win the election with the probability of
1/2.
In a standard dynamic game without commitment, history of a player (political
party here), defined by the sequence of its policies up to period t− 1, may result in
multiple subgame-perfect equilibria through reputation mechanisms that are history-
dependent. However, in our setting, the two political parties all aim at taking the
power to choose the institutional quality, and there are no interests other than that.
Therefore, the hold-up problem from the lack of commitment does not arise here
simply because they do not have any incentive to break the commitment. This, in
turn, implies that there is no room for history-dependent punishment strategies, and
hence, subgame-perfect equilibria coincide to Markov-perfect equilibria, defined by a
set of strategies that depend only on the current state of the economy.
According to the timing of events, the occupation choice is already done at the
voting stage. This implies that the skill threshold zSt is already fixed without regard
to ρt, so that At is also pinned down before voting. Hence, (At, qt) are the state
variables for Pi’s strategy. Then, an equilibrium policy, ρt, is determined by a map
R such that {ρt} = R (At, qt), which is, of course, endogenous and will be derived
below.
Now, let us investigate how the institutional quality ρt is determined in an equi-
librium. For a S-type agent with ability z in generation t, the most preferred insti-
tutional quality, say ρSt (z), maximizes the family value v
S
t (z) as follows:
ρSt (z) ≡ arg max
ρt∈[0,ρ¯]
vSt (z)
= arg max
ρt∈[0,ρ¯]
cSt+1 (z)− κ
(dSt )
2
2At
+ E[cS
′
t+2 (z) |S]; (At, qt) are given. (2.22)
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First note that the map R (At+1, qt+1) can be rewritten as follows:
{ρt+1} =R (At+1, qt+1)
=R (A (At, qt, ρt+1) , φ (qt, ρt+1)) (2.23)
= R˜ (At, qt, ρt+1)
where, in equation (2.23), we use At+1 = A(At, qt, ρt+1) from Proposition 2.1, and
qt+1 = φ(qt, ρt+1) from Proposition 2.2. We can notice from the map R˜ that ρt+1
is independent of ρt once (At, qt) are already fixed. Technically, this is because, as
is obvious from (2.23), an equilibrium tax rate ρt+1 is a fixed point of the map R˜
with (At, qt) being given. In a word, this means that generation t cannot affect ρt+1
through ρt. As we will see in the next section, ρt+1 is jointly determined together
with qt+1 through d
S
t , which is the parental effort on culture traits transmission. That
is, ρt+1 is affected by generation t only through d
S
t .
Now recall that dSt = d
S (qt, qt+1, ρt+1) from Proposition 2.1. Then, d
S can be
rewritten as follows:
dSt = d
S (qt, qt+1, ρt+1)
= dS (qt, φ (qt, ρt+1) , ρt+1)
= d˜S (qt, ρt+1)
We already knew that ρt+1 is independent of ρt with (At, qt) being fixed, and thus,
dSt is also independent of ρt. Similarly, E[c
S′
t+2 (z) |S] is independent of ρt as long
as (At, qt) are already fixed. Technically, this is because E[c
S′
t+2 (z) |S] is a function
of the state variables in period t + 1, (At, qt+1). Since qt+1 = φ (qt, ρt+1), and ρt+1
is irrelevant to ρt when (At, qt) are already fixed, E[c
S′
t+2 (z) |S] is also independent
of ρt. In a word, the current institutional quality, ρt, cannot affect the expected
consumption in the future, E[cS
′
t+2 (z) |S], by itself. Rather, E[cS′t+2 (z) |S] depends on
the future state of culture, qt+1.
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In summary, once the occupation choice is already done, the institutional quality
in time t can no longer affect both the parental effort on children dSt and children’s
future consumption E[cS
′
t+2 (z) |S]. We can, therefore, rewrite equation (2.22) as fol-
lows:
ρSt (z) ≡ arg max
ρt∈[0,ρ¯]
cSt+1 (z) ; (At, qt) are given.
In equilibrium, the lump-sum transfer θt is determined by equation (2.14), and
it is monotone increasing in ρt once the occupation choice is done. This is because
(zSt , pt, wt) are already determined and fixed after the occupation choice, and hence,
irrelevant to ρt. Since θt is equally distributed to all agents of generation t, it is
straightforward that every innovator prefers a lower ρt, while every worker prefers a
higher ρt. That is, there are two voting groups whose interest is sharply conflicting
each other. More formally, we can summarize the following single-peaked preference
for the each voting group:
For {IW,CW} , ρH  ρL ∀ρH ≥ ρL, (2.24)
For {IE,CE} , ρL  ρH ∀ρH ≥ ρL. (2.25)
where {IW, IE,CW,CE} represent individualist workers, individualist innovators,
collectivist workers and collectivist innovators, respectively.
As in equation (2.24) and (2.25), all workers and innovators, respectively, have
the same ordinality on the policy variable, ρ ∈ [0, ρ¯], regardless of the heterogeneous
skill levels z. We can, thus, simply think of a situation that there are only two
representative voters having different political power that corresponds to the number
of voters in each group. More importantly, from (2.24) and (2.25), we notice that
the single-peaks of preferences of the two voting groups are at the opposite corners,
respectively; the most preferred policy for {IW,CW} is ρ¯ while 0 for {IE,CE}.
In this situation, suppose that innovators have relatively stronger or weaker polit-
ical power than workers, which is parametrized by ξ ∈ [−1/2, 1/2], and hence, one of
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the political parties wins if it gets innovators’ votes bigger than 1/2− ξ regardless of
the number of votes it gets.33 Then, by applying the median voter theorem slightly
differently, we can provide the following theoretical result on the political equilibrium:
Proposition 2.3 There is always a unique Nash equilibrium such that ρt = 0 if the
fraction of innovators is larger than 1/2− ξ, and ρt = ρ¯ otherwise.
Proposition 2.3 implies that the fraction of innovators plays a crucial role in the
determination of the political equilibrium. Hence, we need to know how the fraction
of innovators in period t, say Xˆt, is determined in the model. From the occupation
choice problem, Xˆt is given by:
Xˆt = qt
∫ 1
zIt
dF (z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
individualist innovators
+ (1− qt)
∫ 1
zCt
dF (z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
collectivist innovators
(2.26)
Equation (2.26) indicates that one can define a function Xˆ such that Xˆt = Xˆ (qt, ρt),
which is continuous at any qt ∈ [0, 1] ∀ρ ∈ [0, ρ¯] since zSt (S ∈ {I, C}) is a continuous
function of (qt, ρt) by (2.9) and Proposition 2.1.
Now, recall that voting is done after the occupation choice. Therefore, agents of
generation t should forecast the equilibrium tax rate, ρt, at the occupation choice
stage. More formally, suppose that the political party Pi’s strategy is given by a map
Pi (i = 1, 2). Then, Proposition 2.3 implies that:
{ρi,t} = Pi(qt; ρet ) =
 {0},{ρ¯}, Xˆ(qt, ρ
e
t ) >
1
2
− ξ
Xˆ(qt, ρ
e
t ) ≤ 12 − ξ
(i = 1, 2)
where ρet is an expected institutional quality by generation t at the occupation choice
stage. Of course, ρet is simply given from Pi’s perspective, so that it does not care
about ρet . Hence, the set of strategy is always a singleton ∀qt ∈ [0, 1] and, as in
33 Without loss of generality, we assume that innovators lose the election when the fraction of
them is equal to 1/2− ξ.
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the proof of Proposition 2.3, it is symmetric, i.e., P1(qt; ρet ) = P2(qt; ρet ). Then, one
can denote a map that gives an equilibrium policy given ρet as {ρt} = P(qt; ρet ) =
P1(qt; ρet ) = P2(qt; ρet ).
Meanwhile, as said, generation t should foresight ρt at the occupation choice stage,
and the perfect foresight assumption means that:
{ρet} = P(qt; ρet ) ∀qt ∈ [0, 1]
where ρet ∈ {0, ρ¯}. Then, one can define a set-valued function that gives the politi-
cal equilibrium at the occupation choice stage, which is consistent with the perfect
foresight assumption, as follows:
{ρt} =R (qt) =
{
ρ ∈ {0, ρ¯}| ρ¯1{Xˆ(qt,ρ)≤ 12−ξ}
}
(2.27)
In a word, the perfect foresight assumption means that, given the state of culture
qt, each agent of generation t, before choosing her occupation, predicts an equilibrium
policy ρt through the map R(qt), i.e., ρet ∈R (qt).
Here are a few remarks. First, the map R depends only on q, while it is inde-
pendent of A. This means that qt is the only payoff-relevant state variable for the
determination of ρt, while At is not. Technically, this is because an agent’s choices,
(oS(z), dS), are scale-independent. As one can find it from equation (2.9) and Propo-
sition 2.1, the occupation choice is independent of A. dS is also irrelevant to A in a
similar way. This property, of course, simplifies the analysis a lot since we need to
focus only on the state of culture to determine the political equilibrium. More impor-
tantly, this implies that the way of determining the political outcome under majority
voting is irrelevant to the wealth of a nation, and hence, the political equilibrium is
determined by the same map R(q) regardless of weather the country is rich or poor.
That is, in our theory, the only factor underlying the determination of the political
outcome is the state of culture, not the wealth of a nation.
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Another remark is that an equilibrium policy ρ always gets only 0, ρ¯, or both.
This is because the policy preferences of the two voting groups, given by (24) and
(25), are so sharply conflicting that the most preferred policies of the two groups are
persistently incompatible. Technically, this property simplifies the analysis further
since we need to focus only on [0, 1] × {0, ρ¯}, not [0, 1] × [0, ρ¯], for the domain of
Xˆ(q, ρ). Lastly, the image of the map R, {ρt}, is not an empty set ∀qt ∈ [0, 1]; it is
either {0} , {ρ¯} or {0, ρ¯}.
To investigate how the state of culture qt determines the political equilibrium ρt
through the map R(qt) given by (2.27), we need to know how Xˆ(q, ρ) varies with
respect to q given ρ ∈ {0, ρ¯}. However, it is not definite a priori since Xˆ(q, ρ)
depends crucially on functional assumptions on F (z) and ψS(z) as shown in equation
(2.26). To facilitate the analysis, we rely on some assumptions on Xˆ(q, ρ). These
restrictions are not only plausible but also useful in that they make the analysis on
the endogenous determination of culture and institutions a lot simpler.
First, we assume that Xˆ(q, ρ) has an inverse U-shaped relationship in q. This
non-monotonic relationship arises from two different effects of q on Xˆ(q, ρ), opposing
each other. When q increases, Xˆ(q, ρ) also increases since an individualist is more
inclined to be an innovator. This is a positive effect. At the same time, the more
individualists in society, the more able innovators it has. Hence, self-selection for
innovators becomes severe, i.e, the skill threshold zS rises. This severe self-selection
makes the number of innovators smaller, and this is a negative effect.
The positive effect dominates the negative one when the degree of individualism
q is smaller than a certain value. Once q gets bigger than the value, the self-selection
effect dominates, and thus, Xˆ starts to decrease. These conflicting effects render an
inverse U-shaped relationship between q and Xˆ for any given ρ ∈ {0, ρ¯}. We present
empirical evidence supporting this relationship in Appendix B.3.34
Second, we posit that Xˆ(q, 0) > Xˆ(q, ρ¯) ∀q ∈ [0, 1]. In a word, there are fewer
34 We show that the fraction of workers employed in R&D sectors has an inverse U-shaped rela-
tionship with the Hofstede individualism index by using the RDS dataset that includes information
on R&D activities across the OECD and other major economies more than 30 years from 1980.
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innovators whenever the government taxes innovators heavily, which is quite straight-
forward. The incentive to be an innovator will decrease with other things constant
as the tax rate on innovation increases from the minimum level to the maximum, ρ¯.
This leads to fewer innovators in society. Since this restriction is extensively used
to facilitate the analysis, we take an example to check whether or not it is validate.
Details of the derivation are provided in Appendix B.2.
Example 2.2 Suppose that z is uniformly distributed and ψI(z) = ψC(z) = zψ as in
Example 1. Then, Xˆ is given by:
Xˆ(q, ρ) = 1− ϕ(q)[ηˆ(ρ)x(q, ρ)] 1ψ
where
ϕ(q) = qλ−
1
ψ + (1− q)e 1ψ ,
x = x(q, ρ) =
[
1
ηˆ(ρ)
1
ψ (1 + ψ + ηˆ(ρ))
µ(q)
χ(q)
] ψ
1+ψ
,
x ≡ X/L, and ηˆ(ρ), µ (q) and χ (q) are given by (18), (19) and (20), respectively.
Then, with Assumption 1, as long as the skill threshold is interior, i.e., zS ∈ (0, 1),
we can show that:
∂Xˆ (q, ρ)
∂ρ
< 0 ∀q ∈ [0, 1]. (2.28)
Hence, equation (2.28) validates the last assumption that Xˆ(q, 0) > Xˆ(q, ρ¯) ∀q ∈ [0, 1]
as expected.35
Figure 2.6 illustrates how the political equilibrium, given by R(qt), is determined
under the two restrictions on Xˆ(q, ρ); the fraction of innovators, Xˆ(q, ρ), takes an
inverse U-shaped relationship with q, and Xˆ(q, 0) > Xˆ(q, ρ¯) ∀q ∈ [0, 1]. First note
that Xˆ(qt, 0) is smaller than 1/2 − ξ in the region of qt ∈ [0, qˆL]. This implies
35 Sufficient conditions for an inverse U-shaped relationship between Xˆ(q, ρ) and q are provided
in Appendix B.2.
81
�𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡
𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿
�𝑋𝑋(𝑞𝑞, 0)
�𝑋𝑋(𝑞𝑞, ?̅?𝜌)
𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡 ∈ 0, ?̅?𝜌 𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡 = 0𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡 = ?̅?𝜌
1
2
− 𝜉𝜉
10 �𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻
Figure 2.6: Political Equilibrium
that Xˆ(q, ρ¯) is also smaller than 1/2 − ξ in this region since Xˆ(q, 0) > Xˆ(q, ρ¯)
∀q ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, according to the mapR(qt) given by equation (2.27), the political
equilibrium is uniquely determined in this region such that ρt = ρ¯. We call this
political equilibrium “expropriation regime” since the government taxes innovators
heavily for sure.
In the region of qt ∈ (qˆH , 1], the fraction of innovators is larger than 1/2− ξ even
under the maximum tax rate, i.e., Xˆ(qt, ρ¯) > 1/2 − ξ, and therefore, the political
equilibrium is definite, which is given by ρt = 0. We call this equilibrium “non-
expropriation regime” since the tax rate on innovation is minimized for sure in this
region.
Meanwhile, in the region of qt ∈ (qˆL, qˆH ], Xˆ(qt, 0) is larger than 1/2 − ξ, while
Xˆ(qt, ρ¯) is smaller than 1/2− ξ. We, therefore, have multiple political equilibria such
that {ρt} = {0, ρ¯}. In other words, both the minimum and maximum tax rates are
consistent with the conditions for the political equilibrium.
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We now provide an useful result for the political equilibrium, R(q), with the
restriction that Xˆ(q, 0) > Xˆ(q, ρ¯) ∀q ∈ [0, 1]. One can easily prove the result using
Proposition 2.3, so that we present the following corollary without a proof:
Corollary 2.2 Political Equilibrium: Suppose that Xˆ(q, 0) > Xˆ(q, ρ¯) ∀q ∈ [0, 1].
Then, the political equilibrium is given by:
{ρt} =R(qt) =

{0} ,
{ρ¯} ,
{0, ρ¯},
Xˆ(qt, ρ¯) >
1
2
− ξ
Xˆ(qt, 0) ≤ 12 − ξ
o.w.
(2.29)
Here is an implication from the political equilibrium worth noting. The degree of
individualism correlates positively with the institutional quality. Recall that ρt = ρ¯
for sure when qt is small enough, while ρt = 0 for sure when qt is large enough. For
an intermediate degree of qt, characterized by qt ∈ (qˆL, qˆH ], society has either the
minimum or the maximum tax rate in equilibrium. This monotone property is led
by the first assumption on Xˆ(q, ρ) that Xˆ increases with a bigger q although it starts
to decrease as q gets to the point high enough. As in Figure 2.6, if the society is
barely individualistic (qt ∈ [0, qˆL]), there are few individualists, who are more likely
to be innovators compared to collectivists. Hence, the minimum tax rate cannot
be enforced since, even under the minimum tax rate on innovation, the number of
innovators is not enough high to win the election. Then, the only possible equilibrium
is the maximum tax rate, ρ¯. On the contrary, if the society is highly individualistic
(qt ∈ (qˆH , 1]), there are many people having the competitive edge in innovation.
Then, the minimum tax rate is a unique political equilibrium since, even under the
maximum tax rate on innovation, there are enough innovators to win the election.
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2.6 Joint Determination of Culture and Institu-
tions
We now investigate how culture and institutions are jointly determined. In each
period t, an agent of generation t chooses dSt , the intensity of culture transmission,
that incurs disutility, κt(d
S
t ). Then, δt ≡ dIt−dCt , the relative strength of individualism
transmission, shapes the state of culture for the next generation through the law of
motion of qt given by equation (2.15).
Since dSt is a function of (qt, qt+1, ρt+1) as in Proposition 2.1, generation t should
forecast (qt+1, ρt+1) given qt for the optimal choice of d
S
t . In the perfect foresight
setting, they predict (qt+1, ρt+1) correctly as they do for ρt. This implies that they
know how (qt+1, ρt+1) are determined in equilibrium, and mathematically, this is
equivalent with that they solve the following system of equations:
qt+1 = φ (qt, ρt+1) (2.30)
ρt+1 ∈R (qt+1) (2.31)
where R (·) is given by equation (2.29), or more generally, by (2.27). Let us denote
the set of solutions as {(qt+1, ρt+1)} of which an element, (qt+1, ρt+1), jointly solves
(2.30) and (2.31).
One can easily notice from equations (2.30) and (2.31) that culture and insti-
tutions are interconnected, and they are jointly determined given a current state of
culture, qt; qt+1 is determined by institutions ρt+1, which is also determined by qt+1 at
the same time. Then, what type of interactions can describe the joint determination
of culture and institutions from equations (2.30) and (2.31)?
Intuitively, if innovations are expected to be taxed heavily (ρt+1 = ρ¯), parents will
not raise their children as individualists, leading to weak individualism in the future.
This implies that equation (2.30) can be characterized by decreasing qt+1 with a higher
ρt+1. In reverse, if society becomes less individualistic, the number of innovators will
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be small since an individualist is better in innovation than a collectivist. This causes
the tax rate on innovation to be higher as suggested by Corollary 2.2. Hence, one
can infer from (2.31) that ρt+1 tends to increase along with a lower qt+1.
Consequently, equations (2.30) and (2.31) indicate a strategic complementarity
between higher individualism and better protection of property rights in terms of the
tax rate on innovation, and vice versa. As apparent below, this strategic interaction in
the joint determination of culture and institutions permits multiple equilibria in each
period, which we refer to as multiple dynamic equilibria. The equilibria consist of
the two different combinations of culture and institutions with contrasting properties.
Before presenting a formal proposition, we will investigate the intuition underlying
this feature with more details by using an example depicted in Figure 2.7.
There are two panels in Figure 2.7. The upper panel illustrates the political
equilibrium, which is given by equation (2.31), while the lower one depicts the law of
motion for qt+1, which is given by equation (2.30). Since the tax rate is always chosen
to be either 0 or ρ¯ in equilibrium, in the upper panel, there are only two Xˆ(qt+1, ρt+1),
both of which correspond to ρt+1 = 0 and ρt+1 = ρ¯, respectively. Similarly, in the
lower panel, there are only two laws of motion for qt+1 that correspond to ρt+1 = 0
and ρt+1 = ρ¯, respectively.
We first note from Corollary 2.2 that there are three cases for the political equi-
librium depending on the level of qt+1. The three cases are characterized by two
thresholds, qˆL and qˆH . The government can impose the maximum tax rate, ρ¯, in
time t+ 1 when the future individualism is not high enough that qt+1 is smaller than
the high threshold, qˆH , i.e., qt+1 ∈ [0, qˆH ]. Meanwhile, the tax rate can be minimized
in time t+1 when the future individualism is not low enough that qt+1 is higher than
the low threshold, qˆL, i.e., qt+1 ∈ (qˆL, 1]. Hence, there is a region where both the
minimum tax rate (ρt+1 = 0) and the maximum tax rate (ρt+1 = ρ¯) are possible at
the same time. This region is for an intermediate degree of individualism such that
qt+1 ∈ (qˆL, qˆH ]. In contrast, we have the region where only the maximum tax rate is
imposed for sure (the expropriation regime) when the future individualism is weak
85
enough that qt+1 ∈ [0, qˆL]. Similarly, only the minimum tax rate is enforced for sure
(the non-expropriation regime) when the future individualism is strong enough that
qt+1 ∈ (qˆH , 1].
We then move to the lower panel to investigate how the culture parameter, qt,
evolves with institutions being endogenously determined. To do that, we first map
the two political thresholds, qˆL and qˆH , from the upper panel to the lower panel.
Since qt+1 is on the vertical axis in the lower panel while it is on the horizontal axis
in the upper panel, we use the 45 degree line in the lower panel in order to map the
two thresholds. As depicted in the graph, qˆL and qˆH are marked on the vertical axis
in the lower panel.
Now, recall first that the minimum tax rate cannot be imposed if qt+1 is smaller
than the low threshold, qˆL. Hence, given the current state of culture, qt, if qt+1 is
lower than the low threshold even under the minimum tax rate, then the minimum
tax rate cannot be enforced for sure in time t+ 1. This means that qt cannot evolve
along with φ(q, 0), the law of motion associated with the minimum tax rate, as long
as qt+1 = φ(qt, 0) is smaller than the low threshold, qˆL, since the minimum tax rate
cannot satisfy the equilibrium condition represented by equation (2.31) in this case.
In other words, the law of motion, φ(q, 0), must not be used for culture dynamics if
qt+1 = φ(qt, 0) is smaller than the low threshold, qˆL. On the contrary, the minimum
tax rate can be enforced whenever qt+1 is larger than the low threshold, qˆL. Hence,
the equilibrium condition (2.31) is satisfied for the minimum tax rate in this case,
and this implies that the law of motion, φ(q, 0), can be applied to the dynamics of
culture to satisfy the other condition represented by equation (2.30). In sum, the law
of motion, φ(q, 0), can be used if qt+1 = φ(qt, 0) is larger than the low threshold, qˆL.
This is why φ(q, 0) gets thick in the lower panel of Figure 2.7 for the case that qt+1
is larger than the low threshold, qˆL, in order to indicate that φ(q, 0) can be applied
in that case.
Similarly, recall that the maximum tax rate, ρ¯, cannot be imposed when qt+1 is
higher than the high threshold, qˆH . Hence,the maximum tax rate cannot be imposed
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Figure 2.7: Culture and Institutions Jointly Determined
in period t + 1 if, given qt, qt+1 is higher than the high threshold even under the
maximum tax rate, ρ¯. That is, if qt+1 = φ(qt, ρ¯) is larger than the high threshold, qˆH ,
the maximum tax rate, ρ¯, cannot satisfy the equilibrium condition given by equation
(2.31). In contrast, if qt+1 = φ(qt, ρ¯) is smaller than the high threshold, the maximum
tax rate can be imposed, implying that qt can follow the law of motion with ρ¯, which
is given by φ(q, ρ¯), to satisfy the other equilibrium condition represented by equation
(2.30). In sum, the law of motion, φ(q, ρ¯), can be used if qt+1 = φ(qt, ρ¯) is smaller
than the high threshold, qˆH . This is why φ(q, ρ¯) gets thick only when qt+1 is smaller
than qˆH .
We are now ready to explain how culture and institutions are jointly determined
in equilibrium through generation t’s expectations about (qt+1, ρt+1) for the optimal
choice of dSt . Suppose first that qt is smaller than q˜L where q˜L solves qˆL = φ(q˜L, 0).
This is the case that society is so collectivist in period t that the number of innovators
in period t+ 1 is smaller than 1/2− ξ even under the minimum tax rate, and hence,
the minimum tax rate cannot be enforced in time t + 1. Knowing this, generation
t forecasts that ρt+1 will be chosen to be ρ¯ for sure. Then, qt+1 is determined only
by φ(qt, ρ¯). This means that the set of equilibria that consists of equilibrium culture
and institutions for generation t + 1, which is given by {(qt+1, ρt+1)}, is a singleton,
i.e., {(qt+1, ρt+1)} = {(φ(qt, ρ¯), ρ¯)} ∀qt ∈ [0, q˜].
On the contrary, suppose that qt is high enough that qt ∈ (q˜H , 1] where q˜H solves
qˆH = φ(q˜H , ρ¯). In this region, society is so individualistic in period t that the num-
ber of innovators in period t + 1 is larger than 1/2 − ξ even under the maximum
tax rate, and therefore, the maximum tax rate cannot be imposed in time t + 1.
Then, generation t anticipates correctly that ρt+1 will be minimized for sure, so that
qt+1 is determined only by the law of motion with the minimum tax rate, which is
given by φ(qt, 0). Since (qt+1, ρt+1) is uniquely determined, the set of equilibrium,
{(qt+1, ρt+1)}, is a singleton, i.e., {(qt+1, ρt+1)} = {(φ(qt, 0), 0)} ∀qt ∈ (q˜H , 1].
For an intermediate degree of individualism in period t such that qt ∈ (q˜L, q˜H ],
the equilibrium, (qt+1, ρt+1), is not uniquely pinned down. This is because both the
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laws of motion, φ(q, 0) and φ(q, ρ¯), are consistent with the two political equilibria,
ρt+1 = 0 and ρt+1 = ρ¯, in this region, and in reverse, both institutional qualities,
ρt+1 = 0 and ρt+1 = ρ¯, are supported by two different qt+1 from the two laws of
motion, both of which correspond to ρt+1 = 0 and ρt+1 = ρ¯, respectively. That is,
we have multiple equilibria for generation t + 1 in this region, which are given by
{(qt+1, ρt+1)} = {(φ(qt, 0), 0), (φ(qt, ρ¯), ρ¯)}.
Suppose that society lies in this indeterminacy region. If parents predict that
the government will expropriate property rights on innovation in the next period by
maximizing tax rate on innovation, then the premium of being an individualist will
decrease. This makes parents less passionate to transmit the individualist culture
to their children than they would do under the minimum tax rate. This, in turn,
leads to weaker individualism in the next period than that would be formed under
the minimum tax rate. Consequently, there are too few innovators in the next period
to enforce the minimum tax rate on innovation, and the government imposes the
maximum tax rate, fulfilling the pessimistic prophecy of generation t.
On the contrary, if generation t believes that the government will enforce the
minimum tax rate in period t+1, then the premium of being an individualist increases,
resulting in stronger individualism than that would be formed under the maximum
tax rate. Strong individualism in period t+1 period, in turn, renders a large fraction
of innovators enough to minimize the tax rate, confirming the optimistic belief.
In summary, multiple equilibria are likely to emerge when society is neither highly
collectivistic nor individualistic, i.e., qt ∈ (q˜L, q˜H ], so that any belief on the maximum
or minimum tax rate is rational. In this situation, equilibrium selection depends
entirely on self-fulfilling prophecies by generation t. The dynamic complementarity
between culture and institutions gives rise to multiple dynamic equilibria with con-
trasting properties. Recall that strong individualism in period t + 1 can support
better protection of property rights characterized by the minimum tax rate on inno-
vation. In reverse, the minimum tax rate in period t+1 provides the rationale behind
the strong individualism since it raises an innovator’s expected payoff, which is more
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likely to go for an individualist. Similarly, weak individualism and bad protection
of property rights featured by the maximum tax rate are mutually re-enforcing each
other.
For a more general discussion about the role that the interaction between culture
and institutions plays in society, we define equilibrium of society after voting, which
includes culture and institutions in equilibrium as well as the economic equilibrium
in production, occupation choice and consumption.
Definition 2.2 Society: Given (At−1, qt), the social equilibrium after voting in pe-
riod t is a list:
St = {(qt, ρt),Et}
where ρt is an element of the map R(·) given by equation (2.27). Et is the economic
equilibrium in period t, defined by Definition 2.1, that corresponds to (At−1, qt, ρt, qt+1, ρt+1)
where (qt+1, ρt+1) is an element of {(qt+1, ρt+1)}, the set of solutions for the system
of equations given by equations (2.30) and (2.31).
St includes (qt, ρt) and one economic equilibrium in period t. Since St is defined as
an equilibrium of society after voting in period t, the tax rate in period t, ρt, is simply
given from the set of political equilibria such that ρt ∈R(qt). This implies that, given
(At−1, qt), St is uniquely pinned down if, and only if, Et is unique. From Proposition
2.1, Et is always uniquely determined for any given vector (At−1, qt, ρt, qt+1, ρt+1).
Hence, given qt, if {(qt+1, ρt+1)} is a singleton, there is only one economic equilibrium,
Et. This, in turn, implies that St is uniquely pinned down if, and only if, {(qt+1, ρt+1)}
is a singleton.
Suppose that it is not a singleton, then it should have two elements at most
such that {(qt+1, ρt+1)} = {(φ(qt, 0), 0), (φ(qt, ρ¯), ρ¯)}. The first element in the set,
(φ(qt, 0), 0), represents the rosy belief of generation t that results in strong individ-
ualism with solid protection of property rights over innovations for generation t+ 1.
The other one, (φ(qt, ρ¯), ρ¯), on the other hand, stands for the dismal belief that leads
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to weak individualism with the severe expropriation on innovation. Let EOt denote
the economic equilibrium under the optimistic prophecy, and EPt for the one under
the pessimistic prophecy. More precisely, EOt is determined under the vector of state
variables, (At−1, qt, ρt, qt+1, ρt+1) = (At−1, qt, ρt, φ(qt, 0), 0), while EPt is pinned down
under (At−1, qt, ρt, qt+1, ρt+1) = (At−1, qt, ρt, φ(qt, ρ¯), ρ¯); EOt and EPt differ from each
other in (∆t+1, d
S
t ). Then, it is natural to define SOt ≡ {(qt, ρt),EOt } that denotes
society in equilibrium governed by the optimistic belief. Similarly, the one governed
by the pessimistic belief is given by SPt ≡ {(qt, ρt),EPt }.
We know that there may be multiple social equilibria for some qt ∈ [0, 1]. In
the example illustrated in Figure 2.7, when qt lies in (q˜L, q˜H ], St can be either SOt
or SPt , depending on generation t’s beliefs. More formally, we provide the following
theoretical results:
Proposition 2.4 Suppose that ∆(q, ρ) is monotone decreasing in q, and ∆ (q, 0) >
∆ (q, ρ¯) ∀q ∈ [0, 1]. Also, suppose that Xˆ (q, 0) > Xˆ (q, ρ¯) ∀q ∈ [0, 1] where Xˆ(q, 0) is
either a weakly increasing or an inverse U-shaped function with respect to q such that
Xˆ(0, 0) ≤ Xˆ(1, 0), and there is at most one q∗0 ∈ [0, 1] such that Xˆ(q∗0, 0) = 1/2− ξ.
Then,
(i) existence of the social equilibrium: St exists ∀t = 0, 1, 2, · · · .
empSuppose further that Xˆ (q, ρ¯) is either a weakly increasing or an inverse U-shaped
function with respect to q such that Xˆ(0, ρ¯) ≤ Xˆ(1, ρ¯), and ξ ∈ [−1/2, 1/2] satisfies
maxq∈[0,1] Xˆ (q, 0) > 1/2− ξ ≥ minq∈[0,1] Xˆ (q, ρ¯).
empNow define qˆL that solves Xˆ(qˆL, 0) = 1/2 − ξ. If there is no such qˆL, qˆL = 0.
Similarly, qˆH solves Xˆ(qˆH , ρ¯) = 1/2− ξ. If there is no such qˆH , qˆH = 1. Also define
q˜L and q˜H that solve φ(q˜L, 0) = qˆL and φ(q˜H , ρ¯) = qˆH , respectively. Then,
(ii) multiple dynamic equilibria: there always exists an interval (q˜L, q˜H ] where
society with qt ∈ (q˜L, q˜H ] has multiple dynamic equilibria such that {St} = {SOt ,SPt },
one of which is selected by self-fulfilling expectations about (qt+1, ρt+1). Otherwise,
society always has a unique equilibrium. More precisely, {St} = {SOt } ∀qt > q˜H , and
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{St} = {SPt } ∀qt ≤ q˜L.
empFurthermore, suppose that ∆(0, ρ) > 0 and ∆(1, ρ) < 0 ∀ρ ∈ {0, ρ¯}. Then,
(iii) multiple steady states: There are two interior steady states q¯L ∈ (0, 1)
and q¯H ∈ (0, 1) such that q¯H > q¯L where q¯H solves φ(q¯H , 0) = q¯H , and q¯L solves
φ(q¯L, ρ¯) = q¯L.
empFinally, suppose that there is at most one q∗ρ¯ ∈ [0, 1] such that Xˆ(q∗ρ¯, ρ¯) = 1/2−ξ,
and ξ is intermediate, so that neither q¯L > q˜H nor q¯H < q˜L. Then, we obtain the
following stability property that the multiple dynamic equilibria emerge only around
q¯L, which is the steady state characterized by poor protection of property rights and
strong collectivism:
(iv) stability of the steady states: q¯H is always locally stable but q¯L is neither
stable nor unstable if q¯H is high enough that q¯H > q˜H
36 and q¯L is not so small that
q¯L ≥ q˜L.37
In summary, although the economic equilibrium is always uniquely determined
given any vector of culture and institutions, the model admits multiple equilibria
through different combinations of culture and institutions in equilibrium. The mul-
tiplicity stems from the strategic complementarity between culture and institutions.
Each social equilibrium consists of an economic equilibrium along with culture and
institutions, and equilibrium selection depends entirely on self-fulfilling expectations.
Looked at another angle, borrowing Karl Marx’s terms, we developed a theoreti-
cal framework in which multiple equilibria arise through considering superstructure
(culture and institutions) on top of substructure (the economy).
We lastly remark one implication from the theory. One can interpret part (ii) of
Proposition 2.4 as the path dependence (or history dependence) of expectations for
society where the culture is extreme. For example, suppose that qL > 0. If society has
strong enough collectivism today such that qt ≤ q˜L, the social equilibrium is associ-
36 This is a case where λe is not too small.
37 This is a case where ρ¯ is not too large. If ρ¯ is large enough to make sure that q¯L ≥ q˜L, then
the steady state, q¯L, is also locally stable as the other steady state, q¯H , is. In this case, the region
admitting multiple dynamic equilibria arises between the two steady states, q¯L and q¯H .
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ated with pessimistic beliefs only, i.e., {St} = {SPt }. This leads to strong collectivism
tomorrow, and hence, the society is likely to have {St+1} = {SPt+1}, implying that
the dismal beliefs persist. Similarly, if qH < 1 and society has strong enough individ-
ualism today such that qt > q˜H , then optimistic beliefs on the institutional quality
in period t must continue over period t + 1. This suggests that expectations about
future policies are history-dependent in economies governed by extreme cultures.
2.7 Growth under Endogenous Culture and Insti-
tutions
Here, we investigate growth implications of the endogenous interaction between cul-
ture and institutions. For a better understanding, we use the example illustrated in
Figure 2.8, which consists of three panels. In the top panel, there are two politi-
cal thresholds, qˆL and qˆH , that characterize the political equilibrium. In the middle
panel, there are two different ∆(q, ρ), the premium of being an individualist, both
of which correspond to the maximum and minimum tax rate on innovation, respec-
tively. Lastly, in the bottom panel, we have two laws of motion, φ(qt, ρt+1), both
of which correspond to ∆(q, ρ¯) and ∆(q, 0), respectively, and thereby, the maximum
and minimum tax rates.
Note from the bottom panel that the society has two different steady states de-
pending on the quality of institutions in terms of the tax rate on innovation. Since the
premium of being an individualist is larger when the government does not expropriate
innovator, i.e., ∆(q, ρ¯) > ∆(q, 0) ∀q ∈ [0, 1], as we have seen in Section 4, the steady
state without expropriation features strong individualism, denoted as q¯H , while q¯L is
the other steady state that features weaker individualism and severe expropriation
on innovation. If the aggregate innovation, X(q, ρ), is increasing in q but decreasing
in ρ as in Example 1, we have X(q¯H , 0) > X(q¯L, ρ¯). In a word, innovations are more
abundant in an individualistic society without any expropriation than a collectivist
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society with severe expropriation. Since the long-term growth rate is given by σX−1,
society at q¯H enjoys higher growth than the one at q¯L; recall the negative direct and
indirect growth effects of less secure property rights. For this reason, one can call the
steady state at q¯H a “good steady state” in terms of the long-term growth rate. We
then call the other steady state at q¯L a “bad steady state.”
Meanwhile, from the top panel of Figure 2.8, we can notice that society has three
different regions for political equilibrium depending on the degree of individualism.
When the current individualism is so weak that qt ∈ [0, q˜L], generation t anticipates
that next period individualism will be weak enough to cause severe expropriation on
innovation for sure. Then, we have a unique equilibrium characterized by ρt+1 = ρ¯ and
qt+1 = φ(qt, ρ¯). This equilibrium emerges in the dark gray region. On the contrary,
when current individualism is so strong that qt ∈ (q˜H , 1], generation t predicts that
the next period individualism will be strong enough to enforce the minimum tax
rate for sure. Then, the equilibrium is unique such that ρt+1 = 0 and qt+1 = φ(qt, 0),
which appears in the white region. Finally, when the current individualism is between
q˜L and q˜H , there are multiple social equilibria from Part (ii) of Proposition 2.4. In
period t + 1, individualism can be strong enough for the government to minimize
the tax rate on innovation (the non-expropriation regime), i.e., St = SOt . At the
same time, individualism in period t + 1 can be weak enough for the government
to impose the maximum tax rate on innovation, ρ¯ (the expropriation regime), i.e.,
St = SPt . This case corresponds to the light gray region where multiple dynamic
equilibria emerge. Equilibrium selection between the two regimes depends solely on
generation t’s self-fulfilling expectations.
Suppose that society is initially in the white region, where it enforces efficient
property rights characterized by the minimum tax rate on innovation. Then, the
state of culture, qt, evolves along with the law of motion, φ(qt, 0), denoted by the
thick black line in the white region. The society, thus, converges monotonically to
the good steady state, enjoying a higher growth rate over a long period of time.
Suppose now that society starts in the dark gray region for some reasons —
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Figure 2.8: Growth Implications
maybe historical and/or geographical reasons. Then, it will have bad protection
of property rights characterized by the maximum tax rate on innovation, so that
qt evolves along with the law of motion, φ(qt, ρ¯), depicted by the thick black line
in the dark gray region. After a while, it reaches the light gray region where the
social equilibrium is indeterminate between SOt and SPt . If agents in the society
keep believing that the government will expropriate innovators severely as in the
current period, i.e., ρt+1 = ρt = ρ¯, then the pessimistic belief leads the society to be
collectivist enough to impose the maximum tax rate on innovation in period t + 1.
Accordingly, the economy converges to and stays at the bad steady state, q¯L, growing
at the rate of σX(q¯L, ρ¯)− 1, which is smaller than the one at the good steady state,
q¯H . We, therefore, call the bad steady state the “low-growth trap” as well since
society cannot escape from the trap unless people expect government’s commitment
to the non-expropriation.38
It may experience expectations-driven growth cycles in this region instead of stay-
ing at the low-growth trap, q¯L. Figure 2.8 shows an example of two-period limit cycles
that alternates between two states of culture, say q¯0 and q¯1 where q¯1 > q¯0. This im-
plies that society has two steady states in the long run. The steady state at q¯1
displays strong individualism and non-expropriation, while the one at q¯0 is described
by weaker individualism and severe expropriation. Hence, the two steady states are
opposite in terms of institutional qualities, and one can interpret the growth cycles
as political instability. That is, the society in the light gray region suffers from excess
volatility both in economy and politics caused by the endogenous regime switching.
What is important is that the society may not escape from the indeterminacy region
even when it does not stay at the low-growth trap, q¯L. This is because the society
38 If q¯L is larger than q˜L, the bad steady state q¯L belongs to the dark gray region, so that q¯L
has a unique political equilibrium that ρt+1 = ρ¯. In this case, society near q¯L converges to the bad
steady state for sure, implying that q¯L is locally stable. That is, any society near the low-growth
trap ends up being trapped, suffering from low growth permanently as long as there is no attempt or
shock that makes the society get out of the trap. The main message in this chapter, however, is not
changed: stronger (weaker) individualism tends to be associated with stronger (weaker) protection
of property rights, and such an interaction induces economic prosperity (disaster) in the long run.
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should lead agents’ beliefs to the optimistic direction persistently for some periods of
time in order to escape from this region and converge to the good steady state at q¯H .
However, there is no systematic way to steer agents’ expectations to a certain direc-
tion, and hence, society may lie in the indeterminacy region for indefinite periods of
time, suffering from low growth with excess volatility.
2.8 Making Growth Miracles
In this section, we investigate policy implications from the theory to explore how
society can get out of the low-growth trap and converge to the good steady state.
Since our theory deals with endogenous culture and institutions, policy prescriptions
for growth miracles include not only economic tools such as tax policies but also
political reform packages presented below.
Political reform
Suppose that society is in the indeterminacy region. As described by the arrows
between the two laws of motion for qt in the bottom panel of Figure 2.9 (a), this
society has not been able to escape from the region, suffering from expectations-
driven volatility both in growth rates and in institutional qualities. In this situation,
suppose that the society goes through a political reform that shifts the political
power from workers to innovators. This political reform can be parameterized by
an increase in ξ. For example, if ξ increases to ξ′ as in Figure 2.9 (b), then Xˆ(q, ρ¯)
becomes larger than 1/2 − ξ′ whenever the degree of curruent individualism, qt, is
higher than qˆ′H . Since the threshold qˆ
′
H is smaller than the original one, qˆH , the
indeterminacy region gets much smaller as in the bottom panel of Figure 2.9 (b).39
Society then converges to the good steady state, q¯H , regardless of the initial state
of culture as depicted in Figure 2.9 (b). Consequently, the economy grows at a
39 Also notice that the expropriation regime does not exist since Xˆ(q, 0), the number of innovators
under the zero tax, is larger than 1/2− ξ′ ∀q ∈ [0, 1], and hence, qˆ′L = 0.
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Figure 2.9: Political Reform and Growth Miracles
higher rate given by σX(q¯H , 0) − 1 over a long period of time as if it had recovered
its “growth potential.” This can be interpreted as a growth miracle led by a policy
reform that strengthens the political power of innovators whose inventions determine
the aggregate productivity of the economy.
Improvement of individual rights
In the theoretical model, one can interpret the maximum tax rate, ρ¯ ∈ (0, 1),
as the maximal degree of the public predation on the private ownership. It is then
natural to think that ρ¯ will be determined by, for example, an independent judiciary,
constraints on power of authority and the role given to decision makers on taxation.
Not only from those “formal” factors, more familiar in economics, one can also regard
that ρ¯ reflects the value of outside option for innovators; if an innovator can hide his
wealth W at the expense of ρ¯W in order to avoid the public predation, the government
will not set the rate of expropriation above ρ¯.
In any interpretation for ρ¯, we can technically show that a decrease in ρ¯ (improving
individual rights) may make society escape from the low-growth trap. Suppose again
that society has been stuck in the indeterminacy region near the low-growth trap
as in Figure 2.10 (a). In this situation, if ρ¯ decreases to ρ¯′, the mass of innovators
under the expropriation regime will increase ∀q ∈ [0, 1] as in the top panel of Figure
2.10 (b); for example, see equation (28) to check ∂Xˆ(q, ρ)/∂ρ < 0. Same as the case
of an increase in ξ, this makes the threshold qˆ′H smaller than the original one, qˆH .
The indeterminacy region therefore becomes much smaller as in the bottom panel of
Figure 2.10 (b).
In addition to this, the premium value of being an individualist under the expro-
priation regime increases ∀q ∈ [0, 1], and this makes the law of motion for qt under
the expropriation regime shift upward; compare ∆(qt, ρ¯) in the middle panel of Figure
2.10 (a) and that of Figure 2.10 (b). This makes indeterminacy region even smaller.
Summing up all those impacts, regardless of the initial state of culture, society con-
verges to the good steady state, q¯H , where it grows at a higher rate over a long period
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Figure 2.10: Individual Rights and Growth Miracles
of time. This is a growth miracle from improvement of individual rights to private
ownership parameterized by a decrease in ρ¯.
Tax policies
We now know that increasing the mass of innovators under the expropriation
regime is a key to make society get out of the low-growth trap. Then, one can
think of tax policies that induce more innovators in the economy. To do so, the
skill threshold zS (S ∈ {I, C}) needs to be lower given q and ρ¯. From equation (9),
this can be done through a decrease in the opportunity cost of being an innovator
given by εS ≡ eS/λS. However, it is, in general, difficult for the government to do
simply because it is hard to distinguish each individual’s culture type. Instead, the
government can change the relative price of innovation, p/w, by using subsidies and
taxes.
Suppose that, after the voting in period t, the government announces that it will
subsidize innovation in period t + 1 by st+1 > 0. Then, the price of innovation in
period t+1 is given by (1+st+1)pt+1. The government imposes lump-sum tax τt+1 > 0
equally on each individual of generation t in order to fund the subsidy. Note that
this fiscal policy can be implemented without any political conflict after the voting
in period t since generation t has no longer the right to vote. The skill thresholds in
period t+ 1 is then determined as follows:
zSt+1 = min
{
(ψS)−1[εˆS(st+1)ηˆt+1xt+1], 1
} ∀S ∈ {I, C}
where εˆS(st+1) ≡ eS/[λS(1+st+1)] denotes the tax-adjusted opportunity cost of being
an innovator. That is, changing the relative price of innovation p/w through the tax
policy is essentially equivalent with changing the opportunity cost, eS/λS, to affect
zS, the skill threshold.
This tax policy increases the number of innovators, Xˆ(q, ρ), for any q and ρ; see
equation (26). To see this more clearly, note that Xˆ(q, ρ) in Example 2 increases
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whenever λ rises to λ(1 + s). Similarly, ∆(q, ρ¯) also increases since being an individ-
ualist is more valued with the subsidy, which is more likely to go for individualists.
Hence, the fiscal policy can make society escape from the low-growth trap as in the
case of a decrease in ρ¯, and this can be referred to as a growth miracle from tax
policies.40
2.9 Conclusion
We develop a dynamic model in which culture and institutions evolve jointly, and
the interaction between them determines economic growth. The interaction takes
the form of a strategic complementarity: individualism and strong enforcement of
property rights are mutually reinforced, which is consistent with our empirical find-
ings. For example, a vicious mutual reinforcement dynamically causes decades —
or even centuries — of stagnation, which we call the low-growth trap. In addition
to low growth, economies near the trap may suffer from excess volatility driven by
self-fulfilling beliefs, which are independent of fundamental factors of the economy.
We also show that improvement of political factors greatly helps society in the
low-growth trap. Alongside sound fiscal policies, improvement of the political envi-
ronment such as strengthening innovators’ political power or improving individual
rights to private ownership can break the vicious cycles — perhaps, for instance, the
recent experiences in the Soviet Union, China and Vietnam. Society then departs
from the expropriation regime and enjoys the fruits of high growth over a long period
of time as a nation shifts toward individualism.
The novel feature of the model is that it considers “society,” which incorporates
40 The difference is that both Xˆ(q, 0) and ∆(q, 0) also increase in the case of the tax policy. An
increase in Xˆ(q, 0) further shrinks both the indeterminacy and expropriation regimes since qˆL also
decreases as in the case of the political reform. This fiscal policy, however, is limited in that it may
not be applied repeatedly over generations since new generations will learn from the history that
the government will tax them when they are old. Workers knowing the government will tax them
in the next period will want to eliminate the subsidy when they are young, and the political parties
will reflect this policy preference provided that the fraction of workers is large enough.
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culture and institutions on top of the “economy.” Multiple equilibria possibly arise
once culture and institutions are endogenously determined in an otherwise standard
growth model without aggregate uncertainty where the economy itself is complete in
that there is no missing market. In the case of multiple equilibria, self-fulfilling be-
liefs matter since equilibrium selection depends solely on those beliefs.41 This leaves
an important research question open: “What factors underlie the self-confirming be-
liefs?” If we provide a plausible answer to this question, we may devise a systematic
means to form the self-fulfilling optimism which helps to steer society towards eco-
nomic prosperity.
41 Azariadis (1981) demonstrates that multiple equilibria, consistent with the rational expectations
equilibrium, emerge when markets are incomplete. In this setting, self-confirming beliefs also matter
in equilibrium selection.
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Chapter 3
Rent-Seeking, Institutions and
Morality
3.1 Introduction
fdjaklfdjlkfdsfdsfdsfdsafjdlfdfkafdjksalfdkj“Because that’s where the money is.”
fdjaklfdjjjlkafjdlkadfdsfdssfdsdjksalkjWillie Sutton on why he robbed banks
We study rent-seeking. Rent-seeking is defined by any type of redistribution activity
that takes up resources from others. One can classify it into two categories: private
and public rent-seeking. The private rent-seeking is done by a private agent without
public authority, which includes, for example, theft, robbery, looting, trickery, fraud,
scam, embezzlement, appropriation and takeover. The public rent-seeking is executed
under public authority, and thereby, usually executed by government officials, which
includes, for example, expropriation through severe taxation, poor protection of prop-
erty rights, abuse of authority (corruption), and confiscation of private ownership.
Then, it is clear that rent-seeking is a part of our daily life although the extent of
rent-seeking varies by nation. In this chapter, we investigate why the degree of rent-
seeking varies across societies and how rent-seeking can explain continuing income
gap over the globe focusing on its redistribution aspect.
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This research is motivated by three questions. First, is rent-seeking bad for an
economy? and, if so, why is it bad? Second, if it is indeed bad, why it still prevails
in many countries? That is, why those countries did not eliminate rent-seeking ac-
tivities long ago? Third, what is the most profound factor underlying rent-seeking
behaviors? The last question is particularly relevant if one wants to provide a funda-
mental solution for eradicating “ingrained” rent-seeking in society. To answer these
three questions, we examine how rent-seeking results in long-lasting poverty by inves-
tigating the interaction between institutions — the effectiveness of law enforcement
— and culture — morality of society.
To define the morality of society, we divide economic activities into two different
types: productive and unproductive activities. The productive activity represents
any kind of activity that increases one’s wealth through “hard work” without hurting
anyone else. For example, it includes (higher) education, diligent work, innovation,
entrepreneurship — becoming an entrepreneur, or more narrowly, launching his own
business — and etc. On the contrary, the unproductive activity is purely redistribu-
tive in that it takes resources from one to another.1 In our model, each individual
is allowed to conduct the productive or unproductive activities (or both at the same
time). Hence, individuals engaging in the productive and unproductive activities are
determined by their abilities in the productive and unproductive activities.
Then, it would be natural to define a society is morally more sound than another
if it has a smaller fraction of people who have the comparative advantage in the
unproductive activity. Since the incentive to be a rent-seeker is dependent on the
individual comparative advantage between productive and unproductive activities,
the social morality turns out to be a significant factor underlying how much rent-
seeking prevails in society.
However, the extent that rent-seeking prevails in society does not only depend on
the morality. It is also dependent on how effective the law enforcement is, which we
1 In this sense, one can label the productive and unproductive activities as profit-seeking and
rent-seeking activities, respectively.
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call the institutional quality. For example, if the government operates an inefficient
investigation system and enforcers are not trained, not motivated, and even corrupt,
the probability to be punished for rent-seeking will be low. Consequently, we need
to take into account the two fundamental factors — the morality and institutional
quality — in the examination of rent-seeking activities, and hence, we delve into the
two factors by developing theoretical model where they are playing a crucial role
determining rent-seeking behavior.
We now note a somewhat obvious fact to answer the first question: “is rent-seeking
bad for an economy? and, if so, why is it bad?” The fact is that, a victim’s actual loss
from any rent-seeking tends to be larger than the benefit that a rent-seeker obtains
from the rent-seeking. This is simply because every productive project in progress is
“profitable,” which means that a victim’s actual loss from rent-seeking will be larger
than a rent seeker’s benefit in the rent-seeking. Imagine a situation that there is an
entrepreneur who has a creative idea that leads to some profits once it is proceeded
with, for example, $1,000,000 of the initial investment. If the initial investment is
expropriated by a rent-seeker, e.g., thief or corrupt friend, then the profits from the
idea cannot be realized, so that profits are forgone. The forgone profits are the
net-loss in the society although the initial investment is simply redistributed to the
rent-seeker. In other words, the wedge between a rent-seeker’s benefit and a victim’s
loss leads to deadweight loss in rent-seeking, reducing the aggregate income of the
economy.
In addition to the wedge, there is one more channel through which rent-seeking
negatively affects the economy. Namely, the higher threat of rent-seeking, the smaller
incentive to engage in the productive activity. That is, you are less willing to engage
in the profit-seeking activity as you are more likely to meet a rent-seeker while you are
doing the productive activity. Hence, the extensive margin of people who are willing
to engage in the profit-seeking activity gets smaller as the fraction of rent-seekers
increases. This further decreases the aggregate output. Looked at another side,
one can interpret this negative impact of rent-seeking as that society gets a smaller
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fraction of people who believe “economic success through hard work and education”
as the threat to be victimized by rent-seekers increases.
Rent-seeking harms growth if the productive activity entails positive externalities
for the economy. This is based on the insight that even when the productive activity
(which is successfully done) makes the entire economy better off through, for example,
learning-by-doing and knowledge diffusion, a rent-seeker, in general, does not care
about the positive externalities. Rather, he cares only about how much resources he
can take away from rent-seeking and how strict he will be punished once his rent-
seeking activity is exposed, epitomized as the quote by Willie Sutton, a legendary
bank robber, at the beginning of this chapter. In summary, using economics jargon,
the negative impacts of private rent-seeking both on the aggregate income and growth
emerge because a rent-seeker does not internalize any external impact of rent-seeking.
The second question deals with why rent-seeking prevails in many countries even
in very long-run. If rent-seeking is indeed bad for economic prosperity, why so many
countries, especially, poor countries, did not eliminate rent-seeking long ago? One
can answer to this puzzling question using a simple economic intuition — and jargon
again. That is, there will be a mechanism that results in an increasing return to
scale for rent-seeking, which many economists have already argued a lot. We add
another mechanism that induces such an increasing return to scale by focusing on
politics.2 More precisely, we propose a political factor that determines the incentive
to do rent-seeking as an important factor that creates an increasing return to scale
2 In the standard discourse in economics, an individual is modeled as a globule which is perfectly
consonant with Leibniz’ “windowless monad” (or monas); it behaves independently by its own
principle — optimization —, without any explicit relationship with others, but, at the same time,
those respective principles are perfectly harmonized throughout the entire economy — equilibrium.
This philosophical point of view explains individual behaviors in reality to some extent as well as
simplifying the economic analysis a lot by insulating economic aggregates — equilibrium prices
and allocations — from any impact of a single individual’s behavior. However, in the real world,
individuals have their own “will” that makes them together in order to realize the will collectively.
The collective choice, of course, can change aggregates. For example, workers form a labor union to
raise their bargaining power, and hence, wage, just like that firms form a cartel to seek rents. Hence,
society is not always harmonized by the windowless monads, rather it usually encompasses various
conflicts among different interest groups, and society should equip a systematic and influential
vehicle that accommodates people’s various conflicts: politics.
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Figure 3.1: Time Line
for rent-seeking. The intuition is simple. As there are more people who are more
likely to be rent-seekers, their political power will be stronger. Hence, the chances are
pretty low that society establishes institutions against rent-seeking. This is how an
increasing return to scale for rent-seeking activities can emerge. In a word, the more
people who are more likely to be rent-seekers, the poorer institutions, characterized
by less effective enforcement of laws for rent-seeking, resulting in a higher (ex ante)
return to rent-seeking.
Note that the fraction of people who are more likely to be rent-seekers is monotone
in the fraction of people who have the comparative advantage in the unproductive
activity, which is defined as the social morality. Hence, this intuition helps us answer
to the third question about the role of the morality as a fundamental factor underlying
rent-seeking activities. Since the morality is more fundamental than institutions in
our framework, this theoretical result implies further that the social morality needs
to be revived if one desires fundamentally solves rent-seeking problem. If not, the
good institutions (effective enforcement of laws) will not be established, raising the
incentive to seek rents, and hence, rent-seeking will prevail again. This calls for an
important role for the government to somehow revive the morality.
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3.2 The Model
3.2.1 Overview
We consider an OLG economy where each agent lives for two and a half periods.
Time is discrete and extends from zero to infinity; t = 0, 1, 2, · · · . Each generation
t = 0, 1, 2, · · · is born at the middle of period t − 1 and enters at the beginning of
t as depicted in Figure 3.1. Each generation consists of a continuum of individuals,
which is unit measure, and the total population is not changed for all t. Consumption
occurs only in the second period of life. The utility from consumption is linear, and
there is no time discount.
At the beginning of the first period, each agent i of generation t enters the economy
and draws xi ≡ zi/ρi ∈ X ⊂ R+ from a time-varying continuous distribution F˜t (x)
defined on X . Here, zi is his own trait or skill for “productive activity,” for example,
diligence, cooperation, earnestness and creativity, while ρi is the one for “unproduc-
tive activity,” for example, deceit, craftiness, cruelty and selfishness. Specifically, we
interpret the productive activity as any type of activity that increases his wealth
through “hard work” without hurting anyone else. For example, it includes (higher)
education, diligent work, innovation, entrepreneurship — becoming an entrepreneur,
or more narrowly, launching his own business — and etc. We posit that the pro-
ductive activity entails some risk by its nature, and hence, we refer to the productive
activity as “innovation” (or “entrepreneurship”). On the contrary, the unproductive
activity is purely redistributive in that it takes some resources from others. We refer
to the unproductive activity as rent-seeking.
After drawing the skill (personal trait), each individual of generation t votes for
institutional quality that determines the effective punishment level for rent-seeking
activities. Then, he gives birth one child, so that the life-cycle of generation t + 1
begins. After the voting, each agent chooses whether or not to engage in the produc-
tive activity. If he engages in the productive activity, he becomes an “entrepreneur”
so that we refer to this decision as occupation choice. After the occupation choice, a
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pair of two agents randomly meets with each other at the matching stage where rent-
seeing can occur. After the matching, the first period of life ends, and generation t
proceeds to the second period of life. At the beginning of the period t+ 1, innovation
(the productive activity) conducted in period t is realized, and each of generation t
consumes his entire wealth, ending his life-cycle.
3.2.2 Skills in Productive and Unproductive Activities
Now, let us investigate how zi ∈ [0, 1] and ρi ∈ [0, 1] are modeled in the economy.
Each agent of generation t earns labor income wt in the first-period. After that, he can
be an entrepreneur doing the productive activity. If he decides to be an entrepreneur,
he invests his own3 wealth ω ≤ wt. He succeeds in the innovation (entrepreneurship)
with probability p (z) ∈ [0, 1] where p′ (z) > 0 and obtains λω at the beginning of
the second period of life. That is, innovation requires both resources and time; you
cannot create something new right now with empty hands. Of course, λ > 1.
He fails in the innovation with probability 1 − p (z). Then, he gets nothing,
and thereby, consumes nothing in the second period. If he decides not to be an
entrepreneur, he stays idle and keeps his own wealth wt. We let E and I denote the
occupation choice of an agent where E and I stand for “an entrepreneur” and “an
inactivist,” respectively.
After the occupation choice, each agent meets another agent at the matching
stage. The one-to-one matching is anonymous, so that each player i does not know
his opponent j’s type xj. At this matching, each player i can take ρi fraction of j’s
wealth wj. The rent-seeking is exposed by the government with probability pit. Then,
the rent-seeker i returns what he has stolen, which is given by ρiwj, to the victim j.
In addition, the government confiscates θ fraction of an arrested rent-seeker’s wealth
3 We assume that there is no financial market. This is simply because agents conducting the
productive activity will be those whose z are highest under the perfect financial market due to the
linear return to the productive activity. However, regardless whether the financial market is perfect
or imperfect, the main results will not be changed as long as the set of agents doing the productive
activity is not measure zero, and hence, the fraction of them gets smaller along with the extent of
rent-seeking.
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at the beginning of the second period of life. For simplicity but without any change in
the main results, we assume that the government identifies the rent-seeking activities
case by case. Hence, an agent’s rent-seeking activity may not be exposed, so that
he may keep the stolen goods, while his own loss by his opponent’s rent-seeking is
recovered once the rent-seeker is caught by the government.
3.2.3 Destructive Features of Rent-Seeking
What is the primary source that results in negative impacts of rent-seeking on the
economy? That is, what “nature” of rent-seeking makes it destructive? One imme-
diate answer, which is well explained by Grossman and Kim (1995, 1996), is that the
possibility of rent-seeking induces people invest resources in sharpening predatory
power and in protecting private properties, both of which are purely unproductive,
and hence, the deadweight loss in economics point of view.
Our intuition suggests another destructive nature of rent-seeking. Namely, there
is a potential gap between a rent-seeker’s benefit from rent-seeking and his victim’s
loss from the rent-seeking. Since the productive activity already executed must be
“profitable”, and at the same time, rent-seekers are not likely to conduct productive
activities according to the self-selection, the chances are high that a rent-seeker’s
benefit from rent-seeking is smaller than his victim’s loss from the rent-seeking. This
wedge, in turn, leads to the deadweight loss, decreasing the aggregate income.
The second destructive feature is that rent-seeking lowers the number of people
who want to engage in the productive activity. We will show that the number of
entrepreneurs gets smaller as the number of rent-seekers increases. This is simply
because the probability for an entrepreneur to meet a rent-seeker increases as the
fraction of rent-seeker increases. That is, the incentive to conduct innovation or en-
trepreneurship decreases along with a higher threat of rent-seeking (higher probability
to be victimized).
Not only income loss, the two destructive features can also aggravate growth. This
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is because some of the productive activity may have had positive externalities that
promote economic growth through, for example, learning-by-doing and knowledge
diffusion. Based on this argument, we will show that the two destructive features
themselves decrease both the aggregate income and growth even when there is no
waste of resources for sharpening offensive and defensive skills.4 In our model, an
agent invests in neither predatory nor defensive skills, but rent-seeking reduces the
total output and growth because of the two destructive features.
3.2.4 Morality of Society
It is clear that xi ≡ zi/ρi measures the comparative advantage in the productive
activity against the unproductive one. That is, an agent i is relatively better in the
productive activity compared to an agent j if, and only if xi > xj. Looked at another
way, one can interpret xi ≡ zi/ρi as individual morality since zi and ρi represent
“good” and “bad” personal traits, respectively. That is, an individual i is more
morally sound as xi increases. Then, one would be able to rank the morality between
different societies using the distribution of the individual morality as follows:
Definition 3.1 Morality Society A is morally more sound than society B if F˜A (x)
dominates F˜B (x) at first-order, i.e., F˜A (x) < F˜B (x) ∀x ∈ X .
The definition is quite intuitive; the morality of society A is worse than society B
if, at any cumulative probability F˜ (x), individuals in society B have worse individual
morality, x, than those of society A. For analytical simplicity in the rent-seeking
game, which will be presented below, we set ρ ≡ ρi ∈ (0, 1) ∀i ∈ [0, 1]. This does not
lose generality of the analysis, at least, for the purpose of this research since, as in
the definition of the morality, what is important is the relative magnitude of zi to ρi.
That is, with ρi being fixed across agents, the comparative advantage is completely
4 As will be shown, in our model, potential victims rely on the “public fortification” by enhancing
the institutional quality in order to protect their private properties. Then, one should notice that
any costs for establishing a higher quality of institutions are also economic losses.
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Figure 3.2: Moral Decay and Revival
recovered through comparison of zi and zj.
5 Now, let F (z) be a transformation of
F˜ (x) with ρi being fixed at ρ ∈ (0, 1) ∀i ∈ [0, 1]. Then, Definition 3.1 needs to
be rewritten such that society A is morally more sound than society B if FA (z)
dominates FB (z) at first-order, i.e., FA (z) < FB (z) ∀z ∈ (0, 1). Figure 3.1 depicts
an example of moral decay and revival with F (z).
We first let the institutional quality pit and the morality Ft being fixed for the time
being to clarify the model mechanism. the institutional quality will be endogenized
later.
3.2.5 Rent-Seeking and Aggregate Output
Here, we briefly investigate how rent-seeking affects aggregate output of the economy
in the model environment. Recall the first destructive feature that a rent-seeker’s
benefit from rent-seeking is smaller than his victim’s actual loss. In the model, this
gap does not emerge as long as a rent-seeker’s victim is an inactivist, who does
not conduct the productive activity. In this case, the rent-seeker takes ρw, and the
5 In another note below, we will argue that this simplifying assumption is indeed not restricted
for the main results. This is because the solution of rent-seeking game with ρi being fixed ∀i ∈ [0, 1]
is qualitatively the same as the one with varying ρi.
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inactivist loses ρw, so that the benefit and loss are exactly the same. Hence, rent-
seeking victimizing an inactivist has no impact on the aggregate output; it is simply
redistributive, and there is no output loss.
However, if a rent-seeker predates an entrepreneur, the wedge emerges. Recall
that the return to the entrepreneurship (innovation) is linear. Hence, anyone who
chooses to be an entrepreneur invests his entire wealth wt. That is, ω = wt ∀z ∈ [0, 1]
such that ot (z) = E. Then, his expected wealth without any interrupt (rent-seeking)
is given by p (z)λwt. Since the utility from consumption is linear, if there is no rent-
seeking, any agent whose skill is high enough that p (z)λ ≥ 1 will chooses to be an
entrepreneur, and an inactivist otherwise. Let us define the skill threshold z∗ such
that anyone whose z is higher than z∗ becomes an entrepreneur, and an inactivist
otherwise. Then, z∗ should be at least z¯ where z¯ solves p (z¯)λ = 1.
Suppose now that the entrepreneur’s skill is z0 ≥ z∗. Then, although the rent-
seeker takes ρw amount of resources in any rent-seeking incidence, the entrepreneur
actually losses p (z0)λρw, which increases along with his skill z0. The gap between the
benefit and cost of rent-seeking victimizing an entrepreneur is given by [1−p (z0)λ]ρw,
which is strictly negative almost surely since the skill threshold z∗ is bounded below
by z¯ where p(z¯)λ = 1. That is, although rent-seeking is simply redistributive, it
decreases the aggregate output due to the gap between the benefit and the cost. We
will investigate the deadweight loss arising from this wedge between the benefit and
cost of rent-seeking with details after deriving the rent-seeking equilibrium of the
model.
In addition, rent-seeking further decreases the output since it increases the skill
threshold z∗. To examine this negative feature more clearly, we first consider the
aggregate income of the economy without rent-seeking, which is given by:
Y¯t = wt−1
[
Ft−1 (z¯) + λ
∫ 1
z¯
p (z) dFt−1 (z)
]
(3.1)
where Y¯t is the first-best output before the production of generation t given insti-
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tutions and morality (pit−1, θt−1, Ft−1 (·)). Here, z¯ is the minimum level of the skill
threshold that solves p (z¯)λ = 1.
Suppose now that society A and B are exactly the same, except only that A is
morally more sound than B, i.e., FA (z) ≤ FB (z) ∀z ∈ (0, 1). Then, Y At should be
larger than Y Bt since p (z)λ ≥ 1 ∀z ≥ z¯.6 Later, we will show that the threshold
z∗ increases when there are more rent-seekers, meaning more severe rent-seeking
decreases Yt since it reduces the fraction of people willing to engage in the profitable
productive activity. This is the second channel through which rent-seeking reduces
social welfare through the threat of victimized by a rent-seeker.
3.3 Rent-Seeking Decision
We first examine the rent-seeking game as a backward induction. After deriving
the optimal rent-seeking decision, we will investigate the optimal occupation choice.
From now on, we drop the time subscript unless it makes confusion.
According to the timing, the occupation choice is already done, so that the thresh-
old z∗ is common knowledge at the one-to-one matching where rent-seeking occurs.
However, since the one-to-one matching is anonymous, each player does not know his
opponent’s type z. To solve this type of incomplete information games, one can use
the Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE), which maximizes each type’s expected payoff
for an agent i, given any type’s optimal strategy for an agent j 6= i. Here, we focus
only on a pure strategy equilibrium. Then, BNE is a profile of optimal strategies,
{ai|i ∈ [0, 1]}, where ai ≡ a (zi) ∈ {N,R} is an optimal strategy for a player i whose
type is zi ∈ [0, 1]. N indicates “no rent-seeking” while R represents “rent-seeking.”
6 That is, the morality matters even without rent-seeking. This is simply because, in society
A, there are more “active” agents who are self-motivated, and hence, willing to work hard in the
productive activity in order to be achieve higher income (or “better life”) in future. For this reason,
one can interpret the fraction of people who chose E, given by 1− F (z∗), as the fraction of people
who believe “economic success through hard work and education.”
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Mathematically, ai solves:∫ 1
0
uai,a(z) (zi, z) dF (z) ≥
∫ 1
0
ua˜i,a(z) (zi, z) dF (z) ; a (z) is given ∀z ∈ [0, 1]
where ai, a˜i ∈ {N,R} and ai 6= a˜i. uai,a(zj)(zi, zj) is i’s expected payoff when he meets
a player j whose type is z and they choose ai and a(zj), respectively.
7 For simplicity,
we assume that a player choose N over R when the two choices are indifferent.
Although the types are infinitely many, it is simple to solve the game. This is
mainly because we let ρ ≡ ρi ∈ (0, 1) ∀i ∈ [0, 1],8 and every agent has the same initial
endowment w in the game. That is, an agent’s loot from rent-seeking is given by ρw
regardless of a victim’s types, and hence, the optimal strategy on the rent-seeking
behavior is independent of the opponent’s type. We summarize the BNE for the
rent-seeking game as follows:
Lemma 3.1 Solution of the Game: ∀z∗ ∈ [0, 1], there always exists a unique
BNE that solves the rent-seeking game as follows:
a (z) =
 NR if piθ ≥ (1− pi) ρo.w. ∀z < z∗,
a (z) =
 NR if piθp (z)λ ≥ (1− pi) ρo.w. ∀z ≥ z∗.
Lemma 3.1 is quite straightforward. First, an inactivist, i.e., ∀z < z∗, does
7 This shortcut for solving the BNE is available since the matching is totally random between a
type i and a type j; the probability of matching between types i and j is i.i.d.. Hence, maximizing
a player i’s expected payoff over the type space z ∈ [0, 1] is identical with maximizing the expected
utility of each type of z ∈ [0, 1].
8 This simplifying assumption is justifiable since, as already mentioned, what is important for
the main results is the relative magnitude of zi to ρi. Although we can solve the game with varying
ρi across agents, there is no significant gain in the analysis while the algebra becomes complicated a
lot more since the solution depends on the distribution F˜ (x). More precisely, with some simplifying
assumptions, one can show that a player i is more likely to be a rent-seeker as xi ≡ zi/ρi is small;
details are available upon request. This is the same as, at least qualitatively, that a player i is more
likely to be a rent-seeker as zi is small with ρi = ρ ∀i ∈ [0, 1], which coincides with Lemma 3.1
below.
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not seek rent as long as the expected punishment piθw is larger than the expected
benefit of rent-seeking (1− pi) ρw. This logic also applies to an entrepreneur, i.e.,
∀z ≥ z∗, but slightly differently. This is because an entrepreneur’s expected wealth
is given by p (z)λw not by w. Since p (z)λ ≥ 1 ∀z ≥ z∗, Lemma 3.1 means that
an inactivist is more likely to be a rent-seeker than an entrepreneur. This is simply
because an inactivist has the comparative advantage in the unproductive activity,
i.e., an inactivist has a smaller xi ≡ zi/ρi than an entrepreneur with ρi being fixed
at ρ ∀i ∈ [0, 1].
For convenience, we let pˆi ≡ piθ/ (1− pi) denotes the effective (ex-ante) degree
of punishment for rent-seeking. Note also that ρ (z) ≡ ρ/ [p (z)λ] represents the
comparative advantage in the unproductive activity against the productive activity.
It is obvious that ρ (z) decreases as he is more able in the productive activity. With
pˆi and ρ (z), one can rewrite Lemma 3.1 as follows:
a (z; z∗) =
 NR if pˆi ≥ ρ1{z<z∗} + p (z)1{z≥z∗}o.w. (3.2)
3.4 Occupation Choice
It is clear that the occupation choice depends on the number of rent-seekers. This is
because the loss from rent-seeking is proportionately larger for an entrepreneur than
for an inactivist although a rent-seeker’s benefit from rent-seeking is ρw regardless of
a victim’s type. Hence, we first need to understand how the number of rent-seekers,
say ψ∗ ∈ [0, 1], is determined. Specifically, from Lemma 3.1, we have:
ψ∗ = ψ (z∗; pi, θ, F (·)) = F (max{z∗, zˆ})− F (z∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
entrepreneur rent-seekers
+ F (z∗)1{pˆi<ρ}︸ ︷︷ ︸
inactivist rent-seekers
(3.3)
where zˆ solves ρ (zˆ) = pˆi. We will show that there is no entrepreneur rent-seeker as
long as there is no inactivist rent-seekers since an inactivist rent-seeker gets higher
(ex ante) net-benefit from rent-seeking than an entrepreneur rent-seeker due the
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difference in the comparative advantages between them. Note also that ψ∗ is a
function of the morality of society F (·) along with institutions of society (pi, θ).
The final remark is related to the strategic relationship between entrepreneurship
and rent-seeking. As is obvious from (3.3), the number of rent-seekers in equilibrium,
ψ∗, is a function of the equilibrium threshold z∗. An agent regards ψ∗ as given when
he chooses his occupation since he is infinitesimal (measure zero). However, he should
expect ψ∗ in order to choose his occupation optimally.9 As we will see, compared
to an inactivist’s expected utility, an entrepreneur’s expected utility decreases more
largely as ψ∗ increases. Hence, z∗ increases when agents expect that ψ∗ is larger,
i.e., the more rent-seekers, the smaller entrepreneurs. Meanwhile ψ∗ is also (weakly)
increasing in z∗ as in (3.3) because an inactivist has the comparative advantage in
rent-seeking. i.e., the smaller entrepreneurs, the more rent-seekers. This strategic
complementarity between z∗ and ψ∗ admits multiple equilibria for (z∗, ψ∗) as long
as ψ∗ is strictly larger than zero, i.e., as long as there are rent-seeking activities in
equilibrium.
We now consider the expected utility for each occupation to examine the optimal
occupation choice. Given any (z;ψ∗, pi, θ),
v (z;ψ∗) ≡ max
o(z)∈{E,I}
{
vI (ψ∗) , vE (z;ψ∗)
}
(3.4)
s.t. vI(ψ∗) ≡ [1− (1− pi) ρψ∗] + max {(1− pi) ρ− piθ, 0} (3.5)
vE (z;ψ∗) ≡ [1− (1− pi)ψ∗] p (z)λ+ max {(1− pi) ρ− piθp (z)λ, 0} (3.6)
Interpretation of (3.4)–(3.6) is quite straightforward. If a rent-seeker is matched with
only either a no-rent-seeker or another rent-seeker, the probability to meet a rent-
9 The expectation about ψ∗ may vary by individual. Suppose that an agent i’s expectation on
ψ∗ is given by ψei . Then, the rationality implies that ψ
e
i = ψ
∗ ∀i ∈ [0, 1] in any equilibrium. That is,
in equilibrium with the perfect foresight assumption, individuals are rational in that each of them
forms a correct expectation on ψ∗.
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seeker should depend on whether or not he is a rent-seeker. However, in our model,
an agent can be matched with a rent-seeker regardless whether he chooses I or E,
and N or R, i.e., the matching is i.i.d.. Hence, by the law of large numbers, the
probability to be matched with a rent-seeker is the same as the fraction of the rent-
seekers ψ∗ for all agents.10 That is, the probability that an entrepreneur is matched
with a rent-seeker is the same as the probability that an inactivist is matched with
a rent-seeker. Likely, the probability is independent of whether he is a rent-seeker or
not. Hence, both vI(ψ∗) and vE (z;ψ∗) are function of the same ψ∗ as in (3.5) and
(3.6). One can notice that (3.5) and (3.6) are consistent with the optimal rent-seeking
behavior given by Lemma 3.1 — or equation (3.2).
Notably, equations (3.5) and (3.6) imply that vI is independent of z while vE (z)
is strictly increasing in z since p (z) is monotone increasing in z. Also, vI and vE (z)
are all strictly decreasing in ψ∗ but vE (z) decreases proportionately more than vI due
to the comparative advantage in the model. To investigate the occupation choice, it
is convenient to define the following expected utilities:
vIN(ψ
∗) ≡ [1− (1− pi) ρψ∗] (3.7)
vIR(ψ
∗) ≡ [1− (1− pi) ρψ∗] + (1− pi) ρ− piθ (3.8)
vEN (z;ψ
∗) ≡ [1− (1− pi)ψ∗] p (z)λ (3.9)
vER (z;ψ
∗) ≡ [1− (1− pi)ψ∗] p (z)λ+ (1− pi) ρ− piθp (z)λ (3.10)
where the subscript R (or N) stands for the case where an agent chooses (no) rent-
seeking at the matching stage.
For a clearer understanding, we draw vI and vE (z) in Figure 3.3 for the case of
10 As an illustrative example, suppose that the total number of people is n ∈ N, and the total
number of rent-seekers is r ≤ n. Then, the fraction of rent-seekers is ψ∗ = r/n ∈ [0, 1]. In
this situation, for a no-rent-seeker, the probability to be matched with a rent-seeker is given by
r/(n−1) = ψ∗n/(n−1) ∀n > 1. Hence, with the fraction of rent-seekers fixed at a certain level, the
probability converges to ψ∗ as n goes to infinity. Meanwhile, for a rent-seeker, the probability to
be matched with another rent-seeker is given by (r − 1) /(n− 1) = (ψ∗n− 1) /(n− 1) ∀n > 1, and
therefore, the probability also converges to ψ∗ as n goes to infinity with the fraction of rent-seekers
fixed.
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Figure 3.3: Occupation Choice When pˆi < ρ
pˆi < ρ. One can show that zˆ, the break-even threshold between “no rent-seeking”
and “rent-seeking” for a potential entrepreneur, is always larger than the first-best
threshold z¯ if, and only if pˆi < ρ. Hence, when pˆi < ρ, there are some entrepreneur
seeking rent if z∗ < zˆ; see equation (3.3). On the contrary, z∗ can be larger than
zˆ as in Figure 3.3. This case is where only highly able agents in the productive
activity become entrepreneurs, so that they do not want to seek any rent since they
are confiscated a lot when their rent-seeking activity is caught by the government.
Therefore, every entrepreneur is not a rent-seeker while every inactivist is a rent-
seeker when pˆi < ρ.
For convenience and a more general discussion, we define the rent-seeking equi-
librium as follows:
Definition 3.2 Rent-seeking with Exogenous Institutions: For any given in-
stitutions and morality (pi, θ, F (·)), a vector (z∗, ψ∗) is the rent-seeking equilibrium if
it solves the occupation choice problem given by (3.4)-(3.6), satisfying equation (3.3).
Then, a close investigation of equations (3.4)–(3.6) and Lemma 3.1 provides the
following theoretical result that describes the optimal occupation choice and the
fraction of rent-seekers in equilibrium.
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Proposition 3.1 (i) existence: There always exists at least one rent-seeking equi-
librium such that (z∗, ψ∗) ∈ [z¯, 1]× [0, 1].
emz(ii) utopia equilibrium: There is only one equilibrium such that (z∗, ψ∗) =
(z¯, 0) if, and only if pˆi ≥ ρ.
emz(iii) real world equilibrium: Suppose that pˆi < ρ. Then, any vector of (z∗H , ψ
∗
H)
where z∗H ∈ [zˆ, 1] and ψ∗H = F (z∗H) is a rent-seeking equilibrium if it satisfies the fol-
lowing:
vIR (ψ
∗
H) ≥ vEN (z∗H ;ψ∗H) . (3.11)
emzAlso, if the following condition holds:
ρ
pˆi
>
1− piθ + (1− pi) (1− F (zˆ)) ρ
1− (1− pi)F (zˆ) , (C)
then ∃! (z∗L, ψ∗L) where ψ∗L = F (zˆ), and z∗L ∈ (z¯, zˆ) solves the following:
vIR (ψ
∗
L) = v
E
R (z
∗
L;ψ
∗
L) . (3.12)
emz(iv) welfare implications: z∗H ≥ zˆ > z∗L > z¯ and ψ∗H > ψ∗L > 0.
We have three implications from Proposition 3.1. First, there always exists at
least one rent-seeking equilibrium for any given vector of institutions and morality,
(pi, θ, F (·)).
Second, the economy achieves the first-best outcome given a vector of institutions
and the morality (pi, θ, F (·)) if, and only if the institutional quality (pi, θ) is sufficiently
high that the effective punishment pˆi is higher than ρ. In this case, the morality
F (·) has no impact on the rent-seeking equilibrium although it still matters for the
aggregate output as already seen before.
When the institutional quality is not sufficiently good, i.e., pˆi < ρ, there are
possibly infinitely many rent-seeking equilibria due to the strategic complementarity
between z∗ and ψ∗, which is already mentioned before. That said, the first-best
allocation cannot be achieved in any equilibrium since z∗H ≥ zˆ > z∗L > z¯ and ψ∗H >
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ψ∗L > 0.
11 In this situation, the morality does matter in rent-seeking equilibrium.
First note that ψ∗H = F (z
∗
H) and ψ
∗
L = F (zˆ). Hence, the number of rent-seekers in
equilibrium increases as the morality of society gets worse following Definition 3.1.
Since both z∗H and z
∗
L are increasing along with ψ
∗
H and ψ
∗
L, unhealthy morality also
increases the skill threshold, and hence, makes some people, who would engage in the
productive activity without rent-seeking, to become inactivists. This is because the
more rent-seekers, the higher threat (probability) of rent-seeking.
The last implication is about the relationship between institutions and rent-
seeking. One can show that both z∗H and z
∗
L decreases as either pi or θ increases.
This, in turn, implies that both ψ∗H and ψ
∗
L are also decreasing in pi and θ, i.e., the
better institutional quality, the smaller number of rent-seekers. If the institutional
quality improves a great deal, so that pˆi > ρ, then rent-seeking disappears in the
society.
We summarize these implications in the following corollary:
Corollary 3.1 (i) Suppose that institutions are good enough that pˆi ≥ ρ. Then, the
morality has no impact on the rent-seeking equilibrium.
emz(ii) Suppose that institutions are not good enough that pˆi < ρ. Then,
Morality and Rent-Seeking: Rent-seeking becomes more severe as the morality
is decayed in that both ψ∗H and ψ
∗
L increases whenever the morality worsens.
Institutions and Rent-Seeking: Rent-seeking becomes more severe as the insti-
tutional quality is aggravated in that both ψ∗H and ψ
∗
L are decreasing in pi and θ.
11 One can show that z∗L = z¯ when the probability of success in innovation is still the same
at p (z) even if the rent-seeker is not caught, so that any loss from rent-seeking is not recovered;
details are available upon request. However, all of the main results are not changed since there
are always rent-seekers in equilibrium, i.e., ψ∗ ≥ ψ∗L = F (z¯) > 0, and it is still possible that the
economy obtains an equilibrium such that z∗ = z∗H > z¯ due to the multiplicity of the rent-seeking
equilibrium. Specifically, if there are infinitely many z∗H , then the economy has z
∗
H > z¯ almost
surely.
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3.5 Welfare Implications
In this section, we investigate economic consequences of rent-seeking, and hence,
welfare implications of the morality as well. From Proposition 3.1, we knew that
the first-best outcome (z∗, ψ∗) = (z¯, 0) is obtained when the institutional quality is
sufficiently high, so that pˆi ≥ ρ. Hence, we consider only the case pˆi < ρ, in which
there are always rent-seekers in equilibrium, so that the first-best allocation is not
obtainable. We first examine the aggregate resources that rent-seekers take, say ΨB,
which is given by:
ΨB = wψ∗ρ
Meanwhile, the actual loss from rent-seeking, say ΨL, is given by:
ΨL = wψ∗
[∫ z∗
0
ρdF (z) +
∫ 1
z∗
p (z)λdF (z)
]
Then, the net-benefit of rent-seeking is given by:
ΨB −ΨL = −wψ∗
∫ 1
z∗
{p (z)λ− ρ} dF (z) < 0
since p (z)λ > 1 > ρ ∀z > z∗. Note that ΨB − ΨL is the net-benefit of rent-seeking
prior to the government’s investigation upon rent-seeking activities. Since each rent-
seeking case is exposed with the probability of pi, only 1−pi fraction of the net-benefit
becomes “permanent.” Hence, the real net-benefit of rent-seeking for society, say Ψ∗,
is given by:
Ψ∗ ≡ (1− pi) (ΨB −ΨL)
= − (1− pi)wψ∗ [1− F (z∗)] (λE[p (z) |z ≥ z∗]− ρ) < 0
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That is, the real net-benefit is always negative as long as ψ∗ > 0 and pi < 1.12 Then,
the aggregate output before the production of generation t, which is analogous to
equation (3.1), is given by:
Yt = wt−1
[
Ft−1
(
z∗t−1
)
+ λ
∫ 1
z∗t−1
p (z) dFt−1 (z)
]
+ Ψ∗t−1 (3.13)
which is strictly smaller than the first-best output, Y¯t.
13 More precisely, Yt is smaller
than Y¯t even with the same morality F (·) since z∗t−1 > z¯ and Ψ∗t−1 < 0.
We now consider the growth effect of rent-seeking. Formally, we assume that the
labor income wt is given by:
wt = h (At)
where h′ (·) > 0, and At denotes aggregate productivity of the economy. We assume
that there is a positive externality in the productive activity, which is not excludable
over generations, at least, to some extent. Formally, At evolves as the following
fashion:
gt =
At+1
At
= g (Xt) (3.14)
where g′ (·) > 0, and Xt is aggregate innovation successfully done, which is given by:
Xt ≡ λ [1− (1− pit)ψ∗t ]
∫ 1
z∗t
p (z) dFt (z) (3.15)
Any innovation trial interrupted by a rent-seeker fails for sure with the probability
of 1 − pit since we assume that the probability of success in innovation becomes
12 As indicated in the previous note, we can show that z∗L = z¯ when the probability of success
in innovation is not changed and stays at p (z) even if the loss from rent-seeking is not recovered.
However, even when z∗L is chosen as an equilibrium instead of z
∗
H > z¯, the real net-benefit of
rent-seeking, Ψ∗, is still negative since ψ∗L = F (z¯) > 0. More precisely, for this case, we have:
Ψ∗ = − (1− pi)wψ∗ [1− F (z∗)] ρ (λE[p (z) |z ≥ z∗]− 1) < 0.
13 Careful readers may have noticed that equation (14) implies the confiscated wealth from arrested
rent-seekers is not thrown away. The confiscated wealth is already summed in (3.13). Yt becomes
even smaller if the wealth is thrown away.
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zero when it is interrupted and the loss is not recovered.14 We notice from (3.15)
that rent-seeking lowers the rate of growth in two ways as it does for the aggregate
output. First, it decreases Xt directly through ψ
∗
t , that lowers the aggregate volume
of successful innovation. Also, z∗t increases as ψ
∗
t rises, so that rent-seeking decreases
the extensive margin of people who are willing to conduct the productive activity
that causes the positive externality.
3.6 Endogenizing Institutions
In this section, we endogenize the institutional quality through majority voting. Re-
call that any rent-seeking activity is exposed with the probability pi ∈ (0, 1). Once
being caught by the government with the probability pi, the rent-seeker returns what
he has stolen to the victim of his rent-seeking. In addition, the government confiscates
θ ∈ (0, 1) fraction of an arrested rent-seeker’s wealth.
Hence, pi generally represents the quality of institutions while θ represents the de-
gree of punishment for people already arrested for anti-social behavior at large. Then,
a natural question arises: what determines the level of pi? It will depend on qualita-
tive and quantitative features of public administration. For example, it will increase
along with a higher quantitative measure of human resources and physical equipment
such as the number of patrols, investigators, prosecutors and public officers as well
as the number offices, computers, patrol cars and police weapons. Qualitatively, it
will depend on the efficiency of the government administration called “institutional
infrastructure.” For example, if the government operates an inefficient investigation
system and enforcers are not trained, not motivated, and even corrupt, then pi will
14 Again, growth is reduced in presence of rent-seeking without this assumption. This is because
even when z∗L = z¯, there are rent-seeking activities in the economy, i.e., ψ
∗
L = F (z¯) > 0. Hence,
the aggregate innovation X decreases. More precisely, X is rewritten without this assumption as
follows:
X ≡ ρλ [1− (1− pit)ψ∗]
∫ 1
z∗
p (z) dF (z)
which decreases with a higher ψ∗.
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be low even with a large number of enforcers and equipment.
It is then plausible to guess that increasing pi requires some pecuniary costs.
For example, the government should spend money and time in order to hire and
train enforcers. Also, it seems plausible to assume that pi ∈ [
¯
pi, p¯i] where 0 <
¯
pi <
p¯i < 1. Here, p¯i represents “national capacity” that limits society to have extremely
sophisticated institutions.
In this research, we endogenize the institutional quality pi rather than endogenize
θ. This is because adjusting the institutional quality pi itself is a more fundamental
way to control rent-seeking activities than raising θ, the intensity of punishment for
those already arrested. Notice that even when θ is approximately at its maximum,
i.e., θ ≈ 1, it is meaningless for a rent-seeker as long as he is not arrested by the
government for almost sure, i.e., pi ≈ 0. Hence, a stricter punishment does not reduce
the incentive to be a rent-seeker. In reverse, even when the punishment θ is very low
(but non-zero), it is effective for a rent-seeker as long as he is highly likely to be
arrested by the government. From the same logic, a victim does not care about the
degree of punishment, at least economically, as long as the rent-seeker is caught by the
government with a high probability, so that his loss from rent-seeking is recovered.
That is, the effectiveness of law enforcement both in controlling the incentive of
rent-seeking and the incentive of being an entrepreneur depends primarily on the
institutional quality pi rather than on θ (as long as θ > 0).15
For this reason, we endogenize pi while fixing θ at a certain level strictly larger than
zero. We let T (pit, wt) = τ (pit)wt denote the aggregate pecuniary cost to establish a
15 Actually, although the developed countries have, in general, better institutions compared to
those of undeveloped and developing countries, it is commonly observed that punishments for anti-
social behaviors are rather stricter in undeveloped and developing countries. For example, corruption
in the public sector is rampant in China compared to other developed countries while China applies
heavy sentences to public officers involved in a corruption affair, which possibly reaches to a sentence
of death. Also, it is legal for the government to execute corporal punishments such as caning and
flogging in many undeveloped and developing countries, for example, Botswana, Brazil, Guatemala,
Malaysia, Nepal, Peru, and so on, while those corporal punishments are usually banned in many
developed countries except for a few countries like Singapore. Although the punishments are severe,
as said, what are economically meaningful for both of a rent-seeker and a victim are the possibility
to get punished and the probability to be recovered from rent-seeking, respectively.
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certain level of pit ∈ [
¯
pi, p¯i].16 Of course, τ ′ (pi) > 0. We also assume that τ ′′ (pi) > 0,
limpi→
¯
pi τ
′ (pi) = 0 and limpi→p¯i τ ′ (pi) = ∞. This cost is financed through a lump-
sum tax T (pit, wt) upon generation t, and hence, the after-tax labor income is given
by [1− τ (pit)]wt. That is, if generation t agrees to set the institutional quality at a
certain level pit through majority voting, each agent of generation t pays the lump-sum
tax T (pit, wt), or equivalently, the income tax τ (pit)wt to the government.
17 Finally,
we assume that pˆi (
¯
pi; θ) ≡
¯
piθ/(1−
¯
pi) < ρ. Otherwise,
¯
pi will be always chosen in any
political equilibrium, and there is no rent-seeking (see Proposition 3.1), which is an
unrealistic and uninteresting case.
Majority voting
We consider majority voting as a device determining pi endogenously. The setting
is standard. There are two political parties, P1 and P2, that competes with each other
in order to take the power that determines pit, or equivalently, the income tax rate
τ (pit). They announce pi1,t and pi2,t, respectively, at the voting stage in each period
t. Given the pair of policies, (pi1,t, pi2,t), each agent of generation t votes for either P1
or P2 closer to her interest, one of which wins if it gets more votes than the other.
If they have a same number of votes, they flip a coin to determine the winner, and
hence, win the election with the probability of 1/2.
According to the timing of events, voting is done before the occupation choice,
and hence, (z∗, ψ∗), the rent-seeking equilibrium defined by Definition 3.2, is yet
determined at the voting stage. We now let pi (z) denote the most preferred policy
for a type z agent. Then, pi (z) solves the following problem given the morality F (·):
pi (z) ≡ arg max
pi∈[
¯
pi,p¯i]
v(z;ψ∗, pi) [1− τ (pi)] (3.16)
16 Mathematically, the linearity of the cost T (pi,w) in w is for stationarity; since w grows over
time, the pecuniary cost also needs to grow at the same rate. Economically, one can interpret the
linearity such that the government pays a fraction of the aggregate labor income w for enforcers’
labor income.
17 Due to the linearity of the cost T (pi,w) in w, the incidence of the lump-sum tax T (pi,w) is
identical with that of an income tax. Hence, the political equilibrium of the model is independent
of whether the government finances the cost through a lump-sum tax or an income tax.
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where v(z;ψ∗, pi) is given by (3.4)–(3.6), and ψ∗ ≡ ψ (z∗; pi) is given by (3.3). That is,
choosing pi (z) is equivalent with choosing (z∗, ψ∗) that maximizes v(z;ψ∗, pi) [1− τ (pi)]
given the morality F (·).
To facilitate the derivation of pi (z) ∀z ∈ [0, 1], we postulate the following assump-
tions:
p¯i ≤ ρ/ (ρ+ θ) , (A1)
z∗ (pi) ≡ min {z∗H (pi)} , (A2)
ψ∗ (pi) = F (z∗ (pi)) is twice differentiable, (A3)
d2ψ∗
(dpi)2
≥ 0. (A4)
The first assumption (A1) precludes the utopia equilibrium where there is no rent-
seeking. That is, we only focus on the real world equilibrium where some people
become rent-seekers, and the fraction of rent-seekers is controlled by the morality
and the institutional quality. Then, from Proposition 3.1, we know that there are
possibly many equilibria (z∗, ψ∗) for any pi ∈ [
¯
pi, p¯i]. Hence, we need to fix (z∗, ψ∗)
in order to derive pi (z). Therefore, as indicated by (A2), we assume that each agent
believes z∗ (pi) will be chosen as the minimum value of z∗H (pi).
18 (A3) and (A4)
jointly guarantee a single-peaked preference over the policy variable pi ∀z ∈ [0, 1].
More precisely, (A3) and (A4) make sure that pi (z) is uniquely determined, and
v(z;ψ∗, pi) [1− τ (pi)] decreases monotonically as pi differs from pi (z).19
Then, we can provide the following result:
Lemma 3.2 Suppose that (A1)-(A4) hold. Then, (i) for any given F , there are two
institutional qualities piE (F ) and piI (F ), each of which is the most preferred institu-
18 One can easily notice from the proof of Lemma 3.2 that (A2) is not critical for the political
equilibrium summarized by Proposition 3.2. For example, one can assume that z∗ (pi) ≡ E [z∗H (pi) |pi],
but the political equilibrium is not changed qualitatively in that piE > piI still holds.
19 Of course, (A3) implicitly requires that the distribution F (z) and the probability of success
p(z) are twice differentiable. Then, (A3) is always satisfied if ∃z∗H ∈ [zˆ, 1] when pi = p¯i. Since (A2)
guarantees that there exists z∗H ∀pi ∈ [¯pi, p¯i], the twice differentiability of F (z) and p(z) are necessary
and sufficient conditions for (A3).
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tional quality for an entrepreneur and an inactivist, respectively, and they satisfy the
following inequalities:
¯
pi ≤ piI (F ) < piE (F ) < p¯i.
Also, (ii) v(z;ψ∗, pi) [1− τ (pi)] decreases monotonically as pi differs from piE (F ) and
piI (F ) for an entrepreneur and for an inactivist, respectively.
Lemma 3.2 indicates that an entrepreneur prefers better institutional quality than
an inactivist. This is quite intuitive since an entrepreneur loses more than an inac-
tivist from rent-seeking when he is a victim, and therefore, an entrepreneur is more
willing to pay for a better institutional quality than an inactivist. Importantly, both
piE (F ) and piI (F ) are independent of the individual skill z. Since an inactivist’s
payoff vI is independent of z, piI (F ) must be independent of z as well. The reason
that piE (F ) is also independent of z is simple: for an entrepreneur, the marginal
benefit and cost arising from better institutional quality increases at the same rate
in his ability z.20 Hence, piE (F ) is independent of z as piI (F ) is. This independence,
of course, simplifies the analysis for the political equilibrium a lot. Using this prop-
erty, we can obtain the following political equilibrium by applying the median voter
theorem with the property that both piE (F ) and piI (F ) are independent of z.
Proposition 3.2 Political Equilibrium: Let zM denote the median voter such
that F
(
zM
)
= 1/2. Then, the equilibrium policy, say pi∗, is given by:
pi∗ (F ) =

piE (F )
piI (F )
piE (F ) or piI (F )
if zM ≥ zI ,
if zM < zE,
if zM ∈ [zE, zI),
(3.17)
20 Note that an entrepreneur pays τ (pi) p (z)λw as the tax, which increases as z rises. Although
the marginal benefit of a higher institutional quality increases with a higher z, the marginal cost
also increases, and they exactly cancel out each other.
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where zE and zI , respectively, solve the following:
zE = min{z∗H(piE)}; zI = min{z∗H(piI)},
and hence:
z¯ < zE < zI .
Now, we are ready to define the rent-seeking equilibrium with endogenous insti-
tutions as follows:
Definition 3.3 Rent-Seeking with Endogenous Institutions: For any given
morality F (·), the equilibrium institutional quality pi∗ (F ) is determined by (3.17).21
Then, the rent-seeking equilibrium with endogenous institutions, (z∗, ψ∗), is given by:
z∗ (F ) = min {z∗H (pi∗ (F ))} ,
ψ∗ (F ) = F (z∗ (F )) .
Proposition 3.2 indicates that pi∗ (F ) tend to increase as zM is larger. This, in turn,
implies that pi∗ (F ) tend to be higher (lower) as the morality is healthy (unhealthy).
This is because zM hets larger as F (z) is small ∀z ∈ (0, 1). Then, from Proposition
3.1, Corollary 3.1 and Definition 3.2, we have the following observations on the role of
morality in the determination of the institutional quality, and thereby, the aggregate
output and the growth rate as well.
Corollary 3.2 Morality and Institutions: The institutional quality is more likely
to be poorer as the morality worsens in that zM decreases as the morality worsens.
Morality and Economy: Since unhealthy morality tends to induce a poorer in-
stitutional quality in equilibrium, both the aggregate output and the growth rate are
more likely to be reduced as the morality worsens.
21 More precisely, when zM ∈ [zE , zI), pi∗ (F ) = piE (F ) if v(zM ;ψ∗, piE) [1− τ (piE)] ≥
v(zM ;ψ∗, piI)
[
1− τ (piI)], and pi∗ (F ) = piI (F ) otherwise.
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3.7 Concluding Remarks
We examine rent-seeking behavior through the lens of culture (morality) and insti-
tutions (effective enforcement of laws). We show that rent-seeking harms both the
aggregate income and growth due to the wedge between a rent-seeker’s benefit and
his victim’s loss in the rent-seeking. However, it is, in general, hard for the economy
to eliminate rent-seeking behavior since, to do that, voters have to agree to establish
effective enforcement of laws suppressing the incentive to be a rent-seeker. The social
morality solely determines whether or not they vote for such effective enforcement of
laws, highlighting the fundamental role that the culture plays, interconnected with
what the institutions do, in the determination of the rent-seeking equilibrium.
Consequently, this implies that the government is possibly able to do a crucial
role in dealing with the ingrained rent-seeking problem by properly manipulating
the social morality. As some brilliant previous literature already discussed, e.g.,
Grossman and Kim (2000), one needs to study how the government (or a group of
people) can revive the morality to eradicate long-lasting rent-seeking in society.
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Appendix A
Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 Time-Varying Monitoring Cost
We set the monitoring cost to be time-invariant in the theory part of the chapter.
We find that the negative growth effects of the financial friction disappear as the
economy grows. As one can easily notice, for the asymptotic irrelevance to growth,
it is crucial to assume that the monitoring cost is fixed at a certain level. This is
simply because the monitoring cost µ becomes relatively smaller as the borrower’s
net worth pi1 (the entrepreneurial profit) increases along with the growing economy.
Then, the borrower’s net worth becomes too high in the long-run, compared to µ, to
renege on his debt. Hence, the borrower’s incentive to renege on his debt becomes
inelastic regardless whether the monitoring cost raises or lowers. This is the intuition
behind the asymptotic irrelevance.
However, if the monitoring cost ialso increases along with growth of the economy
as well, the asymptotic irrelevance would not hold for sure. This is simply because, if
so, the monitoring cost would not be trivial even in very long run unless the growth
rate of the monitoring cost, gµt , is strictly smaller than that of the borrower’s profit,
gpii,t . This means that the financial friction may adversely affect growth permanently
in some cases.
To show this clearly, we redefine the monitoring cost by µt ≡ µ (wt, At) where,
obviously, µw (wt, At) > 0. The growth rate of the monitoring cost in the steady state
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gµ will be determined by µA (wt, At) since the wage is constant in the steady state;
recall that wt is wage per efficiency unit of labor, and it is constant on the balanced
growth path from Proposition 1.3. For example, suppose that µA < 0, then the
monitoring cost is diminishing over time, i.e., gµ < 1, since the TFP A is continually
growing, while w is fixed on the balanced growth path.1 We can summarize the
negative growth effects with the time-varying monitoring cost as follows:
Proposition A.1 Growth Effect with Time-Varying Monitoring Cost: Sup-
pose that µ = µ (w,A) is continuously differentiable in A. Then, we have the follow-
ing results:
Case (1) µA (w,A) ≤ 0: The growth effects of the financial friction are temporary.
Case (2) µA (w,A) > 0: (i) If µ (w, φA) = φ
nµ (w,A) ∀φ ≥ 1 with n ∈ (0, 1), then
the growth effects of the financial friction are temporary.
(ii) If µ (w, φA) = φµ (w,A) ∀φ ≥ 1, then the growth effects of the financial friction
are permanent.
(iii) If µ (w, φA) = φnµ (w,A) ∀φ ≥ 1 with n > 1, then the economy stops growing
in the long run, i.e., gY,t → 1.
In summary, Case (1) of Proposition A.1 indicates that the growth effects of the
financial friction are temporary if the monitoring cost never grows in the long run,
i.e., gµ ≤ 1. This is because the growth rate of the monitoring cost is smaller than
the growth rate of the borrower’s profit gpii ; recall that gpii is larger than one. The
financial friction, however, can be still irrelevant to growth even when the monitoring
cost continually grows. More precisely, this is Case (2-i) of Proposition A.1 where
the monitoring cost grows slower than the borrower’s profit, i.e., gpii > gµ > 1, and
hence, it becomes negligible in the long run. In contrast, if it grows as fast as the
entrepreneurial profit, i.e., gµ = gpii , then the negative growth effects are permanent,
meaning the growth rate in the stationary state gets smaller as the financial friction
is worse. This results, which corresponds to Case (2-ii) of Proposition A.1, is quite
intuitive since the monitoring cost will not be trivial any longer even in the long
run when it grows as fast as the entire economy, affecting the economy permanently.
1 One can interpret this case such that the financial intermediation technology evolves relatively
faster than an entrepreneur’s defection technology.
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Finally, if the monitoring cost grows even faster than the entire economy, and hence,
than the borrower’s net worth, the borrowing rate diverges to infinity as time goes on.
Hence, there will be no one willing to invest in the risky but productivity-enhancing
project, so that the economy will stop growing in the long-run. This is Case (2-iii) of
Proposition A.1. Based on this result, we can provide an example of the time-varying
monitoring cost and its growth implications as follows:
Example: Linear Monitoring Costs
Suppose that the monitoring cost is linear in the efficiency unit of labor as follows:
µt = wt`m (At)
where `m is the efficiency unit of labor required for the monitoring, which is de-
termined by the current TFP level such that `m : R++ → R+. Assume that `m is
twice continuously differentiable. Then, from Proposition A.1, we have the following
results:
Case (1) `′m (At) ≤ 0: The monitoring cost converges to zero, i.e., µt → 0, and
therefore, the negative growth effects are temporary.
Case (2-i) `′m (At) > 0, `
′′
m (At) < 0: The gross growth rate of the monitoring cost
converges to unity, i.e., gµt → 1, since At increases to infinity. Hence, the
negative growth effects are temporary.
Case (2-ii) `′m (At) > 0, `
′′
m (At) = 0: The gross growth rate of the monitoring cost
is the same as the growth rate of At, resulting permanent negative growth
effects.
Case (2-iii) `′m (At) > 0, `
′′
m (At) > 0: Growth stops in the long run.
Which Case is Empirically Plausible?
Then, which one is the case in the real world? First, Case (2-iii) seems not the case
simply because the interest rate spread increases forever if it is true (see the proof
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of Proposition A.1) while, in the real world, the interest rate spread decreases, and
then, stabilizes in the long run (see Figure 1.2).
Similarly, Case (2-ii) seems not empirically plausible. If it is true, the theory
predicts that the growth rate, the investment rate and the interest rate spread will
be fixed at a constant level over time, respectively, once rt is fixed; see the proofs
of Proposition 1.4 and A.1. This implies that the financial friction severity is not
endogenously relaxed, contradicting the actual transition features depicted in Figure
1.2. As shown in the figure, the averaged growth rate and investment rate increase
along with a decreasing trend of the interest rate spread, and this reflects the en-
dogenous relaxation of the financial friction. Therefore, this case does not support
the asymptotic irrelevance property, which is verified by our empirical analysis; recall
that δ turned out strictly positive, not zero.
Then, only Case (1) and Case (2-i) remain. Both of the cases are empirically
plausible since they are consistent with the essential features of transition dynamics
in reality, and therefore, we have assumed that the monitoring cost is fixed at a certain
level over time, which is a specific example of Case (1) for a clearer exposition of the
main idea without any change in the theoretical results.
Consequently, for the theory, it seems plausible to assume that either the mon-
itoring cost decreases as the economy grows, or that it grow slower than the entire
economy. To make this assumption more attracting, we provide another empiri-
cal evidence that the financial intermediation cost, in fact, grows slower than the
economy, and hence, the constant monitoring cost assumption we have had so far is
indeed realistic. This, in turn, implies that the asymptotic irrelevance holds in the
real world based on our theoretical conclusion; see Corollary 1.3.
For the evidence, we will use comprehensive data, provided by Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt,
Laeven and Levine (2004) (DLL). This data includes abundant information on fi-
nancial conditions of more than 1,400 banks across 72 developed and developing
countries over the period of 1995–1999. One of advantages of using this data is that
we can control for country-level differences in the banking environment as well as
bank-level differences in various banking-related factors.
In virtue of this advantage, DLL examined impacts of bank regulations, market
structure and national institutions on the financial intermediation cost proxied by the
135
net interest margin and overhead expenditure ratio. The net interest margin is equal
to interest income minus interest expense divided by interest-bearing assets, and
thus, it is analogous to the interest rate spread in our theoretical model. Therefore,
if the net interest margin becomes smaller over time, it indicates that the monitoring
cost (the financial intermediation cost) grows slower than the economy from the
theoretical conclusion of our model; recall that the interest rate spread decreases
when the monitoring cost grows slower than GDP per capita by equation (1.1).
Meanwhile, the overhead expenditure ratio is equal to bank overhead costs divided
by total assets. That is, it measures overhead costs with controlling for the bank size
at a constant level, and therefore, it proxies the monitoring cost in our model.
In the empirical analysis, we control for other relevant differences in individual
banking activities by utilizing the virtue of the data. Not only bank specific differ-
ences, we also control for nationwide banking environments, institutional factors and
some macro variables. We drop an observation associated with negative economic
growth of a given country since we want to verify the argument that the monitoring
cost gets relatively smaller as an economy grows, although we have similar results
with the full sample.
We use a simple identification strategy. We first regress each of both financial
intermediation costs (the net interest margin and overhead ratio) on a rich set of
control variables in order to identify error terms that represent idiosyncratic shocks
over the sample period. Then, we can obtain fitted growth rates of the two de-
pendent variables orthogonal to the identified non-systematic exogenous shocks, and
we can check if the fitted intermediation costs, in fact, are implying either that the
monitoring cost decreases along with economic growth, or that it grows slower than
the economy.
For the empirical analysis, we use the following specification similar to the one
used in DLL:
ln costict = α + X
′
ictβ + X
′
icγ + X
′
ctδ + X
′
cζ + ηDt + ui + εict
where i, c and t index a bank, a country and year, respectively. Xict and Xic are
time-varying and time-invariant bank-specific controls, respectively. Xct and Xc
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are country-specific controls, both of which are time-changing and time-constant,
respectively. Details of them are provided in the note of Table A.1. Dt is time
dummy, and ui is either the fixed or random effect for an individual bank. The
dependent variable ln costict is the log of either the net interest margin (the interest
rate spread) or the overhead expenditure ratio (the monitoring cost).
Consider first the logged net interest margin as the dependent variable, i.e.,
ln costict = ln ∆˜ict. Also, let ˆcostict denote the fitted value (predicted value) of
the dependent variable, ln costict. Then, one can calculate the net growth rate of the
interest rate spread, which is orthogonal to idiosyncratic random shocks, by calculat-
ing γ∆˜ict = ln
ˆcostict+1− ln ˆcostict. If γ∆˜ict < 0, it means that the interest rate spread
decreases when the economy grows. This, in turn, implies that the monitoring cost
grows slower than the entire economy based on our theory.
Consider second that the logged overhead expenditure ratio as the dependent
variable, i.e., ln ˆcostict = lnµict. Similarly, the net growth rate of the monitoring
cost is computed by γµict = ln ˆcostict+1 − ln ˆcostict. Since the overhead ratio can be
interpreted as the monitoring cost in our model, the monitoring cost grows slower
than the economy, confirming the hypothesis again, if γµict − γyˆct < 0.
Table A.1 summarizes estimation results from the panel regression with either
the fixed effect (FE) or random effect (RE). As indicated, the estimated growth rate
of the interest rate spread, γ∆˜ict , is negative at 99% confidence level in each sample
year. This pattern is also the same for the other estimated growth rate, γµict − γyˆct ,
the growth rate of the monitoring cost minus the growth rate of GDP per capita.
Consequently, these findings support the argument that the monitoring cost, which
represents the financial intermediation cost, in fact, grows slower than the economy
on average, and thereby, advocate the use of the assumption in the theory part that
the monitoring cost is time-invariant.2
2 We have similar results with more controls for banking regulation although we do not report
the estimation results here.
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Table A.1: Growth Rate of the Financial Intermediation Cost (Panel)
Estimated Variable γ∆˜ict γµict − γyˆct
Year (1): FE (2): RE (3): FE (4): RE
1995
mean −.012 −.011 −.036 −.036
99% c.i. [−.020;−.003] [−.020;−.002] [−.048;−.023] [−.047;−.024]
# of Obs. 1,059 1,059 1,059 1,059
1996
mean −.043 −.042 −.048 −.046
99% c.i. [−.052;−.034] [−.052;−.033] [−.063;−.032] [−.061;−.031]
# of Obs. 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000
1997
mean −.034 −.033 −.021 −.019
99% c.i. [−.043;−.024] [−.042;−.023] [−.035;−.007] [−.033;−.004]
# of Obs. 987 987 987 987
1998
mean −.024 −.024 −.042 −.039
99% c.i. [−.034;−.014] [−.035;−.014] [−.055;−.029] [−.053;−.026]
# of Obs. 1,026 1,026 1,026 1,026
Note: We conduct panel regressions with the fixed effect (FE) or random effect (RE). The
set of controls includes bank-specific variables, bank environment, institutional factors and some
macro variables. For the bank-specific variables, we use bank size, return on average assets, cost to
income ratio, bank equity, liquidity, fee income, bank risk and market share. The bank environment
variables consist of the number of banks and bank concentration in a nation. The institutional
factors include property rights, economic freedom and the KKZ quality index of a country. Finally,
for the macro variables, we use GDP per capita, total trade value, and the average inflation rate and
growth rate of total population. Details of each variable are given in Appendix of Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt,
Laeven and Levine (2004).
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Figure A.1: Mean Growth Rate of the Financial Intermediation Cost
A.2 The Closed Economy
Switching to recursive notation where primes denote next period variables, we can
rewrite the equation that determines the threshold of the entrepreneurial ability z∗
as follows:
p [pi′1 − (1 + i′)x (z∗)] = pi′0
Since pi1 = γpi0 and 1 + i = (1 + r − δ) ∆/p, the equation is rewritten as follows:
pγ − 1
pγ
{pγpi′0 − (1− p)µ} = (1 + r′ − δ)x (z∗t )
where we use ∆ ≡ pγpi0/ [pγpi0 − (1− p)µ]. From equations (1.8) and (1.11), we can
define pi′0 and r
′ as follows: pi′0 ≡ pi (z∗, k′); r′ ≡ r (z∗, k′). Then, we have:
pγ − 1
pγ
{pγpi (z∗, k′)− (1− p)µ} = {1 + r (z∗, k′)− δ}x (z∗)
From (8), it is obvious that piz > 0 and pik′ > 0. This implies that γ needs to
be sufficiently large since the condition that pγpi (z, k′) − (1− p)µ > 0 should be
satisfied at any equilibrium, or equivalently, i ≥ r + δ for any given z∗ and k′ > 0.
Hence, suppose that γ is sufficiently large, so that ppi (zL,
¯
k) − (1− p)µ = 0 for
¯
k ≈ 0. Then, one can easily verify that, for any k′ ≥
¯
k ≈ 0, z∗ ∈ [zL, zH ] is uniquely
determined since the RHS is decreasing in z∗ from infinity to zero (note that rz < 0),
while the LHS is increasing in z∗ under the assumption, ppi (z∗, k′)− (1− p)µ > 0 in
any equilibrium. Hence, we can define z∗ ≡ z (k′;µ), which is straightforward that
zk < 0 and zµ > 0.
To pin down the capital investment in equilibrium, we can rewrite the capital
market clearing condition, given by equation (1.5), by letting Bft = 0. Then, we
have:
k′ +
X (z (k′;µ))
L
= s (z (k;µ) , z (k′;µ) , k, k′)
where we use w ≡ w (z (k;µ) , k) from equation (1.10), r′ ≡ r (z (k′;µ) , k′) from
equation (1.11) and s ≡ s(w, r′). The LHS is the demand for funds and the RHS is
the supply of funds. Now, let us confine our attention on a steady state. Then, the
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capital market clearing condition is rewritten as follows:
k +
X (z (k;µ))
L
= s (z (k;µ) , k)
Note first that dX (z (k;µ)) /dk > 0 since zk < 0 and xz < 0. Now let us specify the
R&D investment cost function x(z, A) as follows:
x (z, A) ≡ ζA
(
1
z − zL −
1
zH − zL
)
where ζ > 0 measures the efficiency in the R&D investment. It is straightforward
that the cost function satisfies all of the assumptions on x (z, A): xz (z, A) < 0,
limz→zL x (z, A) = ∞, limz→zH x (z, A) = 0 and xA (z, A) > 0. With this cost func-
tion, one can show that limk→0 dX (z (k;µ)) /dk = 0,3 and d2X (z (k;µ)) / (dk)
2 > 0.4
Similarly, ds (z (k;µ) , k) /dk > 0 with the log utility function u (c) = ln c since,
with the log utility function, s (z (k;µ) , k) = Qψ (z (k;µ)) kαv where Q is a positive
3 From the entrepreneur’s problem, we have:
dz
dk
=
rk (z (k) , k)x (z (k))− ppik (z (k) , k)
ppik (z (k) , k)− [rz (z (k) , k)x (z (k)) + {1 + r (z (k) , k)− δ} dx (z (k)) /dz (k)]
=
C1k
αv−2x (z (k))− C2kαv−1
C2kαv−1 − [C3kαv−1x (z (k)) + C4kav + C5]
where Ci (i = 1, 2, · · · , 5) is a constant. Then,
dX
dk
=
dX
dz
dz
dk
=
C2k
αv−1x (z (k))− C1kαv−2 [x (z (k))]2
C2kαv−1 − [C3kαv−1x (z (k)) + C4kav + C5]
since dX (z) /dz = −x (z). Hence, given any z (k), if x (z (k)) satisfies that x (z (k)) ≥ k ∀k ∈ [0, ε],
then limk→0 dX (z (k)) /dk = 0. This condition is easily satisfied. Since x (z,A) ≡ ζA{1/ (z − zL)−
1/ (zH − zL)} where ζ > 0 and A > 0, the condition requires:
z (k)− zL ≤ 1
k/A+ 1/ (zH − zL) ∀k ∈ [0, ε]
Note that, for any k ≈ 0, 1/ [k/A+ 1/ (zH − zL)] ≈ zH − zL = max{z (k) − zL} ≥ z (k) − zL as
desired.
4 d2X/ (dk)
2
= −[zkk (k;µ)]2{x (z) + x′ (z)}. Hence, d2X/ (dk)2 > 0 if, and only if, −x′ (z) >
x (z), which always holds with the cost function, x (z) ≡ ζA{1/ (z − zL)− 1/ (zH − zL)}.
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constant.5 Then, it is easy to check that limk→0 ds/dk = ∞.6 Hence, a sufficient
condition for the uniqueness of k∗ >
¯
k ≈ 0 is that d2s (z (k;µ) , k) / (dk)2 < 0, which
is, unfortunately, not trivial to verify. However, if the c.d.f. of the skill, given by
F (z), is assumed to be highly concave, so that the p.d.f. f(z) is decreasing in z
fast, i.e., f ′ (z)  0, it is likely to have d2s (z (k;µ) , k) / (dk)2 < 0, and then, k∗ is
uniquely determined.7
Suppose now that k∗ is uniquely pinned down for analytical simplicity. Then, we
have:
dk∗
dµ
=
zµ (k
∗)
{
X′(z∗)
L
+ sz (z
∗, k∗)
}
1−
{
sz (z∗, k∗) zk (k∗) + sk (z∗, k∗)− X′(z∗)L
}
where sz (z
∗, k∗) < 0 with the log utility function, so that the numerator is negative.
Hence, dk∗/dµ > 0 if, and only if, the denominator is negative. Since X ′ (z∗) < 0,
the denominator is negative when ds (k∗) /dk = sz (z∗, k∗) zk (k∗) + sk (z∗, k∗) >
0 is sufficiently large. One possible case is that k∗ is sufficiently small, so that
the marginal product of capital is sufficiently large; recall that we have assumed
d2s (z (k;µ) , k) / (dk)2 < 0 for the uniqueness of k∗.
This implies that an increase in the monitoring cost may result in a huge increase
in the supply of funds (the domestic saving) so does the capital stock k. The equilib-
rium threshold z∗, then, decreases due to the fact that zk (k;µ) < 0, and this leads to
an increase in the output. Therefore, the negative scale effect of the financial friction
presented in Proposition 1.1 is ambiguous a priori in the closed economy.
5 Q is equal to (1− β) (1− α) v (A/L)1−v > 0.
6 s′ (k) = Q
[
ψ′ (k) kαv + αvψ (k) kav−1
]
where f (z) is the p.d.f. of the skill/ability z. Since
ψ′ (k) = − (pγ − 1) f (z) zk > 0 ∀ k > 0 (recall that f (z) > 0 ∀ z ∈ [zL, zh]), limk→0 ψ′ (k) kαv ≡
ξ ≥ 0. Hence, limk→0 s′ (k) = Qξ +Q limk→0 αvψ (k) kαv−1 =∞.
7 Note that s′′ (k) = Q
[
ψ′′ (k) kαv + 2αvψ′ (k) kav−1 − αv (1− αv)ψ (k) kαv−2] where ψ′ (k) =
− (pγ − 1) f (z) zk > 0 and ψ′′ (k) = − (pγ − 1) [f ′ (z) zk + f (z) zkk], the sign of which is not deter-
mined a priori. However, if f ′ (z) 0, then it is likely to have ψ′′ (k) 0 so is s′′ (k).
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A.3 The Case of Exogenous Borrowing Constraint
In this appendix, we consider the exogenous borrowing constraint adopted in most
of the previous literature in order to point out its limitations by comparing it with
the endogenous credit constraint. This will clarify the importance of using the en-
dogenous credit constraint in the growth analysis. The exogenous credit constraint,
adopted in most of previous literature, is given by:
bt ≤ λat
where a and b denote asset and debt, respectively, and λ is exogenously given.8
In our model, every prospect borrower (an entrepreneur) is born without any
asset, and hence, at = 0 for all t ≥ 0. We, thus, assume that an entrepreneurs born
in period t is endowed one unit of labor as a worker. He, then, earns labor income
in the first period of his life. We let Let be the efficiency unit of labor supplied
by entrepreneurs. Recall that, we have assumed that gL,t = gA,t for the stationary
growth. Similarly, we assume that gLe,t(= gL,t) = gA,t. Then, ga,t = gLe,t since the
total population of entrepreneurs born in period t is given by unity ∀t.
For simplicity, we assume that the asset at is illiquid in period t, and hence,
cannot be invested in R&D in the same period. Then, the exogenous borrowing
constraint is rewritten as follows:
x (z, At) ≤ λat
and one can easily prove that the skill threshold under this exogenous borrowing
constraint, say zˆt, is uniquely determined for all t ≥ 0.9
Then, the exogenous financial friction does not affect the economy as long as the
8 The exogenous borrowing constraint can be interpreted as a collateral constraint. Suppose
that a financial intermediary can seize the entire asset of a borrower a if the borrower renege on
his debt b. Suppose also that a borrower can abscond with fraction of 1/λ of the loan b. Then the
financial intermediary must lend asset only to the extent that no borrower can defect: b/λ ≤ a.
9 The determination of the threshold zˆt is the same as that in the benchmark case with the
endogenous credit constraint except that the borrowing limit is exogenously given by λat and the
gross borrowing rate 1 + it is equal to the fair insurance rate (1 + rt − δ) /p. To see this more
clearly, let µ = 0 in the financial market clearing condition given by equation (1.3).
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following condition holds:
x (z∗, At) ≤ λat
where z∗ denotes the asymptotic level of z∗t , or equivalently, the skill threshold that
guarantees the first-best optimum. The more interesting case is when the exogenous
borrowing constraint is binding as in the previous literature, i.e., x (z∗, At) > λat, so
that zˆt > z
∗, meaning it is infeasible to achieve the first-best allocation.10
Same as the argument applied to the main section, one can easily show that the
growth rates of GDP and the TFP are the same under the exogenous borrowing con-
straint, and the rate is given by ψ (zˆ) where the threshold zˆ increases as λ decreases.
Hence, the severity of the financial friction is measured by 1/λ, which is exogenously
given at a constant level ∀t.
Limitations of the Exogenous Borrowing Constraint
First note that we cannot define and describe the interest rate spread with the
exogenous borrowing constraint. This is because 1 + it = (1 + rt − δ) /p by the
financial market clearing condition; see equation (1.3), letting µ = 0.
Also, it is straightforward that the amplification effect (the indirect growth ef-
fect) of the financial friction is not captured. This is because the tightness of the
borrowing constraint, which is measured by λ, does not change regardless of whether
the aggregate uncertainty rises or lowers.
Third, note that zˆt+1 = zˆt if the growth rate of at is equal to the growth rate of
x (zˆt, At). For purpose of comparison, assume that x (zˆ, A) is linear in A as in the
baseline case. Then, the growth rate of the R&D cost becomes equal to gA,t, which
is also equal to the growth rate of the entrepreneurial net worth at. Hence, with the
exogenous borrowing constraint, zˆt is time-invariant given any constant interest rate
r. This, in turn, implies that the negative growth effect is permanent since the skill
threshold zˆt is time-invariant even when the economy continually grows.
The permanence of the growth effect is reminiscent of the well-known conclu-
sion in the previous literature with the exogenous borrowing constraint. where λ is
10 This is because any entrepreneur with z ∈ [z∗, zˆt) cannot invest in R&D although the invest-
ment is profitable.
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fixed at a certain level. This is inconsistent with empirical evidence supporting the
asymptotic irrelevance of the financial friction provided in Section 1.4.
One implication of the exogeneity in the financial friction is that the maximal
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, or the LTV ratio for a borrowing-constrained individual,
is also arbitrarily given and fixed, which seems clearly unrealistic. This implies
further that, under the exogenous credit constraint, the convergence is immediate,
and therefore, the convergence speed is irrelevant to the financial friction. In fact,
the investment rate is fixed over time, which is inconsistent with the actual transition
dynamics in the real world as illustrated by Figure 1.2.
In contrast, the maximal LTV ratio, say λ∗t ≡ x (z∗t , At) /at, is endogenously de-
termined in the economy with the endogenous financial friction. Recall that the skill
threshold z∗t increases as the financial friction is more severe. Then, the maximal
LTV ratio λ∗t is monotone decreasing in µ since λ
∗
t is monotone decreasing in z
∗
t .
11
Consequently, 1/λ∗t , which is endogenously determined in equilibrium, can be inter-
preted as the implied credit constraint tightness that reflects the financial friction
severity.
Note also that the implied tightness 1/λ∗t is time-varying along with various eco-
nomic circumstances, while the economy converges to the stationary growth steady
state. In particular, λ∗t increases during the transition phase, converging to its
asymptotic level, i.e., λ∗t ↑ λ∗.12 Since the credit constraint is binding tightly at
the beginning of economic development, the maximal LTV ratio λ∗t is low, but it
increases over time as the economy grows. Hence, less able entrepreneurs can finance
funds for productivity-enhancing investments along with the endogenous relaxation
of the credit constraint, and this causes an increasing trend of the investment rate
consistent with what we observe from data.13
11 This is simply because ∂xt/∂z < 0.
12 This is easily verified. Note that:
λ∗t+1
λ∗t
=
x
(
z∗t+1, At+1
)
x (z∗t , At)
at
at+1
=
x
(
z∗t+1, At
)
x (z∗t , At)
ψ (z∗t )
ψ (z∗t )
=
x
(
z∗t+1, At
)
x (z∗t , At)
> 1
where the inequality comes from z∗t > z
∗
t+1 (see (i) of Proposition 1.4). The convergence holds by
the continuity of λ∗t in z
∗
t . Obviously, this is consistent with the endogenous relaxation, represented
by limt→∞ ∆˜t = − log p > 0 (see Figure 1.2).
13 It is worth noting that the increasing investment rate is obtainable under the exogenous
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Aggregate LTV Ratio
We now think of aggregate debt-to-net worth ratio, or equivalently, aggregate LTV
ratio, say Λt, which is defined by:
Λt ≡
∫ zH
zˆt
xt (z) dF (z)∫
atdF (z)
=
Xt
at
=
Xt
Yt
Yt
at
= ρt
Y0
a0
.
where ρt is the R&D expenditure rate in period t as defined in Proposition 1.4. In the
economy with the exogenous borrowing constraint, the aggregate LTV ratio is fixed
over time, i.e., Λt = Λ, as long as the interest rate r is constant. This is because the
threshold zˆt does not change as we have seen. However, under the endogenous credit
constraint considered in the3 chapter, the aggregate LTV ratio, say Λ∗t , increases and
converges to its steady state value Λ∗ since ρt is increases and converges to its steady
state value; see part (iv) of Proposition 1.4.
A.4 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1.1:
Let us suppress the time subscript for convenience. First, from the first-order condi-
tions for (k0, `0), one can notice that pi0 > 0 for any given price vector, (r, w) ∈ R2++,
since A > 0. Then, k0 > 0 and `0 > 0, so that the non-negative constraints for (k0, `0)
are not binding. Also, the first-order conditions for (k0, `0) and (k1, `1) imply that
k1 = γk0 and `1 = γ`0, and therefore, pi1 = γpi0. Since x
′ (z) < 0, limz→zL x (z) =∞
and limz→zH x (z) = 0, there is a unique interior solution, z
∗ ∈ (zL, zH), which solves
ppi1−pi0 = (pγ − 1) pi0 = p (1 + i)x (z∗) for any given i ≥ 0 if, and only if, pγ−1 > 0,
or equivalently, pγ > 1. 
Proof of Lemma 1.2:
Let us suppress the time subscript for convenience. Since the objective function is
borrowing constraint. For example, if an entrepreneur is allowed to self-finance through his own
saving, then he will be eventually able to conduct profitable R&D investment by accumulating
necessary funds for the investment. This results in the realistic trend of the investment rate, which
is increasing along with economic development; see Buera and Shin (2013) for details.
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linear in the choice variables, the optimal borrowing rate 1 + i should be minimized
while satisfying both (PC) and (IC). Note that pi1− [1 + i(z)]x (z) ≥ pi0 ∀z ∈ [z∗, zH ]
and pi0 > 0 since A > 0. This implies that pi1 > 0. Also, 1 + i(z) ≥ 1 + r − δ should
be satisfied, so that 1 + i(z) > 0 since 1 + r− δ > 0. Then, we can replace (PC) and
(IC) with the following inequality:
p
(1− p)µx (z) (1 + i (z))−
1 + r − δ
(1− p)µx (z) ≥
x (z)
pi1
(1 + i (z)) (A.1)
It is easily shown that if inequality (A.1) is satisfied, there exists a η (z) satisfying
(IC). More specifically, if the LHS is equal to the RHS, there exists a unique η(z)
such that (IC) holds with equality. Rearranging inequality (A.1) yields:
[ppi1 − (1− p)µ] (1 + i) ≥ pi1 (1 + r − δ) (A.2)
Hence, we must assume that ppi1 − (1− p)µ > 0 as in Assumption 2 since both
the RHS of inequality (A.2) and 1 + i(z) are strictly positive. In reverse, once
1 + i ≥ 1 + r − δ is satisfied, Assumption 2 must be satisfied; note that pi1 > 0.
Then, to minimize (1 + i), inequality (A.2) should hold with equality, resulting in
equation (1.1). Since inequality (A.2) holds with equality, (IC) also holds with
equality, yielding equation (1.2). Then, η ≥ 0 ∀z ∈ [zL, zH ] by Assumption 2. Finally,
we must check whether or not 1 ≥ η ∀z ∈ [z∗, zH ]. First note that η = (1 + i)x/pi1
from equations (1.1) and (1.2). Since p{pi1− (1 + i)x} ≥ pi0 ∀z ∈ [z∗, zH ] and pi0 > 0
, 1 > η. In sum, η ∈ [0, 1) ∀z ∈ [z∗, zH ] as desired. 
Proof of Proposition 1.1:
Note first that k1,t = γk0,t and l1,t = γl0,t. Then, from the law of large numbers, we
have:
Kt ≡
∫
ki,t (z) dF (z) =
[
pγ
{
1− F (z∗t−1)}+ F (z∗t−1)] k0,t
Lt ≡
∫
`t (z) dF (z) =
[
pγ
{
1− F (z∗t−1)}+ F (z∗t−1)] `0,t
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Hence, (
Kαt L
1−α
t
)v
=
[
pγ
{
1− F (z∗t−1)}+ F (z∗t−1)]v (kα0,t`1−α0,t )v (A.3)
Since Yt ≡
∫
yt (z) dF (z) =
[
pγ
{
1− F (z∗t−1)}+ F (z∗t−1)]A1−vt−1 (kα0,t`1−α0,t )v, equa-
tion (A.3) yields:
Yt ≡
([
pγ
{
1− F (z∗t−1)}+ F (z∗t−1)]At−1)1−v (Kαt L1−αt )v
Finally, from the perfect competition in the factor markets, we have:
wt = v (1− α)A1−vt−1 kvα0,t`v(1−α)0,t `−10,t
and observe that:
∂Yt
∂Lt
= v (1− α) [pγ {1− F (z∗t−1)}+ F (z∗t−1)]1−v A1−vt−1 (Kαt L1−αt )v L−1t
= v (1− α)A1−vt−1 kvα0,t`v(1−α)0,t `−10,t = wt
where we use equation (A.3) for the second equality. Note also that ∂Yt/∂Lt =
v (1− α)Yt/Lt. The same argument can be applied for the remaining part. 
Proof of Corollary 1.1:
Since pi1 is decreasing in µ (see (iii) of Proposition 1.2), the interest rate spread,
∆ ≡ ppi1/ [ppi1 − (1− p)µ], is increasing in µ. 
Proof of Proposition 1.2:
Without loss of generality, we let L0 = 1 for simplicity. Since rt is fixed at r in a
steady state, from equation (1.12), we have:
r = αv [A−1ψ (z∗)]
1−v kαv−1
Then, the capital per efficiency unit of labor in the steady state, k, is given by:
k =
(αv
r
) 1
1−αv
[A0ψ (z
∗)]
1−v
1−αv (A.4)
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From the entrepreneur’s profit maximization problem, we have the following funda-
mental equation that determines z∗ for any given (A0, r):(
pγ − 1
pγ
)[
pγ (1− v)
(αv
r
) αv
1−αv
A
1−v
1−αv
0 [ψ (z
∗)]
−v(1−α)
1−αv − (1− p)µ
]
= (1 + r − δ)x (z∗, A0)
(A.5)
The RHS is continuous at any z ∈ [zL, zH ] while strictly decreasing from infinity
to zero; recall that xz (z, A) < 0, limz→zL x (z, A) = ∞ and limz→zH x (z, A) = 0.
Meanwhile, ψ′ (z∗) < 0 and ψ (zL) = pγ > 1 and ψ (zH) = 1, implying that the
LHS is continuous at any z ∈ [zL, zH ] while strictly increasing in z∗. Now, note that
z∗ > zL since limz→zL x (z, A) =∞. Meanwhile, z∗ ≤ zH if, and only if,
pγ (1− v)
(αv
r
) αv
1−αv
A
1−v
1−αv
0 [ψ (z
∗)]
−v(1−α)
1−αv = ppi1|z∗=zH ≥ (1− p)µ
The inequality is satisfied by the assumption that ppi1− (1− p)µ > 0 in any equilib-
rium to guarantee i ≥ r− δ. Hence, z∗ ∈ (zL, zH). Finally, the LHS shifts downward
when µ increases, so that z∗ increases in µ, so does ψ. Then, both k and y decrease
in µ, respectively, from equations (A.4) and (1.8). Since Y = yL, Y is also decreasing
in µ. This means that yˆ = Y/Nˆ is also decreasing in µ. Finally, from equations (1.9)
and (1.10), pii (i = 1, 2) is decreasing in µ. 
Proof of Proposition 1.3:
We let ϕt ≡ (At/Lt)1−v for convenience. First, from equation (1.12), we have:
rt = αvϕtk
αv−1
t
Hence, kt is given by:
kt =
(
avϕt
rt
) 1
1−αv
(A.6)
First note that ϕt ≡ (A0/L0)1−v ≡ ϕ where ϕ is a constant due to the assumption
that gL,t = gA,t ∀t ≥ 0 for stationary growth. Then, gk = 1 since gr = 1 in the
stationary state; see Definition 1.3. To show gw = 1, observe equation (1.11) to
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have:
wt = (1− α) vϕkavt
which means that gw = 1 in the long run since gk = 1, and this is consistent with the
definition of long-run growth steady state. Also, from equation (1.8), y = ϕkαv, and
therefore, gy = 1, proving (ii). To prove (iii), suppose that gz∗ = 1; we will verify
this later. Then, gA = ψ (z
∗) from equation (1.13), and hence, gL = ψ (z∗). Now,
recall that Yt ≡ ytLt, implying that gY = gL = ψ (z∗). To prove (iv), note that:
pi0,t = (1− v)ϕt
[
ψ
(
z∗t−1
)]−1
Ltk
av
t = (1− v)ϕtLt−1kavt
which is obtained from equation (1.9). Hence, gpii = ψ (z
∗) (i = 1, 2) since pi1,t = γpi0,t
from equation (1.10). Now, we will check that gi = 1 in the long run. From equations
(1.1) and (1.2), we have:
g(1+i) =
(1 + i)′
1 + i
=
pγpi′0
pγpi0
pγpi0 − (1− p)µ
pγpi′0 − (1− p)µ
= ψ (z∗)
pγpi0 − (1− p)µ
pγpi′0 − (1− p)µ
' ψ (z∗) 1
ψ (z∗)
= 1
where the prime denotes variables in the following period. The last approximation
holds for large enough pi1, and it must hold in the long-run if pi1 grows over time.
We will prove later that this is true in the long run by showing that ψ (z∗) > 1;
recall that the growth rate of piiisequaltoψ (z
∗) (i = 1, 2). Hence, asymptotically,
1 + i = 1 + i′ that implies gi = 1, and therefore, g∆ = 1 from equation (1.1). We
should prove that gz∗ = 1 too. From the entrepreneur’s problem, the skill threshold
z∗ is given by:
(pγ − 1) pi0 = p (1 + i)x (z∗, A)
which implies that:
(1 + i)′
1 + i
=
ψ (z∗)x (z∗, A)
x (z′∗, A′)
=
ψ (z∗)x (z∗, A)
x (z′∗, ψ (z∗)A)
since A′ = ψ (z∗)A and gpi0 = ψ (z
∗) in the steady state. Since gi = 1 in the long
run, we have:
x (z′∗, ψ (z∗)A) = ψ (z∗)x (z∗, A)
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Since x (z, A) is linear in A while strictly decreasing in z, z′∗ should be equal to
z∗, implying that gz∗ = 1 in the long run. Now, we will prove the uniqueness of
the balanced growth path. First note that 1 + i = (1 + r − δ) /p in the asymptotic
stationary state, which means that limt→∞∆t = 1. The asymptotic threshold z∗
is, therefore, determined by the following equation from the entrepreneur’s profit
maximization problem:
(pγ − 1) pi′0 = (1 + r − δ)x (z∗, A)
From equation (1.8), knowing that gL,t = gA,t ∀t, pi′0 = (1− v)ϕLkαv. Then, from
equation (1.9), we have:
(pγ − 1) (1− v)
(αv
r
) αv
1−αv
(
A−1
L−1
) 1−v
1−αv
L = (1 + r − δ)x (z∗, A)
Finally, using the linearity of x (z, A) in A and gL,t = gA,t = ψ (z
∗
t ), we have:
(pγ − 1) (1− v)
(αv
r
) αv
1−αv
(
A−1
L−1
) 1−v
1−αv
= (1 + r − δ)x (z∗, A−1) (A.7)
equation (A.7) is similar to equation (A.5) but different in that the monitoring cost
µ is irrelevant to the determination of z∗. Then, it immediately follows that z∗ > zL
since limz→zL x (z, At) = ∞. Also, z∗ is below its upper bound, i.e., z∗ < zH .
This is because the LHS of equation (A.7) is ppi1 − (1− p)µ where µ = 0, while
ppi1 − (1− p)µ > 0 for guaranteeing i ≥ r − δ. Hence, z∗ is uniquely pinned down,
and it is interior of [zL, zH ]. That is, z
∗ ∈ (zL, zH) ∀ (A0, L0, r). Finally, it is
straightforward to show that ψ (z∗) > 1 since the p.d.f. of skill distribution, f(·)
satisfies f(x) > 0 ∀x ∈ [zL, zH ]. 
Proof of Corollary 1.2:
The asymptotic skill threshold z∗ is determined by equation (A.7). Note that z∗
is independent of µ since equation (A.7) does not include µ. Note now that the
gross growth rate ψ (z∗t ) is solely dependent on z
∗
t , the asymptotic growth rate is
independent of µ. 
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Proof of Corollary 1.3:
On the transition phase, z∗t is determined by the following equation, which is analo-
gous to (A.5):
(
pγ − 1
pγ
)[
pγ (1− v)
(
αv
rt+1
) αv
1−αv
(
At
Lt+1
) 1−v
1−αv
Lt+1 [ψ (z
∗
t )]
−v(1−α)
1−αv − (1− p)µ
]
= (1 + rt+1 − δ)x (z∗t , At)
which is rewritten as follows:(
pγ − 1
pγ
)[
pγ (1− v)
(
αv
rt+1
) αv
1−αv
(
A−1
L−1
) 1−v
1−αv
Lt − (1− p)µ
]
= (1 + rt+1 − δ)x (z∗t , At)
since gA = ψ (z
∗
t ), and gL,t = gA,t. From Lemma 1.1, z
∗
t is uniquely pinned down
given any vector of (At, Lt, rt+1). Then, one can notice that an increase in µ shifts
the LHS downward, so that z∗t is increasing in µ, implying that the gross growth rate
in period t, ψ (z∗t ), is decreasing in µ. Meanwhile, we have the following equation
from (A.6):
kt+1 =
(
αvϕ
rt+1
) 1
1−αv
(A.8)
which implies that kt+1 is independent of µ. Also, from equations (1.9) and (1.10),
pii,t+1 (i = 0, 1) is decreasing in z
∗
t and hence, decreasing in µ as well; recall that z
∗
t is
increasing in µ. This proves (iii). Therefore, ∆t is increasing in µ by equation (1.1).
From Proposition 1.1, gY,t = ψ (z
∗
t ), so that gY,t is decreasing in µ. Hence, gyˆ,t is also
decreasing in µ since it is monotone increasing in gY,t. 
Proof of Proposition 1.4:
(i) The asymptotic convergence is trivial from the proof of Proposition 1.3. To prove
the decreasing property, one can use the fact from the proof of Corollary 1.3 that z∗t
is determined by the following equation for all t ≥ 0:(
pγ − 1
pγ
)[
pγ (1− v)
(αv
r
) αv
1−αv
(
L
v(1−α)
t A
1−v
t
) 1
1−αv − (1− p)µ
]
= (1 + r − δ)x (z∗t , At)
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where we let rt be constant at r ∀t ≥ 0. Then, we have:
ψ (z∗t )x
(
z∗t+1, At
)
= x
(
z∗t+1, At+1
)
= (1 + r − δ)−1
(
pγ − 1
pγ
)[
pγ (1− v)
(αv
r
) αv
1−αv
(
L
v(1−α)
t+1 A
1−v
t+1
) 1
1−αv − (1− p)µ
]
≡ R−1X1
[
C2
(
L
v(1−α)
t+1 A
1−v
t+1
) 1
1−αv − (1− p)µ
]
where R ≡ 1 + r − δ, C1 ≡ (pγ − 1) / (pγ) and C2 ≡ pγ (1− v). Hence, we obtain:
x
(
z∗t+1, At
)
= {ψ (z∗t )}−1R−1C1
[
C2
(
L
v(1−α)
t+1 A
1−v
t+1
) 1
1−αv − (1− p)µ
]
= {ψ (z∗t )}−1R−1C1ψ (z∗t )
[
C2
(
L
v(1−α)
t A
1−v
t
) 1
1−αv − {ψ (z∗t )}−1 (1− p)µ
]
> R−1C1
[
C2
(
L
v(1−α)
t A
1−v
t
) 1
1−αv − (1− p)µ
]
= x (z∗t , At)
where the second equality holds since gL,t = gA,t = ψ (z
∗
t ). Then, we have:
x
(
z∗t+1, At
)
> x (z∗t , At) ∀t ≥ 0
which implies z∗t+1 < z
∗
t ∀t ≥ 0.
(ii): This is straightforward from (i) of Proposition 1.4. The convergence holds by
the continuity of ψ in z∗.
(iii): Note that, given any constant r over time, gk,t = 1 ∀t ≥ 0 from equation (A.8).
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Hence, let us denote kt by k ∀t ≥ 0. Then, we have:
ιt ≡ It
Yt
≡ Kt − (1− δ)Kt−1
Yt
=
Lt
Yt
(
1− 1− δ
ψ
(
z∗t−1
)) k
=
(
A−1
L−1
)v−1(
1− 1− δ
ψ
(
z∗t−1
)) k1−αv
<
(
A−1
L−1
)v−1(
1− 1− δ
ψ (z∗t )
)
k1−αv = ιt+1
where we use Lt−1/Lt = 1/ψ
(
z∗t−1
)
, and kt = kt−1 = k in the second equality.
The third equality holds since Yt/Lt = (At/Lt)
1−v kαvt from Proposition 1.1 with the
assumption that gA,t = gL,t ∀t ≥ 0. Now, note that 1− (1− δ) /ψ
(
z∗t−1
)
> 0 ∀t ≥ 0
since ψ
(
z∗t−1
)
> 1 ∀t ≥ 0; from Lemma 1.1, z∗t is an interior solution ∀t ≥ 0, implying
that ψ (z∗t ) > 1 ∀t ≥ 0 since f(z) > 0 ∀z where f(z) is the p.d.f. of the skill z. Also,
we know from part (i) of Proposition 1.4 that z∗t decreases over time, and therefore,
ψ (z∗t ) > ψ
(
z∗t−1
)
, proving that ψ (z∗t ) increases ∀t ≥ 0. The convergence is obvious
by the continuity of ι in z∗; recall that ψ(z) is continuous at any z.
(iv): Note first that:
ρt+1 ≡ Xt+1
Yt+1
>
Xt
Yt
≡ ρt ⇔ gX,t ≡ Xt+1
Xt
>
Yt+1
Yt
≡ gY,t
From Proposition 1.1 with the result from the proof of (iii) of Proposition 1.4 such
that gk,t = 1 ∀t ≥ 0 under a constant interest rate r, one can show that: gY,t = ψ (z∗t )
∀t ≥ 0. Meanwhile, we also have:
gX,t ≡ Xt+1
Xt
=
∫ zH
z∗t+1
x (z, At+1) dF (z)∫ zH
z∗t
x (z, At) dF (z)
=
ψ (z∗t )
∫ zH
z∗t+1
x (z, At) dF (z)∫ zH
z∗t
x (z, At) dF (z)
> ψ (z∗t ) = gY,t
where the third equality comes from the linearity of x (z, A), and the last inequality
comes from z∗t+1 < z
∗
t from the part (i). Hence, ρt+1 > ρt ∀t. The convergence holds
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by the continuity of ρ at any z.
(v): From equation (1.13) and gA,t = gL,t = ψ
(
z∗t−1
)
, we have:
yt =
A−1
L−1
kαv
Notice first from the proof of (iii) of Proposition 1.4 that k is time-invariant when
r is time-invariant. Hence, yt is also time-invariant. Also, from Proposition 1.1,
wt = v (1− α)Yt/Lt = v (1− α) yt, implying that wt is also time-invariant. Then,
the saving, which can be defined by the saving function, st ≡ s (rt+1, wt), is time-
invariant too. Knowing it all, from equation (1.5), we obtain:
θt ≡ B
f
t
Yt
= k + ρt − s(k)
yψ
(
z∗t−1
) < k + ρt+1 − s(k)
yψ (z∗t )
≡ B
f
t+1
Yt+1
= θt+1
where ρt ≡ Xt/Yt. We know from (ii) and (iv) of Proposition 1.4 that both ρt
and ψ
(
z∗t−1
)
are increasing over time, converging to its respective asymptotic value.
Hence, θt ≡ Bft /Yt is increasing ∀t ≥ 0. The convergence is trivial by the continuity.

Proof of Proposition 1.5:
One can solve for the threshold z∗t by the following equation:
(pγ − 1)Et [pi0,t+1] = (1 + rt+1 − δ)x (z∗t , At)Et [∆t+1] (A.9)
where pi1 (s
t+1) = γ (1− v)
(
αv
rt+1
) αv
1−αv [
L−1t+1ψ (z
∗
t )
]−v(1−α)
1−αv A˜
1−v
1−αv
t and pi0 (s
t+1) = γ−1pi1 (st+1)
from equations (1.9), (1.10) and (1.12). Then, equation (A.9) is rewritten as follows:
(
pγ − 1
pγ
) Et [A˜ 1−v1−αvt ]
Et
[
A˜
1−v
1−αv
t
pγ(1−v)
(
αv
rt+1
) αv
1−αv A˜
1−v
1−αv
t −(1−p)µ
]= (1 + rt+1 − δ)x (z∗t , At) (A.10)
First, from equation (A.10), the equilibrium threshold z∗t is uniquely pinned down as
an interior point on [zL, zH ] since the LHS of equation (A.10) is strictly positive and
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independent of z. Meanwhile, the RHS of equation (A.10) is strictly decreasing in z
from infinity to zero. Note also that pi0,t+1 is strictly concave in A˜t, and therefore,
the LHS of equation (A.9) is strictly decreasing in mean-preserving spread of the
random shock s. Now, suppose that there is no financial friction, i.e., µ = 0, and
hence, ∆t+1 = 1. Then, the RHS of equation (A.9) is equal to (1 + rt+1 − δ)x (z∗t , At).
In this situation, z∗t increases along with mean-preserving spread, and therefore, the
mean growth rate ψ (z∗t ) decreases with mean-preserving spread. Hence, the mean
growth rate of Yt also decreases as the volatility increases; recall that gYt+1 is strongly
monotonic in ψ (z∗t ) by Corollary 1.3. In other words, growth decreases by higher
volatility even without the financial friction. Next, to prove the amplification effect,
note that the wedge, ∆t+1 ≡ ppi1,t+1ppi1,t+1−(1−p)µ , is strictly convex and decreasing in pi1,t+1,
while pi1,t+1 is strictly concave in A˜t. This implies that
ppi1,t+1
ppi1,t+1−(1−p)µ is strictly convex
in A˜t. Hence, the RHS of equation (A.9) increases with mean-preserving spread.
Hence, z∗t increases more compared to the case without the financial-friction. 
Proof of Proposition A.1:
Case 1) The case that µA (w,A) = 0 is equivalent with the baseline case that the
monitoring cost is fixed over time, i.e., gµ,t = 1 ∀t. This is because wage wt is con-
stant in the stationary state. Hence, the growth effects disappear asymptotically in
this case. Also, µA (w,A) < 0 implies that µ decreases in each period in the steady
state since ψ (z∗) > 1 implies that A continuously increases. Hence, gµ < 1, and µ
converges to its lower bound, 0; recall that µ is assumed to be greater than zero.
Hence, the economy asymptotically boils down to the standard growth model with-
out the financial friction, so that the growth effects disappear in the long run.
Case 2) (i) In this case, it is trivial to show that gµ,t ∈ (1, gpii,t) ∀t ≥ 0. We now
let εt ≡ gpi1,t/gµ,t > 1 ∀t ≥ 0. Then, ∀M > 0, ∃T > 0 such that pi1,t/µt+1 >
M ∀t > T since one can choose any T > 0 satisfying that
¯
εT+1 > Mµ0/pi1,0
where
¯
ε ≤ min {ε1, ε2, · · · εT+1}. Then, by picking an arbitrary large M such that
µt+1/pi1,t = 1/M ' 0, we have the following result for large enough t > T satisfying
that µt+1/pi1,t ' 0:
g(1+i) =
ppi′1
ppi1
ppi1 − (1− p)µ
ppi′1 − (1− p)µ′
= ψ (z∗)
p− (1− p)µ/pi1
ppi′1/pi1 − (1− p)µ′/pi1
' ψ (z∗) 1
ψ (z∗)
= 1
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which implies gi = 1 asymptotically. Then, we can prove gz∗ = 1 by using the same
method applied to the proof of Proposition 1.3. Finally, µt+1/pi1,t+1 ' 0 for any
t > T since µt+1/pi1,t ' 0 ∀t > T and pi1,t+1 > pi1,t. Hence, the determination of the
asymptotic threshold z∗ is irrelevant to the monitoring cost.
Case 2) (ii) In this case, it is straightforward that gpi1,t = gµ,t ∀t ≥ 0. Hence, the
equation that determines z∗ becomes different from equation (A.7), and it is given
by:
pγ − 1
pγ
[
pγ (1− v)
(αv
r
) αv
1−αv
(
A−1
L−1
) 1−v
1−αv
− (1− p)µ0
]
= (1 + r − δ)x (z∗, A−1)
where z∗ is decreasing in the initial monitoring cost µ0. Hence, the initial monitoring
cost reduces the long-term growth rate ψ (z∗) in the steady state.
Case 2) (iii) In this case, gµ,t > gpii,t = ψ (z
∗
t ) > 1. Hence, 1+ i grows faster than pi1
over time while assuming that Assumption 2 is still satisfied. Then, the equilibrium
threshold z∗t ∈ (zL, zH) must decrease over time, converging to its minimum value, zL.
This, in turn, implies that the growth rate of the economy converges to ψ (zL) = 1,
meaning no-growth in the stationary state. 
A.5 Empirical Analysis with Split Sample
In Section 1.4, we verify the asymptotic irrelevance hypothesis by using the inter-
action term between the (adjusted) interest rate spread and initial income. The
coefficient of the interaction term is estimated positive, meaning that the negative
growth impact of the financial friction gets smaller as the economy is initially richer.
In this appendix, we corroborate this argument through regression with two split
samples. We divide the total sample into two sub-samples according to whether
a given country has higher or lower GDP per capita than the median of the total
sample.
With the two sub-samples, we use the following econometric framework to esti-
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mate the direct growth effect of the financial friction for each group:
g¯Gyˆ,i = X
G′
i θˆ + βˆ
G ¯˜∆Gi + ε
G
i
G is the index for the two sub-samples such that G ∈ {P,R} where P and R denote
the sub-sample for countries whose initial incomes are below (poor) and above (rich)
the median, respectively. Then, to be consistent with the asymptotic irrelevance
hypothesis, the estimate of βˆG needs to be statistically significant ∀G ∈ {P,R} and
the following inequalities must hold: βˆP < βˆR < 0. In words, the negative growth
effect led by the unit change of the interest rate spread ¯˜∆ gets smaller when the
economy is richer.
The estimation results are summarized in Table A.2. We notice from regressions
(2) and (3) that the estimate of βˆG is statistically significant ∀G ∈ {P,R} and
βˆP < βˆR < 0. This means that the financial friction decreases the long-term growth
rate of GDP per capita and this negative impact on growth is more severe when
the initial income is relatively low. As already mentioned, this is consistent with
the estimation result in Section 1.4 where the empirical analysis is done with the
interaction term.
The same estimation approach can be applied to growth of the TFP. That is, we
can estimate the direct growth effect on the TFP by using the average growth rate
of the TFP for the dependent variable. The estimation results are the same; from
regressions (5) and (6), we find that βˆG is statistically significant ∀G ∈ {P,R} and
βˆP < βˆR < 0. Hence, the estimation results from regressions (2), (3), (5) and (6)
support the asymptotic irrelevance hypothesis for TFP growth as well.
A.6 Empirical Analysis with Credit Ratio
The ratio of private credit to GDP has been commonly used in many empirical
studies as a measure of financial development.14 Although the interest rate spread is
14 For instance, King and Levine (1993), de Gregorio (1996), Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000),
AHM and AABM among others. However, Cˇiha´k, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, Feyen and Levine (2013) argue
that this commonly used measure does not provide sufficient information in the assessment of
financial development in a country. They, therefore, construct a new cross-country database that
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Table A.2: Regressions with Split Sample (OLS)
Panel A. Dependent Variable: Average Growth Rate of GDP per capita (%)
Full Sample Below Median Above Median
(1) (2) (3)
Independent Variable N = 74 N = 37 N = 37
Interest Rate Spread −.322∗∗∗ −.317∗∗∗ −.200∗∗
(.057) (.078) (.008)
Initial Income −1.876∗∗∗ −2.045∗ −2.697∗∗∗
(.430) (1.101) (.819)
Initial Human Capital .975∗ 1.372 .701
(.537) (.929) (.558)
Population Growth −.175 −.804∗ .028
(.173) (.434) (.090)
R2 .444 .584 .345
Panel B. Dependent Variable: Average Growth Rate of the TFP (%)
Full Sample Below Median Above Median
(4) (5) (6)
Independent Variable N = 74 N = 37 N = 37
Interest Rate Spread −.203∗∗∗ −.194∗∗∗ −.130∗
(.041) (.055) (.070)
Initial Income −.691∗∗∗ −.810∗∗ −.996∗∗∗
(.136) (.653) (.435)
Initial Human Capital 1.291∗∗∗ 1.550∗∗ 1.130∗∗
(.390) (.653) (.435)
Population Growth .128 −.348 .294∗∗
(.126) (.305) (.131)
R2 .675 .514 .534
Note: All regressors are the averages over the sample period of 1980–2010. Initial
income and human capital are taken for 1980. Initial income is logged GDP per capita.
“Below (Above) Median” is for a country, the initial income of which is below (above) the
median. We excluded any country from the regressions either when the number of data
points of the interest rate spread is smaller than 20, which is two thirds of the total number
of data points over the sample period, 1980–2010, or when the average interest rate spread
is larger than 20%. Constant terms are not shown. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
***, ** and * significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Figure A.2: Direct and Indirect Effect with Split Sample
a proper proxy for financial conditions based on our theoretical framework, we can
test all the theoretical results using the credit-to-output ratio instead of the interest
rate spread.
To do that, we can rewrite the econometric specification used in Section 1.4 as
follows:
g¯yˆ,i = X
′
iθ˜ + α˜σi + β˜φi + γ˜φiσi + δ˜φi log yˆ1980,i + εi
where φi is the average of annual credit-to-output ratios (%) over the sample period,
1980–2010. Similarly, the same hypotheses for TFP growth can also be tested. For
the credit ratio during the sample period, {φi,t}, we use the the World Bank Dataset
for the domestic credit to the total output (% of GDP).
In our model, the credit-to-output ratio in period t is defined such that φt ≡
(Xt + It) /Yt×100 where X and I are the R&D and capital investments, respectively.
Then, from parts (iii) and (iv) of Proposition 1.4, φi,t is decreasing in the monitoring
cost µ during the transition phase. Hence, φi,t must negatively correlates with the
interest rate spread ∆˜i,t (recall that ∆˜i,t is increasing in µi). This implies that β˜ and
includes a rich set of dimensions on financial conditions.
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γ˜ must be positive while δ˜ must be negative to be consistent with the theoretical
results. To check if it is true, we conduct OLS regressions, and the results are
presented in Table A.3. As indicated in the table, both β˜ and γ˜ are positive, while
δ˜ is negative. All estimates are statistically significant at either 1% or 5%, implying
validity of the theoretical conclusions again. Therefore, we have another evidence for
the theoretical results from the commonly used proxy for financial conditions: the
credit-to-output ratio.
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Table A.3: Regressions with Credit-to-Output Ratio (OLS)
Dependent Variable: Average Growth Rate (%) GDP per capita TFP
(1) (2)
Independent Variable N = 109 N = 109
Credit-to-Output Ratio .112∗∗∗ .065∗∗
(.037) (.027)
Credit-to-Output Ratio × Volatility .006∗∗∗ .004∗∗∗
(.002) (.001)
Credit-to-Output Ratio × Initial Income −.028∗∗∗ −.007∗∗∗
(.009) (.003)
Volatility −.238∗∗∗ −.170∗
(.071) (.052)
Initial Income −.718 −.408∗∗∗
(.483) (.152)
Initial Human Capital .672 981∗∗∗
(.430) (.312)
Population Growth −.224 .120
(.158) (.113)
R2 .429 .398
Note: All regressors are averages over 1980–2010 period. Volatility is the standard deviation of %
growth rates. Initial income and human capital are taken for 1980. Initial income is logged GDP per
capita. Constant terms are not shown. Standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, ** and * significant at 1%,
5% and 10%, respectively.
Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 2
B.1 Details of the Empirical Analysis
The Hofstede individualism index
Given at least 40 respondents in each country for the two international surveys by
IBM, Hofstede constructed measures for five different dimensions of culture for 50
countries with three multicountry regions. The five dimensions are Individualism,
Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, Masculinity and Long-term Orientation.
Most of the 50 countries have more than 200 respondents in the first and second
round surveys combined. The culture measure has been updated by new waves of
surveys and subsequent studies using a similar set of questionnaires to that used in
the original surveys, and it now covers 102 countries.1
To construct the individualism index, Hofstede chose 14 survey questions related
to “work goals,” which are conceptually consistent with the notion of individual-
ism/collectivism. Among these, only 9 questions were used to calculate the indi-
vidualism score from the factor analysis; only the 9 questions’ factor loadings —
the square root of relative explanatory power — are higher than 0.35 (35%). From
the factor analysis results, he categorized the 9 questions into positive and negative
groups that are positively and negatively correlated with the notion of individualism,
1 The most recent version of the data can be found at http://www.geert-hofstede.com.
163
respectively, in order to calculate the individualism score.2
Then, is it reliable as a measure of culture? It has been in fact validated in
many subsequent studies. For example, across various studies and measures of in-
dividualism, the UK, the USA and Netherlands are consistently among the most
individualistic countries, while Pakistan, Nigeria and Peru are among the most col-
lectivist countries (Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2017). More surprisingly, a survey
conducted by Chinese scholars — not by Western scholars — in 1979, which overlap-
ping 20 countries with Hofstede’s sample countries, obtained very similar results to
the Hofstede individualism index despite the completely different questions, differ-
ent populations, different time periods, and different mix of countries (Hofstede and
Bond, 1988). Furthermore, the IBM surveys were translated into local languages to
prevent cultural biases in the way questions are framed (Gorodnichenko and Roland,
2017). For these reasons, the Hofstede individualism index have been widely used in
various fields.
Culture-Innovation relationship
Gorodnichenko and Roland (2017) conduct cross-country OLS regressions controlling
for many relevant explanatory variables, including protection of property rights as a
proxy for the institutional quality, to show that the number of patents per million
population tends to be bigger as a country is more individualistic. Furthermore, they
provide evidence that the same relationship also holds for the innovation performance
index, which incorporates information on the number of patents and alternative
indicators such as royalty and license fees.3,4
2 The positive and negative groups consist of four and five questions, respectively. One can refer
to the Chapter 5 in Hofstede (2001) for more details on how he constructed the individualism index.
3 Gorodnichenko and Roland (2017) also show that the TFP level is higher in a more individu-
alistic country, which is also consistent with their empirical findings.
4 Similarly, Shane (1992) investigates the positive relationship between individualism and inno-
vation by using the Hofstede culture indices. He notes that the Power Distance Index (PDI), which
is also one of the culture dimensions measured by Hofstede, has the strong negative relationship
with the individualism index. Then, he concludes that individualism encourages innovation by
showing that the number of patents correlates negatively with PDI. This may be attributable to
the tendency that innovation needs “good support” — permissions, authorizations and etc. — from
hierarchy in a high PDI society [Shane et al. (1995)].
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Acemoglu et al. (2015) define the concept of creative innovation that proxies
for qualitative aspects of innovation rather than quantitative ones. It consists of
a set of sub-indices: Innovation Quality, Superstar Fraction, Tail Innovation and
Generality (or Originality). In the cross-country regressions controlling for various
explanatory variables, all of the qualitative measures of innovation are consistently
higher in a more individualistic country where the Hofstede individualism score is
higher. In sum, innovation is more encouraged by individualism both quantitatively
and qualitatively.
For the micro-evidence within a country, as argued by Gorodnichenko and Roland
(2017), the USA is a particularly appropriate research object since there are various
ethnicities in the country, and occupational opportunities are relatively open for
peoples of all origins and cultures. We use 5 percent public micro data (IPUMS)
of the U.S. Census in 2000 to obtain the data of ethnicity, age, gender, birth place,
educational attainment, marital status, English proficiency, citizenship and school
attendance. To avoid potential biases, our sample includes only employed males.
We also drop respondents from the sample if they are younger than 25 or older than
65. The identification method is basically the same as the one in Gorodnichenko and
Roland (2017). We estimate the following probit in the first step:
ROOi = Φ(X
′
iβ + ΣkαkDik + εi)
where i and k are individuals and ethnic groups, respectively; the ethnicity is the
respondent’s self-reported country of ancestry in the 2000 census. ROO is a dummy
variable equal to one if an individual has a research-oriented occupation and zero
otherwise. D is a set of dummies of each ethnicity, and X includes controls such
as age, age squared, education attainment, marital status, citizenship, English pro-
ficiency, and school attendance.5 Also, we consider four sub-samples for a more
comprehensive analysis. The number of observations for the sub-samples in the first
stage probit regression ranges from 426,492 to 1,759,246.
5 Following Gorodnichenko and Roland (2017), the ethnicity variable for the UK is dropped
since the UK is the second most individualistic country in the sample.
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In the second step, we estimate the following specification by OLS:
αˆk = γ + θINDk + εk
where αˆk is the estimated coefficient for k th ethnicity that indicates the explanatory
power of k th ethnicity in the propensity to choose research-oriented jobs. IND is
the Hofstede individualism score. Table B.1 summarizes the estimation results. As
seen in the table, the estimates of θ are significant and positive in all regressions.
For the case of Italian immigrants to the USA, we use the IPUMS US census 1980
since it includes information about which province an Italian immigrant came from,
one can exploit the same probit regression already used. Since southern Italy can be
defined either widely or narrowly in terms of the regions as depicted in Figure B.2,
we conduct the probit regression separately for each of the two cases.
As seen in Table B.2, we notice that the same result also holds for the Italian
immigrants; an immigrant from northern Italy is more likely to have a research-
oriented job than an immigrant from southern Italy. Accordingly, we can argue that
an individual is more (less) likely to voluntarily choose a research-oriented job if
he is an individualist (a collectivist), and this suggests that an individualist has a
comparative advantage in innovation compared to a collectivist.
Culture-Growth relationship
The OLS regression results are shown in Table B.3. As seen in the table, indi-
vidualism increases the average growth rate over the sample period even when we
control continent-specific differences by adding continent dummies. Since cultures
also change over time according to the development of society, the endogeneity prob-
lem needs to be addressed, especially for long periods of time. For this, we use
historical pathogen prevalence such as malaria, dengue and etc. as an instrument
variables following Gorodnichenko and Roland (2017).6,7
6 Fincher et al. (2008) argue that pathogen prevalence may require collectivist behaviors such
as extended nepotism and in-group care more generally, resulting in strong positive correlations
between prevalence and collectivism. One can find details of how the data was constructed from
Fincher et al. (2008).
7 Gorodnichenko and Roland (2017) advocate the use of the historical pathogen prevalence as
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As demonstrated in Table B.3, we have the same results in all IV regressions.
However, a word of caution follows; the IV turns out “weak” in that the first stage
F-stats are less than 10, which is the rule of thumb criterion suggested by Staiger and
Stock (1997). In this case, one can employ the Anderson-Rubin (AR) test, which is
an inference robust to weak instrumental variables. Using the AR test, we find that
all estimates on the instrumented variables are still statistically significant at least
at the 10% level.8
Table B.4 summarizes the estimation results with the PWT data. The results
also indicate the same pattern as that we have already seen using the Maddison data;
individualism increases the average growth rate over the sample period. The TFP
growth rate increases with individualism, which is consistent with the observation
that individualism is more beneficial for innovation than collectivism. The results
are the same in the IV regressions using the historical pathogen prevalence. Also,
the estimates are significant when using the AR test, and hence, robust to the weak
instrument.
Culture-Institutions relationship
Table B.5 provides the OLS regression results for the interactions between individ-
ualism and property rights. The protection against expropriation risk is taken from
the International Country Risk Guide and averaged between 1985 and 2009. An-
other measure of protection of property rights is taken from Gwartney et al. (2015),
which is averaged over 1995 and 2009.9 To address the endogeneity issue arising
an instrument in cross-country income regressions since health variables that may or may not affect
income, e.g., life expectancy, are not significantly correlated with historical pathogen prevalence.
In line with this, Fincher et al. (2008) report that variations in the average life expectancy cannot
be attributed to variations in the historical pathogen prevalence.
8 When IVs are weak under the assumption of normal errors, one can also use the conditional
likelihood ratio (CLR) test developed by Cruz and Moreira (2005) to achieve more reliable statistics
since it is known that the CLR test is more powerful than the AR test among a class of two-sided
tests; see Andrews et al. (2006). Although we do not report the estimation results, we have similar
results when using the CLR test, assuming homoskedasticity. However, even when the estimates
are significant under the weak instruments robust tests, the finite sample bias of 2SLS estimators
becomes severe with weak instruments, and hence, there could be substantial bias in the estimates;
see Cruz and Moreira (2005).
9 This is because the earliest available year for the data is 1995.
167
from a two-way interaction, we use the historical pathogen prevalence for the effect
from individualism to property rights while using the Acemoglu et al. (2001) settler
mortality rate for the reverse effect as in Gorodnichenko and Roland (2017). As
expected, the Hofstede individualism score correlates positively with both the pro-
tection against expropriation risk and the protection of property rights. The results
still hold in the IV regressions. The estimates are also significant under the AR test,
and thereby, robust to the weak instrument.
168
169
Table B.1: Propensity to Choose Research-Oriented Occupations Using IPUMS US
2000 Census (OLS)
All Persons All Persons w/ Bachelor Degree
Extended controls No Yes No Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Individualism .004∗∗∗ .003∗∗∗ .004∗∗∗ .004∗∗∗
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Obs. 83 83 83 83
R2 .167 .134 .176 .150
U.S. Born U.S. Born w/ Bachelor Degree
Extended controls No Yes No Yes
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Individualism .011∗∗∗ .013∗∗∗ .016∗∗∗ .016∗∗∗
(.003) (.004) (.004) (.004)
Obs. 83 83 82 82
R2 .104 .105 .166 .167
Note: The dependent variable is the set of estimated coefficients associated with the set of nation-
alities of immigrants’ ancestors. The definition of research-oriented occupations includes Life, Physical, and
Social Science Occupations (codes 160-196 in the 2000 census occupational classification system recorded
in the IPUMS variable OCC). “Individualism” is the Hofstede individualism index. Controls are age, age
squared, and dummies of college graduates and marital status. Extended controls further include dummies
of citizenship, English proficiency, and school attendance. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in
parentheses. *** significant at 1%.
Figure B.1: Provinces of Italy
(a) Narrow (b) Wide
Figure B.2: Two Different Definitions of Southern Italy
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Table B.2: Propensity to Choose Research-Oriented Occupations Using IPUMS US
1980 Census for Italy (Probit)
Region Narrow Wide
(1) (2)
Coeff. Avg. ME (%) Coeff. Avg. ME (%)
From northern Italy .396∗ 3.55 .350∗∗ 4.09∗∗
(.239) (2.30) (.169) (1.98)
Obs. 295 (N = 122; S = 173) 1201 (N = 122; S = 1079)
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy of research-oriented occupations; if the re-
spondent’s job is a research-oriented occupation, the dependent variable is one, and zero
otherwise. The definition of research-oriented occupations includes Life, Physical, and Social
Science Occupations (codes 160-196 in the 2000 census occupational classification system
recorded in the IPUMS variable OCC). “From northern Italy” is a dummy that is one if the
respondent’s father came from northern Italy, and zero for the respondent whose father came
from southern Italy. Coefficients associated with controls are omitted. The controls are age,
age squared, and dummies of college graduates, marital status, citizenship, school attendance
and sex. “Narrow” indicates the narrow definition of southern Italy including only four south
provinces — BA, CL, CM and PU. “Wide” is the wide definition including seven south provinces
and the Sicily island — AB, BA, CL, CM, MO, PU and SI. Northern Italy consists of eight
north provinces of EM, FR, LI, LO, PI, PR, VE and VA. “Avg. ME” indicates average marginal
effects at mean values. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. ** and *
significant at 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table B.3: Individualism and Growth Using the Maddison data (OLS)
1850 - 2005 1900 - 2005 1950 - 2005 1970 - 2005
Continent dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Individualism .011∗∗ .013∗∗∗ .013∗∗∗ .017∗∗∗ .021∗∗ .023∗∗∗ .034∗∗∗ .037∗∗∗
(.005) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.008) (.006) (.010) (.008)
Obs. 49 49 66 66 89 89 85 85
R2 .420 .614 .368 .535 .463 .685 .510 .653
IV Regressions (2SLS)
1850 - 2005 1900 - 2005 1950 - 2005 1970 - 2005
Continent dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Individualism .034∗∗∗ .028∗∗ .054∗ .029∗ .127∗∗ .036∗ .131∗∗∗ .061∗∗
(.012) (.011) (.030) (.015) (.050) (.021) (.045) (.024)
Obs. 48 48 65 65 88 88 84 84
R2 .161 .528 -.387 .489 -.693 .752 -.222 .739
1st. stage F-stat. 6.49 4.10 3.17 4.42 5.85 6.10 7.36 7.97
Partial R2 .243 .264 .078 .131 .085 .130 .096 .158
Note: The dependent variable is the annual average growth rate of income per capita from Maddison
(2013). “Individualism” is the Hofstede individualism index. Coefficients associated with controls are omitted.
The controls consist of initial logged GDP per capita, and geographical and religion factors. The geographical
controls are the absolute values of latitude and longitude, mean distance to the nearest river or coast, the land
productivity, and dummies of landlocked countries and small islands. The religion factor is the percentage
of population practicing major religions — Christianity, Judaism, Muslim, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Eastern
religion — in a given country in 1900 CE for (1)-(4) and (9)-(12), while the same one in 1970 CE is used
for the rest. For regressions (7), (8), (15) and (16), the average investment-to-output ratio and the average
trade-to-output ratio are further controlled. The instrument is historical pathogen prevalence. All estimates on
the instrumented variables are statistically significant at least at the 10% level when using the Anderson-Rubin
test, which is an inference robust to weak instrumental variables. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in
parentheses. ***, ** and * significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Figure B.3: Individualism and Growth (Maddison)
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Table B.4: Individualism and Growth Using the PWT (OLS)
1970 - 2005
IV Regressions (2SLS)
Income TFP Income TFP
Continent dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Individualism .031∗∗∗ .019∗∗∗ .030∗∗∗ .021∗∗∗ .095∗∗∗ .033∗ .061∗∗∗ .037∗∗∗
(.009) (.007) (.007) (.008) (.024) (.018) (.016) (.013)
Obs. 79 79 60 60 77 77 59 59
R2 .585 .746 .634 .783 .337 .744 .516 .530
1st. stage F-stat. 13.71 7.28 8.82 12.27
Partial R2 .222 .199 .255 .242
Note: The dependent variable is the annual average growth rate of income per capita from the PWT
(Ver. 8.0). “Individualism” is the Hofstede individualism index. Coefficients associated with controls are
omitted. The controls consist of initial logged GDP per capita, and the average investment and trade to output
ratios, and geographical and religion factors. The geographical controls are the absolute values of latitude and
longitude, mean distance to the nearest river or coast and the land productivity, and dummies of landlocked
countries and small islands. The religion factor is the percentage of population practicing major religions —
Christianity, Judaism, Muslim, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Eastern religion — in a given country in 1970 CE.
The instrument is historical pathogen prevalence. All estimates on the instrumented variables are statistically
significant at least at the 10% level when using the Anderson-Rubin test, which is an inference robust to weak
instrumental variables. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * significant at
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Figure B.4: Individualism and Growth (PWT)
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Adjusted protection of property rights
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Figure B.5: Individualism and Property Rights
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B.2 Proofs and Derivations
Proof of Proposition 2.1:
To prove Proposition 2.1, we first prove the following lemma:
Lemma B.1 Given any (qt, ρt) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, ρ¯], the skill thresholds zSt and efficiency
units of workers and ideas (Lt, Xt) are uniquely determined in equilibrium. Also,
(zIt , z
C
t ) ∈ (0, 1]2\(1, 1) ∀(qt, ρt) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, ρ¯]. Hence, ∀ρt ∈ [0, ρ¯], zIt ∈ (0, 1) if
qt = 1, and z
C
t ∈ (0, 1) if qt = 0. Also, (zIt , zCt , Lt, Xt) are independent of At−1.
Proof. It is obvious that any solution of (zIt , z
C
t , Lt, Xt) is independent of At−1 since
At−1 is not appeared in (2.9), (2.12) and (2.13). For the rest of arguments, we drop
the time subscript for simplicity. First, we can prove that neither (zI , zC) = (0, 0)
nor (zI , zC) = (1, 1) can be supported in any equilibrium. If (zI , zC) = (0, 0), L = 0
and X > 0 from (2.12) and (2.13). Hence, x ≡ X/L >∞. Then, zS = 1 from (2.9),
which is a contradiction. If (zI , zC) = (1, 1), X = 0 and L > 0 from (2.12) and (2.13),
and thus, x ≡ X/L = 0. Then, zS = 0 from (2.9), which is a contradiction. Hence,
if there are individualists only, i.e., q = 1, then zI should be an interior solution, i.e.,
zI ∈ (0, 1). On the contrary, if there are collectivists only, i.e., q = 0, then zC ∈ (0, 1).
We now know that, in any equilibrium, L > 0 and X > 0 ∀(q, ρ) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, ρ¯],
and hence, x ≡ X/L > 0. To prove that (zI , zC) are uniquely determined ∀(q, ρ) ∈
[0, 1] × [0, ρ¯], we first notice that (zI , zC) ∈ (0, 1]2\(1, 1) is uniquely determined
∀(x, ρ) ∈ R+ × [0, ρ¯] from (2.9). Note also that both zI and zC are strictly in-
creasing in x ≡ X/L ≥ 0 ∀ρ ∈ [0, ρ¯] as long as both zI and zC are strictly smaller
than one. Finally, it is straightforward from (2.9) that zS (S ∈ {I, C}) is a contin-
uous function with respect to x. We denote the function as zS = zS(x; ρ) with ρ
being fixed at any point in [0, ρ¯]. Then, one can define a continuous function z that
maps from zC(x; ρ) < 1 to zI(x; ρ) such that zI(x; ρ) = z(zC(x; ρ)). That is, with
the function z(zC), we can calculate zI given any zC < 1. Now suppose that x in-
creases. Then, zC(x; ρ) will strictly increase as long as zC(x; ρ) < 1 since zC is strictly
increasing in x ≡ X/L ≥ 0. Then, one can notice that the function z(zC(x; ρ)) is
strictly increasing in zC as long as zI < 1 since zI(x; ρ) = z(zC(x; ρ)) and zI(x; ρ) is
strictly increasing in x given zI < 1. Meanwhile, zI will not change once it reaches
its maximum. That is, zI is independent of x if zI = 1, which, in turn, implies that
the function z(zC(x; ρ)) is independent of zC if zI = 1. In sum, zI = z(zC) ∈ [0, 1] is
weakly increasing in zC ∈ [0, 1).
Now notice from (2.12) and (2.13) that L and X are weakly increasing and
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Figure B.6: Uniqueness of the Skill Threshold
decreasing in zS (S = I, C), respectively, so that x ≡ X/L is weakly decreas-
ing in zS (S = I, C) ∀q ∈ [0, 1]. We define a continuous function x such that
x = x(zI , zC ; q). Then, by using the function z(zC), we can redefine the function x
such that x = xˆ(zC ; q) ≡ x(z(zC), zC ; q) ∀zC ∈ [0, 1). Then, it immediately follows
that xˆ is weakly decreasing in zC ∈ [0, 1) ∀q ∈ [0, 1] since we already knew that z(zC)
is weakly increasing in zC ∈ [0, 1). That is, with letting zI ∈ [0, 1] vary along with
zC in the case that zC ∈ [0, 1), x decreases (weakly) from a certain positive value as
zC rises from zero; note that x > 0 if zC = 0. Then, if limzC→1 x(z(zC), zC ; q) < x¯(ρ)
where x¯(ρ) satisfies zC(x¯; ρ) = 1, there always exists a single point in the interval
(0, 1) where zC(x; ρ) and x(z(zC), zC ; q) crosses; see Figure B.6 for a graphical ex-
ample. Hence, zI is also uniquely determined by zI = z(zC(x; ρ)). On the other
hand, if limzC→1 x(z(zC), zC ; q) ≥ x¯(ρ), then zC = 1. In this case, an equilibrium
threshold, zI , solves zI(x; ρ) = x(zI , 1; q). Note that zI(x; ρ) increases strictly from
zero to one, and x(zI , 1; q) weakly decreases from a certain positive value to zero;
x > 0 if zI = 0, and since zC = 1, x = 0 if zI = 1 . Then, there should be a single
point that solves zI(x; ρ) = x(zI , 1; q). Moreover, it must be strictly smaller than
one since zC = 1; as shown in Lemma B.1, (zI , zC) = (1, 1) cannot be an equilibrium
∀(q, ρ) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, ρ¯]. Therefore, in any case, the equilibrium thresholds (zI , zC) are
always uniquely pinned down ∀(q, ρ) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, ρ¯]. Then, given the unique pair of
(zI , zC) in equilibrium, (L,X) are also uniquely determined by (2.12) and (2.13).
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It immediately follows from Lemma B.1 that there are continuous functions L :
[0, 1] × [0, ρ¯] → R++ such that Lt = L(qt, ρt) and X : [0, 1] × [0, ρ¯] → R++ such
that Xt = X(qt, ρt). Then, At is uniquely determined by (2.5) given At−1. Hence,
one can construct a continuous function A : R++ × [0, 1] × [0, ρ¯] → R++ such that
At = A(At−1, qt, ρt). With At, we can obtain Yt. Also, prices (wt, pt) ∈ R2++ are
uniquely determined by (2.7) and (2.8). With the price vector, the government
lump-sum transfer θt is determined by (2.14), and hence, we can also solve for{
cSt+1(z)|S ∈ {I, C}, z ∈ [0, 1]
}
. In the same way,
{
cSt+2(z)|S ∈ {I, C}, z ∈ [0, 1]
}
is
derived by At along with (qt+1, ρt+1), which are exogenously given. Then, we can
solve for ∆t+1 by using At and
{
cSt+2(z)|S ∈ {I, C}, z ∈ [0, 1]
}
. Note that cSt+2(z) is a
linear function of prices, (wt+1, pt+1), which are also linear in At by (2.7) and (2.8);
Lt+1 and Xt+1 are independent of At by Lemma B.1. This implies that c
S
t+2(z) is
linear in At. This, in turn, implies that ∆t+1 is independent of At since ∆t+1 is a
linear function of cSt+2(z) and divided by At. However, c
S
t+2(z) depends on qt+1 and
the institutional quality ρt+1, so does ∆t+1. In consequence, there exists a continuous
function ∆ : [0, 1] × [0, ρ¯] → R such that ∆t+1 = ∆(qt+1, ρt+1), where ∆t+1 is scale-
invariant with respect to ∀At ∈ R++. Then, ∆t+1 is bounded both above and below
∀t ≥ 0 since, from (2.12) and (2.13), both Lt+1 and Xt+1 are bounded. Given ∆t+1,
one can solve for dSt from (2.10) and (2.11), meaning that there exist a continuous
function dS : [0, 1]2 × [0, ρ¯]→ R++ such that dSt = dS(qt, qt+1, ρt+1). From (2.10) and
(2.11), this implies further that if κ > β∆¯ ≡ βmax(q,ρ)∈[0,1]×[0,ρ¯] |∆(q; ρ)| ≥ 0, (dIt , dCt )
are always in the unit square, i.e., (dIt , d
C
t ) ∈ [0, 1]2 ∀(qt, qt+1, ρt+1) ∈ [0, 1]2× [0, ρ¯]. 
Proof of Proposition 2.2:
For simplicity, we drop the institutional quality ρ from below, while the argument
here is supposed to be hold ∀ρ ∈ [0, ρ¯]. From (2.3), (2.10) and (2.11), one can notice
that qt+1 solves the following function ∀qt ∈ [0, 1]:
qt+1 =
{
q+(qt+1; qt) ≡ qt + qt(1− qt)2κ˜∆(qt+1),
q−(qt+1; qt) ≡ qt − q2t (1− qt)κ˜(−∆(qt+1)),
∆(qt+1) ≥ 0
∆(qt+1) < 0
where κ˜ ≡ βκ−1 > 0. It is convenient to define the following sets in proving Propo-
sition 2.2:
Q+ = {qt+1 ∈ [0, 1] |∆(qt+1) ≥ 0}
Q− = {qt+1 ∈ [0, 1] |∆(qt+1) < 0}
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where Qj (j = +, −) can be an empty set. Then, we can first prove the following
lemma:
Lemma B.2 Suppose that ∆(qt+1) is monotone decreasing in qt+1 ∈ [0, 1]. Then,
q¯j ≡ max(qt,qt+1)∈[0,1]×Qj qj ≤ 1 and
¯
qj ≡ min(qt,qt+1)∈[0,1]×Qj qj ≥ 0 (j = +,−), where
the inequalities strictly hold ∀(qt, qt+1) ∈ (0, 1)×Qj. Also, qj is monotone decreasing
in qt+1 ∈ [0, 1] (j = +,−).
Proof. Recall that κ > β∆¯ ≡ βmax(q,ρ)∈[0,1]×[0,ρ¯] |∆(q; ρ)| ≥ 0 to guarantee that
(dIt , d
C
t ) ∈ [0, 1]2. Then, qt(1 − qt)2κ˜∆(qt+1) ≤ 1 − qt ∀(qt, qt+1) ∈ [0, 1] × Q+
since κ˜ ≡ βκ−1 > 0, and the inequality strictly holds ∀(qt, qt+1) ∈ (0, 1) × Q+.
Hence, q+(qt+1; qt) ≤ 1 ∀(qt, qt+1) ∈ [0, 1] × Q+ where the inequality strictly holds
∀(qt, qt+1) ∈ (0, 1)×Q+. Similarly, we can prove for the case of q−. Meanwhile, it is
straightforward that qj(qt+1; qt) ≥ 0 ∀(qt, qt+1) ∈ [0, 1]2 where the inequality strictly
holds ∀(qt, qt+1) ∈ (0, 1)× [0, 1]. Finally, it is obvious that qj is monotone decreasing
∀qt+1 ∈ [0, 1] since κ˜ > 0, and ∆(qt+1) is monotone decreasing in qt+1 ∈ [0, 1].
Now, we are ready to prove that the correspondence Q is a singleton if ∆(qt+1)
is monotone decreasing in qt+1 ∈ [0, 1]. Since ∆(qt+1) is monotone decreasing, we
need to consider only three different cases as follows:
Case 1) ∆(1) ≥ 0:
In this case, ∆(qt+1) ≥ 0 ∀qt+1 ∈ [0, 1], and thus, we only consider q+(qt+1; qt).
When qt = 0, only qt+1 = 0 solves qt+1 = q
+(qt+1; 0). When qt = 1, only qt+1 =
1 solves qt+1 = q
+(qt+1; 1). When qt ∈ (0, 1), q+(qt+1; qt) is monotone decreasing
from 1 > q¯+ ≥ q+(0; qt) to q+(0; qt) ≥
¯
q+ > 0; see Lemma B.2. Meanwhile, qt+1
is monotone increasing from 0 to 1, and hence, there exists a unique fixed point
qt+1 ∈ (0, 1) such that qt+1 = q+(qt+1; qt) ∀qt ∈ (0, 1).
Case 2) ∆(0) ≤ 0:
In this case, ∆(qt+1) ≤ 0 ∀qt+1 ∈ [0, 1], and thus, we only consider q−(qt+1; qt);
note that q+ = q− if ∆(qt+1) = 0. Similarly to Case 1, when qt = 0, only qt+1 = 0
solves qt+1 = q
−(qt+1; 0). Also, when qt = 1, only qt+1 = 1 solves qt+1 = q−(qt+1; 1).
For qt ∈ (0, 1), we can show that there exists a unique fixed point qt+1 ∈ (0, 1) such
that qt+1 = q
−(qt+1; qt) ∀qt ∈ (0, 1) by applying the same method used for Case 1.
Case 3) ∆(0) > 0 and ∆(1) < 0:
In this case, it is straightforward that ∃!q¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that ∆(q¯) = 0 where
∆(qt+1) ≥ 0 ∀qt+1 ∈ Q+ = [0, q¯] and ∆(qt+1) < 0 ∀qt+1 ∈ Q− = (q¯, 1]. Hence, for
any given qt ∈ [0, 1], we need to consider q+(qt+1; qt) ∀qt+1 ∈ Q+, and q−(qt+1; qt)
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otherwise. When qt = 0, only qt+1 = 1 solves qt+1 = q
+(qt+1; 1). In contrast, when
qt = 1, only qt+1 = 1 solves qt+1 = q
−(qt+1; 1). Now, let us consider the case of
qt ∈ (0, 1). First, when qt ∈ (0, 1) and qt+1 ∈ Q+, it is already proven that there
exists a unique fixed point qt+1 ∈ (0, 1) such that qt+1 = q+(qt+1; qt) ∀qt ∈ (0, 1);
see Case 1. In the other case where qt ∈ (0, 1) and qt+1 ∈ Q−, it is also already
shown that there exists a unique fixed point qt+1 ∈ (0, 1) such that qt+1 = q−(qt+1; qt)
∀qt ∈ (0, 1); see Case 2.
That is, if ∆(qt+1) is monotone decreasing in qt+1, there is always a unique fixed
point qt+1 that solves (2.15) ∀qt ∈ [0, 1] since the correspondence Q given by (2.16)
is a singleton. Then, one can construct a function φ : [0, 1] → [0, 1] such that
qt+1 = φ(qt) that satisfies the following law of motion ∀qt ∈ [0, 1]:
φ(qt) =
{
q+(φ(qt); qt) = qt + qt(1− qt)2κ˜∆(φ(qt)),
q−(φ(qt); qt) = qt − q2t (1− qt)κ˜ [−∆(φ(qt))] ,
∆(φ(qt)) ≥ 0
∆(φ(qt)) < 0
(B.1)
Then, one can solve for qt+1 from (B.1) as long as qt is given. Also, (B.1) indicates
that φ(q; ρ) is continuous at any q ∈ [0, 1] since ∆(q) is continuous at any q ∈ [0, 1]
from Proposition 2.1. Finally, it is obvious that φ(0) = 0 and φ(1) = 1.
Now, we prove that (ii)–(iv) of Proposition 2.2. First, from (B.1), it is trivial
that φ(q¯) = q¯ since ∆(q¯) = 0. Second, suppose that qt ∈ (0, q¯). Then, from (B.1),
q+(q¯; qt) = qt < q¯. Meanwhile, q
+(qt; qt) > qt since qt < q¯ that implies ∆(qt) > 0.
Then, by continuity of q+, ∃qt+1 ∈ (qt, q¯) such that q+(qt+1; qt) = qt+1. Moreover,
such a fixed point qt+1 is unique since q
+ is monotone decreasing in qt+1. That
is, φ(qt) = qt+1 ∈ (qt, q¯) ∀qt ∈ (0, q¯). On the contrary, if qt ∈ (q¯, 1), from (B.1),
q−(q¯; qt) = qt > q¯. Also, q−(qt; qt) < qt since qt > q¯ that means ∆(qt) < 0. Then, by
continuity of q−, ∃qt+1 ∈ (q¯, qt) such that q−(qt+1; qt) = qt+1. Such a fixed point qt+1
is also unique since q− is monotone decreasing in qt+1. Hence, φ(qt) = qt+1 ∈ (q¯, qt)
∀qt ∈ (q¯, 1), establishing (ii) and (iii); see Figure B.7 for graphical exposition.
To prove (iv), we first consider Q+ region. Notice that κ˜∆(qt+1) ∈ (0, 1) ∀qt+1 ∈
Q+. Now, note from (B.1) that q+ is differentiable ∀qt ∈ [0, 1]. Then, we have:
∂q+
∂qt
= 1 + κ˜∆(qt+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈(0,1) ∀qt+1∈Q+
(1− 3qt)(1− qt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥− 1
3
∀qt∈(0,1)
> 0 ∀(qt, qt+1) ∈ (0, 1)×Q+ (B.2)
Now, suppose that qt increases to q
′
t, so that q
′
t > qt. Suppose further that qt+1 remains
constant or decreases to q′t+1 in equilibrium, so that q
′
t+1 ≤ qt+1. Since ∆(qt+1)
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Figure B.7: Determination of qt+1 ∈ (qt, q¯)
is monotone decreasing, ∆(q′t+1) ≥ ∆(qt+1), and this implies that q+(q′t+1; q′t) >
q+(qt+1; qt) from (B.2). Then, the equilibrium condition (B.1) is violated since q
′
t+1 is
supposed to be either equal to or smaller than qt+1, which is a contradiction. Hence,
q′t+1 should be strictly larger than qt+1 in equilibrium. For Q
− region, we have the
following inequality:
∂q−
∂qt
= 1− κ˜ [−∆(qt+1)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈(0,1) ∀qt+1∈Q−
(2− 3qt)qt︸ ︷︷ ︸
< 1
3
∀qt∈(0,1)
> 0 ∀(qt, qt+1) ∈ (0, 1)×Q−
Similarly, one can prove that qt+1 must increase (decrease) in equilibrium once qt
increases (decreases). Hence, φ(qt) is monotone increasing in qt. 
Proof of Proposition 2.3:
Proof. Since the policy is one dimension and every voter has the single-peaked
preference given by (2.24) and (2.25), the median voter theorem can be used. Let
us denote the strategy of each political party Pi as ρi (i = 1, 2) where ρi ∈ [0, ρ¯].
Suppose first that Xˆ > 1/2− ξ. Then, in any Nash equilibrium, neither ρ1 nor ρ2 is
larger than 0. This is because, if so, the other party, say P−i, can win the election
for sure by setting ρ−i = 0. Hence, there is at least one party choosing ρi = 0 in
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any Nash equilibrium in this case. If one of them chooses ρi = 0, then the other one
should choose ρ−i = 0 as well in order to raise the probability to win. This is because,
if ρ−i 6= 0, the probability of winning the election for P−i is zero. On the contrary,
if ρ−i = 0, then the two parties have the same number of votes, precisely 1/2 by the
law of large numbers, so that the probability of winning the election is 1/2, which is
the probability of winning in filp of a coin. Hence, (ρ1, ρ2) = (0, 0) is a unique Nash
equilibrium when Xˆ > 1/2 − ξ. Similarly, one can show that (ρ1, ρ2) = (ρ¯, ρ¯) is a
unique Nash equilibrium when Xˆ ≤ 1/2− ξ.
Proof of Proposition 2.4:
The following lemma is useful in proving part (i) of Proposition 2.4.
Lemma B.3 Suppose that ∆(q, ρ) is monotone decreasing in q. Also, for any q ∈
[0, 1], if Xˆ (φ(q, ρ¯), ρ¯) > 1/2 − ξ then Xˆ (φ(q, 0), 0) > 1/2 − ξ. Finally, for any
q ∈ [0, 1], if Xˆ(φ(q, 0), 0) ≤ 1/2 − ξ then Xˆ (φ(q, ρ¯), ρ¯) ≤ 1/2 − ξ. Then, the set of
solutions, {(qt+1, ρt+1)}, where each element (qt+1, ρt+1) solves equations (2.30) and
(2.31), is not an empty set ∀qt ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. If ∆(q, ρ) is monotone decreasing in q, there exists a single-valued function
φ (q, ρ) by part (i) of Proposition 2.2. Also note that R (q), which is given by equa-
tion (2.29), is not an empty set ∀q ∈ [0, 1]. To prove the lemma, note first that
R (q) is {0} , {ρ¯} , or {0, ρ¯}. Hence, R (φ (qt, ρ)) is {0} , {ρ¯} , or {0, ρ¯} ∀qt ∈ [0, 1]
and ∀ρ ∈ {0, ρ¯}. Note also that, from equations (2.30) and (2.31), (φ (qt, ρ) , ρ) is
a solution vector if R (φ (qt, ρ)) includes ρ where ρ ∈ {0, ρ¯}. Now, suppose that
Xˆ (φ(qt, ρ¯), ρ¯) ≤ 1/2 − ξ. Then, ρ¯ ∈ R (φ (qt, ρ¯)), so that an equilibrium vector for
qt exists. On the other hand, suppose that Xˆ (φ(q, ρ¯), ρ¯) > 1/2− ξ. Then, ρ¯ cannot
be an equilibrium policy in the next period at the current state of culture, qt, i.e.,
ρ¯ /∈ R (φ (qt, ρ¯)). In this situation, if Xˆ(φ(q, 0), 0) > 1/2 − ξ, the zero tax can be
an equilibrium, and this is a unique equilibrium, i.e., {0} = R (φ (qt, 0)). Similarly,
suppose that Xˆ (φ(q, 0), 0) > 1/2− ξ. Then, 0 ∈R (φ (qt, 0)), so that an equilibrium
vector for qt exists. We now have the last case such that Xˆ (φ(q, 0), 0) ≤ 1/2− ξ, the
zero tax cannot be an equilibrium policy, i.e., 0 /∈ R (φ (qt, 0)). In this situation, if
Xˆ (φ(q, ρ¯), ρ¯) ≤ 1/2 − ξ, then ρ¯ can be an equilibrium, and this is a unique equilib-
rium, i.e., {ρ¯} =R (φ (qt, ρ¯)).
To prove (i), we first show that Xˆ(q, ρ) is continuous at any q ∈ [0, 1] ∀ρ ∈ [0, ρ¯].
This is because zS (S ∈ {I, C}) is continuous at any x ≡ X/L ≥ 0 from (2.9), where
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both X and L are continuous at any q ∈ [0, 1] from Proposition 2.1. Then, by defi-
nition of Xˆ(q, ρ) given by equation (2.26), Xˆ(q, ρ) is also continuous at any q ∈ [0, 1]
∀ρ ∈ [0, ρ¯].
Suppose now that @q∗0 ∈ [0, 1] that solves Xˆ(q∗0, 0) = 1/2 − ξ. Then, this means
either that Xˆ(q, 0) > 1/2 − ξ ∀q ∈ [0, 1], or that, Xˆ(q, 0) < 1/2 − ξ ∀q ∈ [0, 1]. If
Xˆ(q, 0) > 1/2−ξ ∀q ∈ [0, 1], then 0 ∈R(φ(q, 0)) ∀q ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, a solution vector
exists ∀q ∈ [0, 1]. If Xˆ(q, 0) < 1/2− ξ ∀q ∈ [0, 1], then Xˆ (q, ρ¯) < 1/2− ξ ∀q ∈ [0, 1]
since Xˆ (q, 0) > Xˆ (q, ρ¯) ∀q ∈ [0, 1]. Then, ρ¯ ∈ R(φ(q, ρ¯)) ∀q ∈ [0, 1], implying that
a solution vector exists ∀q ∈ [0, 1].
Suppose now that there is one q∗0 ∈ [0, 1] that solves Xˆ(q∗0, 0) = 1/2 − ξ. If
q∗0 = argmaxq∈[0,1] Xˆ(q, 0), then Xˆ (q, ρ¯) < 1/2− ξ ∀q ∈ [0, 1] since Xˆ (q, 0) > Xˆ (q, ρ¯)
∀q ∈ [0, 1], and hence, ρ¯ ∈ R(φ(q, ρ¯)) ∀q ∈ [0, 1]. We now consider the last case
such that q∗0 6= argmaxq∈[0,1] Xˆ(q, 0), which implies that Xˆ(q, 0) ≤ 1/2 − ξ ∀q ∈
[0, q∗0], and Xˆ(q, 0) > 1/2 − ξ ∀q ∈ (q∗0, 1]. This is because there is only one q∗0
such that Xˆ(q∗0, 0) = 1/2 − ξ and Xˆ(q, 0) is a weakly increasing or an inverse U-
shaped function with respect to q that satisfies Xˆ(0, 0) ≤ Xˆ(1, 0). Then, ∀q ∈ [0, 1]
such that φ(q, 0) ∈ (q∗0, 1], there is a solution vector since 0 ∈ R(φ(q, 0)). Now,
consider ∀q ∈ [0, 1] such that φ(q, 0) ∈ [0, q∗0]. For such q, we need to show that
Xˆ(φ(q, ρ¯), ρ¯) ≤ 1/2−ξ. Then, by Lemma B.3, there is a solution vector. To show this,
first note that φ(q, 0) > φ(q, ρ¯) ∀q ∈ [0, 1] since ∆(q, 0) > ∆(q, ρ¯) ∀q ∈ [0, 1]. Then,
Xˆ(φ(q, ρ¯), 0) ≤ 1/2−ξ ∀q such that φ(q, 0) ∈ [0, q∗0] since Xˆ(q, 0) ≤ 1/2−ξ ∀q ∈ [0, q∗0].
Meanwhile, Xˆ(φ(q, ρ¯), ρ¯) < Xˆ(φ(q, ρ¯), 0) since Xˆ(q, ρ¯) < Xˆ(q, 0) ∀q ∈ [0, 1]. Hence,
we have Xˆ(φ(q, ρ¯), ρ¯) < 1/2 − ξ ∀q ∈ [0, 1] such that φ(q, 0) ∈ [0, q∗0], and therefore,
there is a solution vector since ρ¯ ∈R(φ(q, ρ¯)).
To prove part (ii), first note that ξ satisfies maxq∈[0,1] Xˆ (q, 0) > 1/2 − ξ ≥
minq∈[0,1] Xˆ (q, ρ¯). Hence, it suffices to consider only two cases. The first case
is that maxq∈[0,1] Xˆ (q, ρ¯) ≥ 1/2 − ξ ≥ minq∈[0,1] Xˆ (q, ρ¯). In this case, we de-
fine a set Qρ¯ = {q ∈ [0, 1] | Xˆ (q, ρ¯) = 1/2 − ξ}, which is not an empty set,
and denote q∗ρ¯ = minQρ¯. Then, there must exist a set Q
∗
ρ¯ ⊆ [0, 1] such that
Q∗ρ¯ = {q ∈ [0, 1] | Xˆ (q, ρ¯) ≤ 1/2 − ξ}. We can define a set, Q∗∗ρ¯ , which is a sub-
set of Q∗ρ¯ that satisfies Q
∗∗
ρ¯ ≡ Q∗ρ¯ ∩{q ≤ q∗ρ¯}. Note that Q∗∗ρ¯ is not an empty set since
Xˆ (q, ρ¯) is either a monotone increasing or an inverse U-shaped function with respect
to q such that Xˆ(0, ρ¯) ≤ Xˆ(1, ρ¯). Similarly, there must exist a set, Q∗∗0 ⊆ [0, 1], such
that Q∗∗0 ≡ {q ∈ [0, 1] | q ≤ q∗ρ¯ and Xˆ (q, 0) > 1/2 − ξ}. Since Xˆ (q, 0) > Xˆ (q, ρ¯)
∀q ∈ [0, 1], Q∗∗0 is not an empty set and minQ∗∗0 < maxQ∗∗ρ¯ . Since Xˆ (q, 0) > 1/2− ξ
∀q ∈ Q∗∗0 , ρt+1 = 0 can be supported as an political equilibrium ∀q ∈ (qˆL, q∗ρ¯]
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where qˆL ≡ minQ∗∗0 . Similarly, since Xˆ (q, ρ¯) ≤ 1/2 − ξ ∀q ∈ Q∗∗ρ¯ , ρt+1 = ρ¯ can
be supported as an political equilibrium ∀q ∈ [0, qˆH ] where qˆH ≡ maxQ∗∗ρ¯ . Since
∆ (q, 0) > ∆ (q, ρ¯) ∀q ∈ [0, 1], ∆ (q, 0) 6= ∆ (q, ρ¯) ∀q ∈ (qˆL, qˆH ]. This implies that
φ (q, 0) 6= φ (q, ρ¯) ∀q ∈ (qˆL, qˆH ]. Similarly, ∆ (q, 0) > ∆ (q, ρ¯) ∀q ∈ (q˜L, q˜H ] where q˜L
solves φ (q˜L, ρ¯) = qˆL, and q˜H solves φ (q˜H , ρ¯) = qˆH . Consequently, φ (q, 0) 6= φ (q, ρ¯)
∀q ∈ (q˜L, q˜H ]. Finally, note that, ∀qt ∈ (q˜L, q˜H ], qt+1 = φ (q, 0) is consistent with
the political equilibrium, ρt+1 = 0 since 0 ∈ R(φ (qt, 0)). At the same time, in
this region, φ (qt, ρ¯) is also consistent with the political equilibrium, ρt+1 = ρ¯ since
ρ¯ ∈R(φ (qt, ρ¯)). Hence, {St} = {SOt ,SPt } ∀qt ∈ (q˜L, q˜H ].
We now consider the last case that maxq∈[0,1] Xˆ (q, 0) > 1/2−ξ > maxq∈[0,1] Xˆ (q, ρ¯).
If there exist q∗0 that solves Xˆ(q
∗
0, 0) = 1/2− ξ, then one can easily prove it similarly
to above, which is more straightforward, so that we omit the proof here to save space.
If not, i.e., @q∗0 that solves Xˆ(q∗0, 0) = 1/2 − ξ, then Xˆ (q, 0) > 1/2 − ξ ∀q ∈ [0, 1],
while Xˆ (q, ρ¯) < 1/2 − ξ ∀q ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, it is straightforward that {0, ρ¯} = R(q)
∀q ∈ [0, 1], meaning that there are multiple social equilibria ∀q ∈ [0, 1], and therefore,
q˜L = 0 and q˜H = 1.
Finally, parts (iii) and (iv) are rather trivial to prove by using part (ii) of Propo-
sition 2.2, Corollary 2.1 and part (ii) of Proposition 2.4, and hence, omit the proof
here to save space. 
Derivation of X(q¯(ρ); ρ) and q¯(ρ) in Example 1:
Given the functional specifications, the skill thresholds given by (9) can be written
as follows:
zIt = min
{
(ηˆtλ
−1xt)
1
ψ , 1
}
; zCt = min
{
(ηˆtext)
1
ψ , 1
}
. (B.3)
Recall that ηˆt = ηˆ(ρt) ≡ η/(α(1 − ρt)) and xt ≡ Xt/Lt. Here, for simplicity, we
consider only the case of (ηˆtex¯)
1
ψ < 1 where x¯ ≡ max(q,ρ)∈[0,1]×[0,ρ¯] x(q, ρ).
Using (2.12) and (B.3), one can rewrite Lt as follows:
Lt = qtz
I
t + (1− qt)ezCt
= χt [ηˆxt]
1
ψ (B.4)
where
χt = χ(qt) ≡ qtλ−
1
ψ + (1− qt)e1+
1
ψ (B.5)
186
Similarly, using (2.13) and (B.3) yields:
(1 + ψ)Xt =
[
qtλ(1− (zIt )1+ψ) + (1− qt)(1− (zCt )1+ψ)
]
= µt − χt [ηˆxt]1+
1
ψ (B.6)
where
µt = µ(qt) ≡ qtλ+ (1− qt) (B.7)
Note that µt is the aggregate innovation in period t when all agents are innovators, and
they all succeed in innovation; recall that λC is normalized at one, while λ ≡ λI > 1.
Hence, dµ(q)/dq > 0 from (B.7) with Assumption 1. That is, µt can be interpreted as
the maximum level of the aggregate innovation in society given qt, which gets larger
as the society is more individualistic.
Meanwhile, Xt = Ltxt, and thus, (B.4) implies:
Xt = χt [ηˆxt]
1
ψ xt (B.8)
Then, from (B.6) and (B.8), we obtain:
Xt = X(qt, ρt) =
µ(qt)
1 + ψ + ηˆ(ρt)
(B.9)
In our simple baseline functional specifications, Xt also takes a simple formula; it is
the maximum level of innovations, µ(qt), adjusted by ψ, the elasticity of the success
probability in innovation with respect to the skill, and by ηˆ(ρt), the relative impor-
tance of labor in the production of consumption goods adjusted by the expropriation
risk.
Notably, since dµ(q)/dq > 0 and dηˆ(ρ)/dρ > 0, it immediately follows from
(B.9) that ∂Xt/∂qt < 0 and ∂Xt/∂ρt < 0 with Assumption 1 as expected. Then,
it is also obvious that X, the aggregate innovation in the steady state, is monotone
decreasing in q. Also note that both ∂Xt/∂qt < 0 and ∂Xt/∂ρt < 0 imply that both
direct and indirect effects of institutions on long-term growth are all negative, so that
dX/dρ < 0.
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Now, we solve for ∆(q; ρ). First note that:
Ez
[
cCt+1(z)
]
= zCt ewt +
(1− ρt)pt
1 + ψ
[
1− (zCt )1+ψ
]
= zCt e
η
α
xtpt − (1− ρt)pt
1 + ψ
(zCt )
1+ψ +
(1− ρt)pt
1 + ψ
(B.10)
where, for (B.10), we use wt =
η
α
xtpt from equations (2.7) and (2.8).
Also note that:
zCt e
η
α
xt = ηˆ
1
ψ
t e
1+ 1
ψx
1+ 1
ψ
t
η
α
=
[
η
α(1− ρt)ext
]1+ 1
ψ
(1− ρt)
= (zCt )
1+ψ(1− ρt) (B.11)
where we use (B.3) to obtain (B.11). Then, equations (B.10) and (B.11) yield:
Ez
[
cCt+1(z)
]
=
(1− ρt)pt
1 + ψ
[
ψ(ηˆtext)
1+ 1
ψ + 1
]
(B.12)
using equation (B.3) again. Similarly, we can obtain:
Ez
[
cIt+1(z)
]
=
λ(1− ρt)pt
1 + ψ
[
ψ(ηˆtλ
−1xt)
1+ 1
ψ + 1
]
(B.13)
Then, from (B.12) and (B.13), we have:
Ez
[
cIt+2(z)− cCt+2(z)
]
=
(1− ρt+1)pt+1
1 + ψ
[
(λ− 1)− (e1+ 1ψ − λ− 1ψ )ψ(ηˆt+1xt+1)1+
1
ψ
]
(B.14)
where, from (B.4) and (B.9), innovations per worker xt+1 ≡ Xt+1/Lt+1 is given by:
xt+1 = x(qt+1; ρt+1) =
[
1
ηˆ(ρt+1)
1
ψ (1 + ψ + ηˆ(ρt+1))
µ(qt+1)
χ(qt+1)
] ψ
1+ψ
(B.15)
Hence, the relative value of being an individualist to a collectivist is increasing in λI ≡
λ and decreasing in eC ≡ e with other things being constant, which are intuitively
straightforward. Also, as long as the relative value is positive, it is increasing in the
after-tax price of innovations (1− ρt+1)pt+1. This is simply because an individualist
188
is more productive in innovation, so that he is more inclined to be an innovator.
Finally, we can solve for ∆(q; ρ) as follows:
∆t+1 = ∆(qt+1; ρt+1) =
ασ(1− ρt+1)Lηt+1
1 + ψ
[
(λ− 1)− (e1+ 1ψ − λ− 1ψ )ψ(ηˆt+1xt+1)1+
1
ψ
]
(B.16)
where, from (B.4) and (B.15), Lt+1 is given by:
Lt+1 = L(qt+1; ρt+1) =
[
ηˆ(ρt+1)
1 + ψ + ηˆ(ρt+1)
µ(qt+1)χ(qt+1)
ψ
] 1
1+ψ
(B.17)
To prove that dq¯(ρ)/dρ < 0, first note, from (B.15) and (B.16), that q¯(ρ) solves
the following equation:
µ(q¯(ρ))
χ(q¯(ρ))
=
(λ− 1)(1 + ψ + ηˆ(ρ))
ψηˆ(ρ)(e1+
1
ψ − λ− 1ψ )
≡ ζ(ρ) (B.18)
which yields the following equation:
dζ
dηˆ
=
−ψ(1 + ψ)(λ− 1)(e1+ 1ψ − λ− 1ψ )[
ψηˆ(ρ)(e1+
1
ψ − λ− 1ψ )
]2 < 0 (B.19)
Since dηˆ(ρ)/dρ > 0, (B.18) and (B.19) imply that dζ(ρ)/dρ < 0. Then, given As-
sumption 1, since µ(q) is monotone increasing in q from (B.7) while χ(q) is mono-
tone decreasing in q from (B.5), putting (B.18) together with dζ(ρ)/dρ < 0 yields
dq¯(ρ)/dρ < 0 as expected and already depicted in Figure 2.4 and argued in Example
1. That is, better (worse) protection of property rights induces stronger (weaker)
individualism in the long run, which confirms the negative indirect growth effect of
institutions.
Recall that we have assumed that ∆(q; ρ) is monotone decreasing in q for the
uniqueness of qt+1 given qt and ρt+1. Furthermore, we have also assumed that
∆(0; ρ) > 0 and ∆(1; ρ) < 0 for any given ρ ∈ [0, ρ¯] for the existence of an inte-
rior steady state q¯(ρ). Here, we provide sufficient conditions that guarantee these
assumptions.
Condition for ∂∆(q; ρ)/∂q < 0:
From (B.16), it is straightforward that ∂∆(q; ρ)/∂q < 0 if ∂L(q; ρ)/∂q < 0 and
∂x(q; ρ)/∂q < 0. Also, one can notice from (B.15) that ∂x(q; ρ)/∂q < 0, meaning
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innovations per worker, x ≡ X/L, is monotone decreasing in q. This is simply because
an individualist is more productive in innovation than a collectivist, and in return, a
collectivist has a competitive edge in the production of goods.
For ∂L(q; ρ)/∂q < 0, note first from (B.17) that:
∂L
∂q
< 0⇔
d
[
µ (q)χ (q)ψ
]
dq
< 0⇔ µ′ (q)χ (q) + ψµ (q)χ′ (q) < 0 (B.20)
Since we already knew that µ′ (q) > 0 and χ′ (q) < 0 ∀q ∈ [0, 1] from (B.5) and (B.7),
a sufficient condition that guarantees the inequality in (B.20) is given by:
(λ− 1) χ¯+ ψ
¯
µ
(
λ−
1
ψ + e1+
1
ψ
)
< 0 (B.21)
where χ¯ ≡ maxq∈[0,1] χ (q) = e1+
1
ψ , and
¯
µ ≡ minq∈[0,1] µ (q) = 1. Then, (B.21) is
equivalent with the following inequality:
e >
[
ψ
ψ − (λ− 1)
] ψ
1+ψ
λ−
1
1+ψ ≡ f (ψ) (B.22)
Then, one can easily show that f ′ (ψ) < 0 ∀ψ > ψ¯ where ψ¯ ≡ ψ¯(λ) is a threshold
depending on λ. Also, limψ→∞ f (ψ) = 1 given any λ < ∞. Hence, the inequality
in (B.22) is satisfied when ψ is sufficiently large given any λ since e is assumed
bigger than one. Mathematically, ∆ (q, ρ) is monotone decreasing in q given any
(λ, e) ∈ R2++\ [0, 1]2 as long as ψ is sufficiently large.
Conditions for ∆(0; ρ) > 0 and ∆(1; ρ) < 0:
Since ∆(0; ρ) > 0 and ∆(1; ρ) < 0, by continuity of ∆, ∃q¯ = q¯(ρ) ∈ (0, 1) where
∆(q¯; ρ) = 0 ∀ρ ∈ [0, ρ¯]. From (B.16), ∆(0; ρ) > 0 ∀ρ ∈ [0, ρ¯] if, and only if,
λ− 1 > (e1+ 1ψ − λ− 1ψ )ψ[ηˆ(ρ)x(0; ρ)]1+ 1ψ ∀ρ ∈ [0, ρ¯]
Using (46), we can rewrite this as follows:
(λ− 1)(1 + ψ + ηˆ(ρ))
ψηˆ(ρ)(e1+
1
ψ − λ− 1ψ )
>
µ(0)
χ(0)
∀ρ ∈ [0, ρ¯]
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Then, we have:
η¯(ρ) ≡ 1 + ψ + ηˆ(ρ)
ψηˆ(ρ)
>
1− (λe)− 1ψ e−1
λ− 1 ∀ρ ∈ [0, ρ¯] (B.23)
Since ηˆ′(ρ) > 0, we have η¯′(ρ) < 0, and hence, (B.23) yields the following condition:
η¯(ρ¯) =
1 + ψ + ηˆ(ρ¯)
ψηˆ(ρ¯)
>
1− (λe)− 1ψ e−1
λ− 1 (B.24)
Similarly, ∆(1; ρ) < 0 ∀ρ ∈ [0, ρ¯] if, and only if,
(λe)1+
1
ψ − λ
λ− 1 >
1 + ψ + ηˆ(0)
ψηˆ(0)
= η¯(0) (B.25)
Then, (B.24) and (B.25) are conditions that guarantee ∆(0; ρ) > 0 and ∆(1; ρ) < 0
∀ρ ∈ [0, ρ¯] while assuming ∂∆(q, ρ)/∂ρ < 0.
Finally, combining (B.23)–(B.25) yields the following sufficient conditions guar-
anteeing that ∆(q; ρ) is monotone decreasing in q ∈ [0, 1], and ∆(0; ρ) > 0 and
∆(1; ρ) < 0 ∀ρ ∈ [0, ρ¯] as follows:
Condition 1 Given (α, η), suppose that (ψ, λ, e, ρ¯) ∈ R++× (1,∞)2× (0, 1) satisfies
the following inequalities:
e >
[
ψ
ψ − (λ− 1)
] ψ
1+ψ
λ−
1
1+ψ ,
1 + ψ + ηˆ(ρ¯)
ψηˆ(ρ¯)
>
1− (λe)− 1ψ e−1
λ− 1 ,
(λe)1+
1
ψ − λ
λ− 1 >
1 + ψ + ηˆ(0)
ψηˆ(0)
.
Then, ∂∆(q; ρ)/∂q < 0, ∆(0; ρ) > 0 and ∆(1; ρ) < 0.
Derivation of Xˆ(q, ρ) in Example 2:
The number of innovators, Xˆ(q, ρ), in Example 2 can be easily derived by replac-
ing the skill threshold, zS, in equation (2.26) with the one given by (B.3). We
already solved x(q, ρ), innovations per worker, which is given by (B.15). Since
dηˆ(ρ)/dρ > 0, we can notice that ∂x/∂ρ < 0. Then, it is straightforward to show
that ∂Xˆ(q, ρ)/∂ρ < 0 ∀q ∈ [0, 1]. Recall that we also assumed that Xˆ(q, ρ) takes an
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inverse U-shaped relationship with q, which is supported by the empirical evidence
presented in Appendix B.3. Here, we provide sufficient conditions that guarantee this
assumption.
Conditions for an inverse U-shaped relationship between Xˆ and q:
For convenience, Xˆ given in Example 2 as follows:
Xˆ = 1− ηˆ 1ψϕxˆ
where
ϕ = ϕ(q) = qλ−
1
ψ + (1− q)e 1ψ
xˆ = [x(q)]
1
ψ
and we drop the time subscript for simplicity. Then we have:,
∂Xˆ
∂q
= −ηˆ 1ψϕxˆ [εϕ(q) + εxˆ(q)] (B.26)
where
εϕ(q) =
λ−
1
ψ − e 1ψ
qλ−
1
ψ + (1− q)e 1ψ
(B.27)
εxˆ(q) =
1
1 + ψ
[
λ− 1
qλ+ (1− q) −
λ−
1
ψ − e1+ 1ψ
qλ−
1
ψ + (1− q)e1+ 1ψ
]
(B.28)
Recall that εy(q) is the elasticity of a variable y in q. Notice also that ∂Xˆ(q; ρ)/∂q
is independent of the institutional quality, ρ. From (B.26), ∂Xˆ(q; ρ)/∂q > 0 if, and
only if, εϕ(q) + εxˆ(q) < 0.
We first derive conditions that guarantee εϕ(0) + εxˆ(0) < 0 and εϕ(1) + εxˆ(1) > 0.
If so, Xˆq(0; ρ) > 0 and Xˆq(1; ρ) < 0, so that ∃qˆ ∈ (0, 1) such that Xˆq(qˆ; ρ) = 0 by
the continuity of Xˆq(q; ρ) in q. Then, we provide a condition that guarantees the
uniqueness of such qˆ(ρ) ∀ρ ∈ [0, ρ¯].
First note that εϕ(q) + εxˆ(q) < 0 is equivalent with the following inequality:
f(λ) ≡ (1 + ψ − λ)λ 1ψ > [(1 + ψ)e− 1] e−(1+ 1ψ ) ≡ g(e) (B.29)
Hence, to satisfy the inequality given by (B.29), 1 + ψ > λ should be satisfied since
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1 ?̅?𝑒(𝜆𝜆0;𝜓𝜓) 𝑥𝑥
𝜓𝜓
𝜆𝜆0
𝑔𝑔(𝑥𝑥;𝜓𝜓)
𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥;𝜓𝜓)
𝑓𝑓 𝜆𝜆0 = 𝑔𝑔(?̅?𝑒)
Figure B.8: Graphical Illustration for f(λ0;ψ) > g(e;ψ).
g(e) > 0 ∀e > 1. Now note that:
lim
x→1
f(x) = lim
x→1
g(x) = ψ (B.30)
Meanwhile, from (B.29), we have the following inequalities:
f ′(x) = −(x− 1)(1 + 1
ψ
)x−1+
1
ψ < 0 ∀x > 1 and ∀ψ > 0 (B.31)
g′(x) = −(x− 1)(1 + 1
ψ
)x−2−
1
ψ < 0 ∀x > 1 and ∀ψ > 0 (B.32)
and 0 > g′(x) > f ′(x). Then, we know that g(x) > f(x) ∀x > 1 and ∀ψ > 0. From
(B.30)–(B.32), we can notice that ∃!e¯ > λ such that g(e¯) = f(λ) ∀λ > 1 and ∀ψ > 0;
see Figure B.8 for an example. For the purpose of exposition, we define the function
e¯(λ;ψ) as follows:
g(e¯(λ;ψ);ψ) = f(λ;ψ)
That is:
e¯ = e¯(λ;ψ) = g−1 [f(λ;ψ)] (B.33)
Then, if e > e¯(λ;ψ) > λ for any given (λ, ψ) ∈ (1,∞)×R++, then εϕ(q) + εxˆ(q) < 0,
and thus, Xˆq(0; ρ) > 0.
Second, note that εϕ(1) + εxˆ(1) > 0 is equivalent with:
l(λ) ≡ (1 + ψ − λ−1)λ− 1ψ > [1 + ψ − e] e 1ψ ≡ m(e) (B.34)
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Then,
lim
x→1
l(x) = lim
x→1
m(x) = ψ (B.35)
Similarly, from (B.34), we have:
l′(x) = −(x− 1)(1 + 1
ψ
)x−2−
1
ψ < 0 ∀x > 1 and ∀ψ > 0 (B.36)
m′(x) = −(x− 1)(1 + 1
ψ
)x−1−
1
ψ < 0 ∀x > 1 and ∀ψ > 0 (B.37)
Hence, 0 > l′(x) > m′(x). Then, from (B.35)–(37), we know that l(x) > m(x) ∀x > 1
and ∀ψ > 0. This implies that l(λ) > m(e) if e ≥ λ ∀ψ > 0. That is, it suffices to
have e ≥ λ to guarantee that εϕ(1) + εxˆ(1) > 0, and thus, Xˆq(1; ρ) < 0 ∀ρ ∈ [0, ρ¯].
Since e¯(λ;ψ) > λ, this condition is automatically satisfied once e > e¯(λ;ψ).
Now, we know that Xˆq(0; ρ) > 0 but Xˆq(1; ρ) < 0 if e > e¯(λ;ψ). Then, by
the continuity of Xˆq, ∃q∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that Xˆq(q∗; ρ) = 0. For the uniqueness of
such q∗(ρ) ∈ (0, 1) for each ρ ∈ [0, ρ¯], it suffices to show that Xˆ ′(q; ρ) is monotone
decreasing in q ∈ [0, 1], i.e., Xˆ(q; ρ) is strictly concave in q. To find a condition
for this, note first that Xˆq(q
∗; ρ) = 0 implies εϕ(q∗) + εxˆ(q∗) = 0, and this is also
equivalent with the following equation:
h(q∗) ≡ µ(q
∗)χ(q∗)
ϕ(q∗)
=
λe1+
1
ψ − λ− 1ψ
(1 + ψ)(e
1
ψ − λ 1ψ )
(B.38)
Since the RHS of (B.38) is independent of q, it suffices to find conditions that make
h′(q) is monotone decreasing ∀q ∈ [0, 1]. Note that:
h′(q) =
µ(q)
ϕ(q)
εˆϕ(q)qe
1
ψ (e− 1) + (λ− 1) [1 + σ(q)] (B.39)
where
εˆϕ(q) ≡ −εϕ(q)(1− q)− 1 (B.40)
σ(q) ≡ (1− q)e
1
ψ (e− 1)
ϕ(q)
(B.41)
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Note also that:
max
q∈[0,1]
εˆϕ(q) < −εϕ(1)− 1 < 0 (B.42)
max
q∈[0,1]
µ(q)
ϕ(q)
<
µ(1)
ϕ(1)
(B.43)
max
q∈[0,1]
σ(q) <
e
1
ψ (e− 1)
ϕ(1)
(B.44)
Then, using (B.39)–(B.44), we can prove that the following inequality holds:
max
q∈[0,1]
h′(q) < Ψ(ψ) (B.45)
where
Ψ(ψ;λ, e) ≡ µ(1)
ϕ(1)
[−εϕ(1)− 1] e
1
ψ (e− 1) + (λ− 1)
[
1 +
e
1
ψ (e− 1)
ϕ(1)
]
= (e− 1)λ1+ 1ψ
[
(λe)
1
ψ − 1
]
e
1
ψ + (λ− 1)
[
1 + (λe)
1
ψ (e− 1)
]
(B.46)
One can notice that Ψ(ψ;λ, e) > 0 for ψ = 0 ∀(λ, e) ∈ (1,∞)2 from (B.46). Also, we
know:
Ψ′(ψ) < 0 ∀ψ > 0,fdsjklfdjslkfsjkl (B.47)
lim
ψ→∞
Ψ(ψ;λ, e) = −λ(e− 1) + e(λ− 1) (B.48)
(B.47) and (B.48) imply that ∃!ψˆ > 0 such that Ψ−1(0;λ, e) = ψˆ if −λ(e−1) + e(λ−
1) < 0, i.e., e
λ
< e−1
λ−1 . This condition is equivalent with the condition that e > λ given
λ > 1.10 This condition is automatically satisfied once the condition that e > e¯(λ;ψ)
is satisfied since e¯(λ;ψ) > λ. Hence, provided that ψ > ψˆ, the inequality given
by (B.45) is satisfied, meaning h′(q) < 0 ∀q ∈ [0, 1]. We finally have the following
conditions for the unique existence of q∗ ∈ (0, 1) that guarantees an inverse U-shaped
Xˆ(q; ρ) in q for any ρ ∈ [0, ρ¯]:
Condition 2 Suppose that (ψ, λ, e) ∈ R++ × (1,∞)2 satisfies the following inequali-
10 To see this, let e ≡ kλ where k > 0. Then,
e
λ
<
e− 1
λ− 1 ⇐⇒ k <
kλ− 1
λ− 1 ⇐⇒ kλ− k < kλ− 1,
which holds if, and only if, k > 1, and hence, e > λ.
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ties:
ψ > ψˆ = Ψ−1(0;λ, e),
e > e¯(λ;ψ).
where e¯(λ;ψ) and Ψ(ψ) are given by (B.33) and (B.46), respectively. Then, ∃!q∗ ∈
(0, 1) such that ∂Xˆ(q, ρ)/∂q > 0 ∀q ∈ [0, q∗), while ∂Xˆ(q, ρ)/∂q < 0 ∀q ∈ (q∗, 1].
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B.3 Evidence on Individualism and the Fraction
of Innovators
In the theoretical model, we assume an inverse U-shaped relationship between the
fraction of innovators and the degree of individualism. Although it is theoretically
appealing, considering the general equilibrium effect caused by a change in the relative
price, we provide empirical evidence on this theoretical result.
To verify the inverse U-shaped relationship empirically, we need a reliable dataset
that gives information on the number of innovators in a given country. For this pur-
pose, we can use the Research and Development Statistics (RDS) data provided by
the OECD. The data spans from 1981 to the current date for the OECD countries
and other major economies including Argentina, China, Romania, Russia, Singapore,
Taiwan and South Africa, which are 41 countries in total. The RDS data contains
information on R&D activities such as the number of workers engaged in comprehen-
sive R&D sectors range from natural sciences and engineering to social sciences and
humanities, i.e., the number of researchers in a given nation. We will use the number
of workers in R&D sectors to test if there exists an inverse U-shaped relationship
between the fraction of researchers and individualism.
Prior to conducting the empirical analysis, we need to emphasize that the number
of researchers in the R&D sectors of the RDS data is not the same as the total
number of innovators, Xˆ, in the model. The set of innovators in our model is more
comprehensive since innovation is defined more generally in our theory that it is
any type of ideas that enhances the productivity in the economy, and hence, can be
priced in the market. That is, the total number of innovators in our theory includes
the set of researchers in the R&D sectors as its subset. Although the RDS data is
restrictive in this sense, we will use it by assuming that the number of total innovators
is monotonically increasing in the number of researchers in the R&D sectors in a
country. That is, we regard the number of researchers in the R&D sectors as a proxy
for the total number of innovators in the model.
For the test, we consider the following econometric framework:
yit = α + X
′
itβ + γINDi + δIND
2
i + θDi + ui + εit (B.49)
where i and t index a country and year, respectively. The sample period is 1981–
2011. yit is the fraction of researchers either to the total population or to the total
number of workers employed in a given country. It is natural to think that the fraction
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of researchers yit depends on country-level variables, especially on those related to
development stages. Hence, the controls, Xit, include the institutional quality in
terms of protection of property rights, the total population, the employment rate,
GDP per capita, human capital, and investment and trade to output ratios. INDi
is the Hofstede individualism index normalized by one. Since an inverse U-shaped
relationship is a downward quadratic form, γ needs to be positive, while δ needs to
be negative. We also use continent dummies Di since R&D investments depend on
knowledge diffusion in the form of adoptions and imitations of technologies within a
region. Finally, ui measures country specific random effects, which are time-invariant.
For the statistical assessment of the inverse U-relationship given by (B.49), Lind
and Mehlum (2010) show that the following joint null hypothesis can be used:
H0 : {γ + 2δmin{INDi} ≤ 0} ∪ {γ + 2δmax{INDi} ≥ 0}
against the alternative as follows:
H1 : {γ + 2δmin{INDi} > 0} ∩ {γ + 2δmax{INDi} < 0}
In a word, the null asserts that the slope at the minimum of individualism scores is
weakly negative, but weakly positive at the maximum. This means the function is
monotone or U-shaped, given that it is either concave or convex. On the contrary, the
alternative asserts that the function is inverse U-shaped. To test these hypotheses, we
use the likelihood ratio approach developed by Sasabuchi, Lind and Mehlum (SLM),
which is employed in Arcand et al. (2015).
Using equation (B.49), we conduct panel regressions as our baseline since it is
reasonable to think that there are unobserved (time-invariant) heterogeneities across
groups — countries here —, and the error terms may be autocorrelated within a
group; recall that the RDS data covers a long period of time (30 years). We also
provide estimation results from pooled OLS regressions with clustered standard errors
to corroborate our empirical findings from the panel regressions.
Table B.6 summarizes the estimation results from both the panel and pooled OLS
regressions. As shown in the table, the estimates of γ are consistently positive in all
regressions, while the estimates of δ are consistently negative, providing empirical
evidence supporting the inverse U-shaped relationship in the theory. Also, the SLM
test rejects the null hypothesis, and hence, further confirms our findings. That is,
the estimation results show that both the fractions of researchers in the R&D sectors
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have the inverse U-shaped relationship with the Hofstede individualism index.11 The
table also reports the Fieller estimate for the extremum. The estimates suggest that
the fraction of researchers in the R&D sectors is maximized somewhere between 50
and 80 of the Hofstede individualism index.
11 We also found similar results from the panel and pooled OLS regressions with one-year lagged
explanatory variables and time effects being further controlled although we do not report the results
here; details are available upon request.
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Table B.6: Individualism and the Fraction of Researchers (Panel)
Panel Regressions Pooled OLS Regressions
Dependent variables Researchers
Population
× 100 Researchers
Employed
× 100 Researchers
Population
× 100 Researchers
Employed
× 100
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Individualism 1.680∗∗ 3.404∗∗ 1.135∗∗∗ 2.042∗∗
(.674) (1.546) (.418) (.933)
Individualism2 −1.457∗∗ −2.860∗∗ −1.026∗∗ −1.765∗∗
(.612) (1.377) (.384) (.854)
Institutions .031 .054 .296 .717
(.128) (.294) (.237) (.538)
Population .034 .093∗ −.020 −.036
(.024) (.052) (.018) (.041)
Employment rate (%) .009∗∗∗ .003 .014∗∗∗ .012∗∗
(.004) (.007) (.002) (.005)
GDP per capita .143∗∗ .265∗ .206∗∗∗ .398∗∗∗
(.069) (.153) (.039) (.085)
Human capital .146 .347∗ .027 .093
(.090) (.192) (.072) (.158)
Investment rate (%) −.004 −.008 −.010∗∗∗ −.020∗∗∗
(.003) (.005) (.003) (.006)
Trade rate (%) .001∗ .002∗ −.0005 −.001
(.0005) (.001) (.0003) (.0007)
Obs. 734 734 734 734
Number of groups 37 37 37 37
R2 .530 .400 .663 .571
Slope at min {INDi} 1.185∗∗∗ 2.431∗∗ .786∗∗∗ 1.442∗∗
(.472) (1.090) (.297) (.658)
Slope at max {INDi} −.971∗∗ −1.802∗∗ −.733∗∗ −1.169∗
(.471) (1.037) (.320) (.705)
SLM test (t value) 2.14∗∗ 1.74∗∗ 2.29∗∗ 1.66∗
90% Fieller interval
[50, 72] [50, 84] [45, 70] [48, 75]†for extremum
Note: The dependent variable is the % fraction of researchers in R&D sectors to the total population
or to the total number of workers employed in a given country, which is taken from the RDS. “Individual-
ism” is the Hofstede individualism index, which is normalized at one. “Individualism2” is square value of
“Individualism.” “Institutions” refers to the protection of property rights against expropriation risk by ICRG,
which is normalized by one. “Population” and “GDP per capita” are logged values of the total population and
income per capita, respectively. All the data come from the PWT (Ver. 8.0) except the “Trade rate”, which is
taken from the World Bank dataset. “SLM test (t value)” is the t statistics for testing the inverse U-shaped
relationship suggested by Sasabuchi, Lind and Mehlum. 80% Fieller interval for †. “R2” is the R-square value
for the overall effect for (1) and (2). Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses, which are
clustered by groups for (3) and (4). ***, ** and * and significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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